




WILLIAM F. BYRON





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OUR REVOLUTION

ESSAYS IN INTERPRETATION

BY
VICTOR S. YARROS



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A FAITHFUL LIFE-LONG COMRADE
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THE ESSENCE OF INDEPENDENT RADICALISM: INTRODUCTION

THERE are now a good many radicals in the world who are not "ists"—not State Socialists, not Communists, not Anarchists, not Syndicalists, not Guild Socialists. They are not ashamed to call themselves Opportunists, however, though that does not give them the conventional title of "ists." They are independent radicals, Mugwump radicals. No school or dogma claims them, yet they are in the exact, scientific sense of the term radicals.

What is radicalism, in point of fact? Superficial and confusing definitions one finds everywhere, but few persons seem to know what the touchstone of radicalism is. Yet there is a touchstone. He is a radical who believes that the existing social, economic and political system is wrong and *wrong fundamentally*; that the so-called Liberal reforms and palliatives are not sufficient to set it right, and that profound, far-reaching changes are necessary, desirable and indeed inevitable.

It follows, then, that the radical favors profound changes, welcomes them so far as they are already casting their shadows before them, and endeavors to

facilitate their arrival by interpreting them to the thoughtful elements of the public and by seeking to convince conservatives and moderate Liberals amenable to reason that it is idle and dangerous to resist the stream of social tendency.

Now, the independent radical is not a State Socialist because he distrusts and fears the State, which is in its essence tyrannical and intolerant, and always has been, and must be, unprogressive and inefficient. He is not a State Socialist because he shares most of the ideas concerning the State which the philosophical Anarchists, the Guild Socialists, the Syndicalists, the Single-Taxers and other progressives have long entertained. Glorification of "the State" is to the independent radical repugnant and absurd.

The independent radical is not, however, a philosophical Anarchist either, because that form of radicalism is Utopian and metaphysical, arid and anti-Darwinian. That the State may be abolished at some remote day, is possible. That men and women may learn to dispense with compulsion in their economic and political relations, as they have learned to dispense with compulsion in the spheres of religion and æsthetics, is possible. But such hopes and aspirations have practically no relation to the pressing problems of the day. The independent radical would solve these problems along libertarian lines, though he realizes the necessity—nay the

wisdom—of making substantial concessions to what is called the Socialistic spirit and trend of the time. The independent radical, though individualistic in his philosophy, perceives that it is foolish, idle and reactionary to oppose—for example—child labor laws, shorter workday laws, social insurance, old-age pensions, insurance against unemployment, and the like. He sees that to oppose such ameliorative measures is to give aid and comfort to toryism, to alienate labor and its middle-class sympathizers, and to retard the reform process. He realizes that so long as the State exists, and is being used by social groups with power enough to shape and influence legislation, it is utterly irrational to expect that labor and the humanitarians will be induced, this side of the millennium, to ignore the State or refrain from utilizing its machinery and authority. In short, he knows that life obeys no dogmatic formula, and that progress is a resultant of many forces and factors.

The independent radical is not a Syndicalist, because Syndicalism is an extremely nebulous affair, as Prof. Bertrand Russel has pointed out, that fails to protect the interests of the consumers, of the public, or to provide for any form of systematic co-operation among the autonomous syndicates or communes. The Syndicalists have never thought out or worked out their vague and attractive ideas.

They have served a most useful purpose in helping to undermine and discredit orthodox, rigid, bureaucratic socialism. They have made a profound impression on many Socialist writers and leaders, even though the latter would stoutly deny this. But negative service is not positive. The Syndicalists are like the Communist Anarchists—they know what they do *not* want, but have few definite and constructive ideas.

The Guild Socialists see the weaknesses of Syndicalism and have made an effort to escape them in their own scheme. Bertrand Russell, in particular, has given us an attractive enough scheme of modified Guild Socialism in his "Proposed Roads to Freedom" and in his "Political Ideals." Still, it cannot be pretended that Guild Socialism offers a permanent home to those independent radicals who have little faith in paper plans, and who prefer to apply first principles to problems and situations as they arise. Why, indeed, commit one's self to a nebulous scheme that, if ever realized at all, will undoubtedly undergo a hundred further modifications? What advantage is there in identifying one's self with an "ism" that one does not expect to carry out, or even adequately try on a small scale? It is most important to know one's goal or objective; it is important to have criteria and tests; it is important to know whither one is going, where to stop if it be necessary to retrace one's steps, and how to

get back to the true line of march. But a dogmatic, rigid "ism" is a hindrance, not a help, in all these respects.

The independent radical knows, as has been said, that he is not a State-ist. He also knows that though he is a good, practical democrat, he has no reverence for "the masses," and no love for that abstraction, "humanity." He wants justice, equal opportunity and equal liberty. He hates iniquitous special privileges. He condemns a régime that is supposed to be free and genuinely competitive and that is in fact full of monopoly and artificial, law-supported inequalities. He recognizes that justice needs to be supplemented with what Herbert Spencer calls negative and positive beneficence, but he insists that justice is fundamental and primary.

Translated into concrete, specific propositions, the creed of the independent radical may be summed up thus:

Free access to natural opportunities, with occupancy and use as the only title to land in the broad sense of the term.

Free banking and co-operative credit, with a fair and stable standard of value—preferably the Multiple Standard.

Free trade in the fullest sense of the phrase.

Voluntary co-operation in industry on the widest scale, with democracy in the management of corporations and firms not co-operative in character.

Service at cost as the only basis for public utilities, with but a moderate return to the capital invested, and with Trustee management.

Proportional representation, the referendum, the initiative and the recall.

Second or revising chambers, where advisable at all, constructed on the lines of the Russian soviet, with safeguards against the frauds and abuses that have so far characterized the so-called Soviet system.

These and other planks of the platform of the growing host of independent radicals are expounded and defended in the several essays included in the present volume. Elaboration here would involve repetition, which the author has sought to avoid.

All the papers in this volume, with but one or two exceptions, have appeared in one or another of the following Reviews:

The American Journal of Sociology.

The International Journal of Ethics.

The Open Court.

The Public.

The Nation.

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OUR REVOLUTION
ESSAYS IN INTERPRETATION

OUR REVOLUTION

MAKING READY FOR THE NEW DAY

WHAT do enlightened and advanced liberals mean by "social reconstruction" after the war? What changes would they order if power were placed in their hands? In Great Britain, as we know, an extraordinary programme of social reconstruction has been put forth in the name of the Labor party. While this programme is said to have been prepared by a distinguished middle-class Fabian leader, it embodies, without doubt, an honest and in the main a successful attempt to voice the aspirations and ideas of organized labor in England, Scotland, and Wales. We know also that hosts of British middle-class liberals and radicals accept it as a sort of modern democratic Magna Charta. This programme is distinctly, unmistakably socialistic. We may like it or dislike it, but we cannot seriously pretend to entertain any doubt regarding its nature, meaning, and informing principle. It calls for the nationalization of railways, mines, shipping, and electric-power plants. It demands the gradual nationalization of land. It favors the strict control and regulation of all important industries that may be left, for the present, in private hands. It de-

mands the establishment by law of a national universal minimum standard of living and, necessarily, of minimum wage schedules. It demands such drastic rates of income and inheritance taxation as shall result in diverting the "national surplus" into the national treasury.

Let us turn to the United States. What does "social reconstruction" mean to Americans who are not orthodox socialists or single taxers? President Wilson, in his famous letter to the Democrats of New Jersey, earnestly bade us make ready for the birth of a new day, "a day of greater opportunity and greater prosperity for the average mass of struggling men and women." What is the bearing of this generality on our land problem, our foreign trade and tariff problem, our banking and currency problem, our corporation and labor problem? Restrictive laws, national and State, in certain directions may be necessary and advisable. Doctrinaire opposition to "over-legislation" is idle and perhaps even unsound. We may, without treason to liberty, to a higher individualism, demand and support laws against child labor and woman's excessive toil. We may favor pension and insurance legislation, even minimum-wage legislation. These things, however, are superficial. They will not bring "greater opportunity and greater prosperity to the mass of struggling men and women." What will? What are we really driving at? What, to repeat, would we

propose and do if we, advanced liberals and non-Socialist radicals; we, the discontented and politically unattached or half-attached; we, the seekers of new and more genuine alliances—what would we do if we had the opportunity and the power?

To us the British labor programme of reconstruction comes as a challenge to translate into concrete terms the vague words that are often on the lips as we look forward to the end of the war. Modestly, then, and only for the purpose of stimulating discussion, I submit the following:

1. The land should belong to those who cultivate it. Hence land monopoly and holding of land out of legitimate economic use should be opposed and prevented in every suitable way—by high taxation of uncultivated land, by restricting, if necessary, individual ownership of land to a certain acreage, to be determined by local conditions, and by encouraging the reclamation and improvement of waste land by settlers through co-operative credit agencies and a minimum amount of Government aid and supervision.

2. Trade and commerce should be free, and customs barriers levelled down. Protection should be gradually but steadily abolished, and moderate tariff duties levied for revenue only, pending a thorough revision of our whole system of taxation.

3. Natural resources should be conserved for the benefit of the people, or utilized and developed for

the benefit of the whole people under certain regulations and conditions—only a fair return to invested capital being allowed and the right of “recapture” being properly safeguarded.

4. Credit should be further democratized, and facilities for issuing circulating notes, on the one hand, and bonds secured by land, improvements, or equipment and stocks of insured goods, on the other, should be further extended along the respective lines of the Federal Reserve Act and the Farm Loan Act, Government aid and control always being kept at the minimum compatible, at any given time, with the maximum of efficiency in realizing the ends in view—cheap credit and low rates of interest on borrowed capital.

5. In justice to debtors and creditors alike, the multiple standard of value, as advocated by scientific economists and approved in principle by practical financiers, should be substituted, after a necessary campaign of education, for the metallic standard—now gold—and the recurrent evils of contraction and inflation of the currency, so detrimental to industry and labor, should thus be eliminated.

6. Direct taxation should be substituted for indirect in the interest of economy and governmental responsibility, and the principle of “ability to pay” explicitly recognized in all tax and revenue legislation.

7. The working masses, skilled and unskilled,

should be thoroughly organized, collective bargaining with employers instituted and pushed, and adequate machinery for the arbitration and adjustment of industrial disputes established—legislation along the lines of the limited Canadian law for compulsory investigation and temporary postponement of threatened strikes or lockouts to be part of such machinery, for the most part voluntary.

8. The capitalistic or wage system should be gradually and consciously replaced by co-operative control and management of industry and commerce. The wage system is incompatible with real freedom and dignity of labor and cannot, at the best, yield harmony between employers and employed. Without harmony and good will, efficiency is impossible. Hence, co-operation in production, distribution, and exchange should be encouraged in every possible way, profit-sharing arrangements being employed to pave the way to complete co-operation. Also, the investment by workmen and clerks in the securities of the corporations or firms employing them should be encouraged in every feasible way, and representation should be given on directorates to the labor force. Employers should appreciate the wisdom and necessity of "peopleizing" industry and giving labor a direct, substantial stake in it.

9. There should be representation of the Government, or of the people, on the directorates of all public utility corporations, with full publicity for

all their operations, supervision of their financing, accounting, and bookkeeping, and other applications of the fundamental principle that beneficiaries of franchises or any special privileges whatever are subject to definite public control because the public is one of the interests vitally concerned in the soundness, honesty, and efficiency of such corporations.

10. Vocational and industrial training, in addition to a certain minimum of general or liberal education, should be provided for all who need it.

11. There should be drastic simplification and rationalization of legal procedure, elimination of technicalities and fictions therefrom, and the free administration of justice for poor litigants or claimants.

12. Proportional representation should be established in every legislative assembly, national, State and local.

13. Provision should be made for the employment of the referendum and initiative.

14. The power of the judiciary to annul legislation should be limited so as to render four-to-three or five-to-four decisions in important cases impossible.

A perusal of the foregoing programme will show that most of the planks are economic and social and only a few political. The latter are mere means

to the larger ends in view. The paramount object is to lessen parasitism, eradicate monopoly and anti-social privilege, and insure to labor a just return, independence and dignity. Certain concessions, even liberal ones, are made to what may be called paternalism. The dogmatic and metaphysical individualists of an earlier time would have regarded such concessions as fatal and treasonable, but no enlightened champion of the "new freedom" is likely to commit the error of solving intensely practical and perplexing problems according to a precise *a priori* formula. If government is compromise, so is reform, so is progress. However, concessions to the spirit of the age, to situations and conditions that will change very slowly, if at all, are far from being tantamount to surrendering the main position. The foregoing programme is essentially individualistic. It is based on the idea that opportunity is still "the other name" for America, and that the opening up, or the reopening, of opportunities, with voluntary co-operation and healthy initiative in a fair and free field, would solve our problems and remedy our social and industrial ills. Legislation and political action will be necessary, but much will have to be done by employers, labor, and the neutral elements outside of politics. If there are other alternative programmes that yet meet the test of President Wilson's chal-

lenge or summons, let them be produced for sympathetic examination and fruitful discussion. Only thus can we fashion a programme which will fit the needs of to-morrow.

THE COMING INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY

IN a paper entitled "Representation and Leadership in Democracy," in the *American Journal of Sociology*, the present writer incidentally touched upon the momentous question of industrial democracy versus industrial autocracy or industrial oligarchy. The only point made in that connection was this, that certain questions that are often treated as purely political—such, for example as the question of making representative government truly and fully representative, or of giving the masses of toilers the weight and influence in government to which their numbers and importance entitle them—are really at bottom social and economic questions, since a degraded, morally corrupt, and ignorant class cannot be expected to value integrity, intelligence, and fidelity in elected representatives of the people, or to know how to utilize democratic election machinery to their actual and ultimate benefit. In other words, the point was that economic and social injustice sooner or later reduces political democracy to a hollow mockery and empty form, and that in order to eradicate such notorious evils as corrupt control of legislation, class legislation, insidious bribery, spoils

politics, and waste of public assets, we must gradually remove certain kinds of economic injustice.

That paper brought the writer a spirited letter of admonition and comment from an alert, keen, and thoughtful employer of labor who is not an apologist for the present social economic order, but who yet fears that vague talk about industrial democracy may cause more harm than good. The letter is doubtless typical and symptomatic; many employers who would energetically protest against any reflection on their liberalism and progressivism undoubtedly share the sentiments so candidly expressed therein. So do many influential editors. We have permission to reproduce the letter in its entirety, while the opportunity of considering and meeting the points it raises is not welcome.

The letter is as follows:

With interest I have read your article on "Representation and Leadership in Democracies" and think that you have stated a number of pertinent truths well.

I am a manufacturer and take exception to your statements regarding the democratization of industry, not that this is not desirable, but I believe you and your friends, who for years have been talking about these matters, are on a very dangerous subject that will complicate matters very seriously in the future.

As I wrote Dr. Lyman Abbott years ago, if you want to democratize labor, why do you not start

right in your own family, making the cook, treasurer, and the butler, secretary, and submit all questions of matters pertaining to the household to this council. If you first make a success of this, no doubt the industries will follow.

Success in business is at all times dependent on "eternal vigilance." You have to buy and sell at the right time and produce your material of the right grade and at the right price. It takes practically a genius in these lines to be a successful leader and without that a business goes to smash.

While from the theoretical point, it undoubtedly would be lovely to have a set of artisans that are clever, industrious, honest, and capable of giving counsel, and submit the whole matter to them—of course under able leadership from above—yet under present conditions, the results would not be any better than those achieved from the low-grade wards, unless you could pick out an especially efficient, sober, and industrious class of workmen, much above the average. This, of course, is impossible to do as a general rule, as you must employ the average run of laborers offered.

Talking about business over-charging and so on, is, of course, not altogether nonsense, but the business cannot exist on a margin of 5 per cent profit. Now, just before the war, we built a new plant that was intended to work up rock imported from Germany. This plant was hardly in good working order before the importations were stopped—fifteen or twenty thousand dollars thrown into the gutter. Next we had to buy mines down in Georgia and start producing material there. We were very fortunate in

getting a good deposit, but now the ore is pinching and from all indications, we will have to move all of our machinery, etc., to Tennessee and there build railroads, etc., to handle this proposition. As far as I can see, we will have to make an investment of about seventy-five thousand dollars, and we will never know the quantity or quality of this ore, until we are through working it. These are just minor things that just come up, and come up every day.

Supposing we had a system of democratized industry with minimum wages, minimum hours, and maximum leisure, and we at the same time had to compete, not alone in the home market with other manufacturers, but with the foreign market—for, of course, we have to have free trade, fraternity, and equality the world around—and the Germans with their abundance of natural raw material in our line and expert chemists and low wages, are very formidable competitors, and what about the Japs coming in and the Chinese with a daily wage of ten cents? I think the difficulties before us will be enough as it is without getting us into a fix that democratized industry would unquestionably lead us to.

This is a beautiful thought, but if this dream shall be realized, we must stop the emigration of all but the highest grade of people and few of them. We must improve our home stock, doing away with the large increase that under present conditions is produced by our low-grade people.

Now, all of these advices, I admit, are pretty hard to follow, but believe me, they must be considered before you can introduce "democratized industry." While it may be a very good catchword on the plat-

forms for Progressive leaders, Socialists, and anarchists—I do not use these words to designate low-grade people, but the theorists and individuals who really hope to improve the conditions of humanity—all of these things are goals that we may try to reach in some distant future, but they are not within the practical reach of society today.

Kindly excuse my writing on this subject to you, but the fact is that these matters are of very great importance, and it is of very great importance, too, that our leaders treat them seriously; and it is in the hopes of gaining a new convert for the sane treatment of social improvement with special reference to democratized industries, that I am writing you.

Respectfully yours,

S. H. KREBS.

P.S.—It may interest you to know that I, myself, thirty-five years ago was a Scandinavian emigrant, landing on these shores without means and without any pull whatever, managing to rise, I suppose, to what you might call the top of the heap. I am president and principal stockholder of the Krebs Pigment & Chemical Co.

Before attempting to answer this stimulating communication, it is perhaps not impertinent to point out that some employers of labor, captains of industry, capitalists, or men of big affairs—whatever we may call them—have latterly spoken or written in a very different tone. Mr. Charles M. Schwab, the head of the greatest steel plant in the world, created

an international sensation by telling a school alumni audience that a new social order is coming; that "this social order may mean great hardship to those who control property but, perhaps, in the end it will work for the good of us all." "The man who labors with his hands, who does not possess property," continued Mr. Schwab, "is the one who is going to dominate the affairs of this world." And he concluded with the more reassuring reflection that the transformation of the social and economic order "will be so gradual that we will hardly realize that it has occurred."

Now, Mr. Schwab is neither a sentimentalist nor an academic, doctrinaire radical. He does not wish to give away his wealth, he frankly says, nor to surrender his economic power. He merely perceives that certain changes are inevitable, and, indeed, already taking place, and he feels that it is his duty, or the part of sagacity and common sense, at any rate, not angrily and passionately to oppose, but to meet, instruct, and discuss matters with those who are more radical, or less fortunate, or less rational than himself.

But is Mr. Schwab a good prophet? Is he able to see things as they are? Well, the familiar tendencies and developments of our day would seem to answer these questions beyond peradventure. Mr. Schwab speaks of Socialism, of Russian Bolshevism—which is merely intransigent and international socialism temporarily in the saddle—of Syndicalism,

of the growing influence of labor unions and other radical forces. He has heard of the Non-Partisan League. He knows what the Labor party has achieved in England, in Australia, in New Zealand, in the United States even, where it is not as yet acting independently in national or state politics, but only applying pressure to the great historic parties and forcing them to make concessions in various directions and just beginning to make itself felt in municipal politics.

Can any sober-minded, studious observer assert that all these signs and portents signify little, and that the practical, hard-headed man of affairs, the "realist" in business or government, may calmly ignore them or treat them as of no consequence? Can any thoughtful person who is at all conversant with political and industrial history, or with the doctrine and facts of evolution, assert that the existing social order is immutable and attack-proof?

Hardly. Of course, the shallow, the ignorant, the intellectually indolent and the narrowly selfish, who think only of the present, may be left out of consideration. Profitable argument is possible only with the earnest, the open-minded, the intelligent conservatives and beneficiaries of the present régime.

Among these, no doubt, there are many who think that the present order is sound and just in the main, and that only certain so-called progressive-conservative reforms are either desirable or possible. Does

Mr. Krebs belong to this category? Is he of the opinion that *no* radical reforms, such as are implied in or suggested by the vague phrase "industrial democracy," are necessary or practicable? Is he one of those who think that better elementary and vocational training, industrial insurance, a shorter work-day, and like measures will solve the social problem and do away with the dangers that beset us? Does he think that benevolence and condescension on the part of employers will satisfy labor? Does he think that strikes, friction, bitterness, class feeling, and the terrific economic waste that attends these phenomena, can be abolished by a few palliatives? How does he propose, if he condemns truly but constructively radical reforms, to combat the destructive, extreme notions that are making headway everywhere? Would he rely on force, on bayonets, martial law, and the machinery of coercion and repression generally? Does he hold that might can permanently suppress right?

We must assume that he believes nothing of the sort, and that the real question with him is, *What is right?*

Our answer is, righteousness and justice in industry and economic relation generally now mean and enjoin, and will gradually bring about, "industrial democracy." Our answer is, there is no use in preaching, crying, or thundering industrial peace where there is no peace.

And why is there no peace? Because labor feels that it is still largely at the mercy of capital; that it must agitate, threaten, strike, and even riot to obtain the most moderate concessions; that it does not obtain its just share of the total product and never will obtain it under industrial autocracy; that the interests of the employers and the employed, instead of being regarded as identical, are in fact diametrically opposed; that it is no more reasonable to expect economic justice to be handed down from above than it was to expect political justice to be so handed down by an upper class. The masses are now politically enfranchised and have a voice in deciding national and international affairs. They are demanding economic enfranchisement, a voice in the management and control of industry and trade. If, they are asking, production is impossible without labor, why should capital, the other indispensable human factor, alone control industry?

The present system must make way—gradually, as Mr. Schwab says, but make way—for a coöperative system, a system under which labor is a partner in industry, shares the profits of industry, has a voice in determining industrial policies, helps decide all questions that bear on wages, hours, working conditions. Labor is often unconscious of its own goal, but coöperative, democratic control of industry is *undoubtedly that goal*. To have peace, the whole industrial atmosphere must be changed. On every

business directorate labor should have representation. The rule of reason and equity should replace the rule of brute force in the settlement of industrial questions. Industry must be "peopleized" both with respect to returns, dividends and interest, and with respect to management.

Is this too Utopian an ideal? Is Mr. Krebs right in warning us of the mischief that lurks in encouraging or spreading such ideas? The ideal is not Utopian. On the contrary, it is intensely practical. *No other permanent solution of the social problem is discernible.* The mischief makers are those who frown upon wholesome discussion, and who virtually tell labor that it must always remain economically subject, dependent, enslaved.

But surely industrial democracy is a most difficult system to establish and operate. Yes, in truth, terribly difficult. It will require decades, perhaps centuries, to effect the complete transformation. Only the ignorant and the fanatical Bolsheviki imagine that a decree or two by a group of socialist dictators will suffice to solve the social problem. The extremists are responsible for much friction and bad temper, but let us not forget that there are extremists among the conservatives as well as among the radicals.

The sane, the reasonable elements in society should never fail to recognize the obstacles and difficulties that stand in the way of industrial democracy. Mr.

Krebs is entirely right in all that he says about the part played by constructive ability, organizing capacity, courage, foresight, insight, patience, in modern industry. The function of the true captain of industry is of great and growing importance. Such a captain needs freedom of action and is entitled to ample reward. Any coöperative system that should fail to provide for freedom and adequate reward to the real managers, the directing heads, the discoverers of new opportunities, the originators of policies adapted to changing conditions would speedily collapse. Instead of creating abundance, such a system would create scarcity and uncertainty. Workers who have not learned to trust leaders, to submit to discipline, to make democracy safe by conferring necessary power and responsibility on the competent and fit, would make a mess of any democratized industry. But how are the workers to learn self-restraint and discipline under autocratic industry? They will learn chiefly by doing, by practicing, by trial and error. Humanity can be sent to no other school than that of experience. The wise men are here to give warning, to set examples, but, after all, we get our education by living, suffering, enjoying, profiting by experience.

It is our duty and our privilege to promote industrial democracy in all proper, expedient ways. Trade unions should turn their thought to the question of coöperative production and coöperative distribution.

They are demanding justice, but they are not doing all that they can to advance and establish industrial justice. They think too much of immediate questions and not enough about the future of industry and labor. Why should not American trade unions, or industrial unions, assume entrepreneur functions? Why should they not compete with private contractors? Why should they not start, on a modest scale, coöperative factories? One such factory, if successful, would be worth a thousand strikes from the point of view of ultimate economic justice and order. In primitive Russia there are thousands of *Artiels*, coöperative organizations of peasants and laborers. If American labor wants democratic industry, it should proceed to give society object lessons in democratic or coöperative industry. We may be sure that before long it will do this instead of contenting itself with negative methods. In the Old World coöperation has grown steadily and has been successful in many ways.

Employers of intelligence and right feeling can and should play an active part in democratizing industry. Profit-sharing is a step in the right direction. The sale of stock on the installment plan to employees, with the logical corollary, the election of representatives of the employees as directors, is another and even more important step. The creation of permanent arbitration boards to settle and prevent disputes is another step.

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In short, if we realize that industrial democracy is inevitable and right, we shall find a hundred different ways of facilitating its advent and making the process peaceful and evolutionary.

Occasionally some financial or corporate organ publishes with every evidence of satisfaction figures that tend to prove the steady and even rapid growth of small "owners" of our industrial properties. We are told that not small groups of magnates, but tens of thousands of small investors own the Pennsylvania Railroad, or the New York Central, or even a great industrial property. The moral usually drawn is that legislators and executive officials should beware, in their assaults on "plutocracy," of injuring industrial democracy. There is some sense and force in such admonitions. But if industry is actually becoming "peopleized" and democratized by means of investment in corporate stocks and bonds, and if this tendency is beneficial and deserving of every encouragement, does it not clearly follow that the *control and management* of industry should be democratized also, as far as possible? Are the millions of small investors to be used and led, or driven, by a few speculators or autocrats? Are the small investors to vote blindly for "proxies" and ask no questions so long as they get their dividend checks? And what if the dividends are "passed"? What can the small, scattered, unorganized investors and bondholders do to protect their interests, to prevent fren-

zied finance, gambling, waste, and spoliation? Restrictive legislation alone will not give them adequate protection. Publicity, democratic control, directorates of a new type, will be found increasingly necessary to this end. The very persons who decry foolish and demagogical legislation that hampers enterprise often make such legislation inevitable by opposing publicity and democratic control of industry! If small investors cannot protect themselves, the state will have to protect them, and state protection may or may not be intelligent. The "let alone" policy has become impossible. If we are to have neither autocracy nor anarchy in industry; if we are to escape reactionary bourbonism and hate-inspired, wild Bolshevism alike, we must find a golden mean, and we can find it in industrial democracy.

To repeat, the difficulties and obstacles in the way are innumerable and enormous.¹ But what great change in history was easy? The obstacles will have

¹ Mr. Krebs' reference to democratization of the kitchen and servants' quarters is not very happy. Domestic service presents serious problems, but they are different from those under discussion. The taint of servitude, of personal or social inferiority, is what renders domestic service so deservedly unpopular. The first step toward the solution of the "servant problem" is to elevate the servant to the rank of an independent wage-earner. The wage-worker is not a "servant," even if the law still calls him that; he is the equal of his employer. He is backed by powerful unions; he has learned to insist on collective bargaining; he enters into agreements with employers and even compels the latter to submit to arbitration. None of these things can be predicated of the domestic servant. It is mere common sense, then, to try industrial democracy where the conditions are most, not least, favorable, where the parties meet

to be surmounted, the knots unraveled, the difficulties removed, one by one. There is no choice but to peg away, to labor and try, to summon all our tolerance and sympathy to the task.

on a plane of equality and already have "done business" with each other in a dignified, manly fashion. The kitchen will be the last, not the first, to be democratized, and that fact is in no sense an argument against the practicability of coöperation as a substitute for industrial autocracy.

SOCIALISM AND INDIVIDUALISM IN EVOLUTION

IN the rise, decline and fall, or radical modification, of systems of thought we no longer find anything astonishing. In a world of change thought naturally evolves along with everything else. But, while general statements of this sort command universal concurrence, few are in truth prepared for certain concrete exemplifications of the doctrine expressed in them. The average person cannot readily believe, for instance, that the Socialism of today is a very different thing from the Socialism of 1890, or 1900, or even 1910. He is apt to assume that Socialism is a fixed, stereotyped body of ideas and propositions, and that it cannot undergo any material change without ceasing to be Socialism. Similarly, the average person thinks Individualism is what it was in the days of Bright, Cobden, Manchesterism, or, at any rate, of Herbert Spencer and the British Liberty and Property Defence League. Assure him that Socialism and Individualism have both "marched," evolved, taken on protective coloring and adapted themselves to the requirements of the new era, and he will either venture to doubt the af-

firmation or else conclude inwardly that the alleged changes are apparent rather than real, shadowy and negligible rather than substantial.

Even the serious reader and student occasionally pauses to wonder at the nature and quality of the differences that he finds between the Socialism or the Individualism of today and the same schools or bodies of doctrine as he knew them a quarter of a century ago.

The Socialism of Edward Bellamy, of Laurence Gronlund, of Hyndman, of Bebel and other followers of Marx and Engels was distinctly rigid, mechanical, artificial. When a William Morris insisted on a certain elasticity in the arrangements of the Socialistic order, he was dubbed a dreamer and Utopian. The radical who could not swallow the orthodox Socialist creed was usually driven to become an Anarchist-Communist of the Bakounin or Kropotkin type.

On the other hand, the Individualist of that period never thought of compromising with Socialism. He condemned the whole Socialist movement as reactionary, non-evolutional, unscientific and dangerous.

What is the situation today as between Socialism and Individualism? And what is the situation in each of these camps?

Let us consider a few symptomatic developments.

A few months ago there appeared in an English translation a little book entitled "Socialism versus

the State." It was written before the world war, but the activities of the "state"—of the governments—during the war only served to confirm the author's conclusions. Yet he is a leading European socialist, Mr. Emile Vandervelde, a Belgian writer of note and now a minister of state.

The thesis of the book is, in substance, that Socialism should not be confused with Statism; that the extension of the power and sphere of the State, as exemplified by the nationalization of railroads and other utilities, or by the creation of government monopolies, is detrimental, not beneficial, reactionary, not progressive, unless it is accompanied by corresponding changes in the political organization of the State and in the social organization of the industries taken over and "statitized."

Mr. Vandervelde maintains that Socialism is the opposite of Statism. The latter, he says, is founded on authority, on the government of men by men, on force and tyranny. Statism is inseparable from autocracy and bureaucracy, and never can be democratic. There is no such thing as a free State. The State's authority must be restricted, not enlarged, and in the future the State will disappear entirely. Socialism will gradually undermine the State and make it unnecessary and undesirable. Socialism is "founded on the management, the administration of things," and is essentially "the organization of social

labor by the workers, grouped in public associations."

Now, all these phrases have a Syndicalist, rather than a Socialistic, sound, but, whatever the Socialist casuists may say, the fact is that contemporary Socialism has been profoundly influenced by Syndicalist criticism and thought and has been compelled to borrow rather generously from the stock of Syndicalist ideas. But let us pass over this particular phenomenon, interesting and piquant as it is. Let us ask how Vandervelde proposes to safeguard what he calls Socialism and keep it democratic, free, vital.

It cannot be said that his answer is clear, candid or satisfactory. He repeatedly draws a distinction between the democratic State and the Socialist régime or system. He tells us that there are various ways and means of separating the State as the organ of authority, the embodiment of force, from the State as the organ of management or administration. The democratic State can give a certain degree of autonomy to a department or bureau that operates a public utility. Or it is possible to create a public corporation "not for profit," appoint trustees to manage it in the interest of the whole community, and give them sufficient power to manage the corporation on sound business principles, rather than as an adjunct of the central governmental machine. Such a corporation would have no "police power" and its

trustees would be likely to retain the methods of private industry.

This is true and important—to a democratic State or municipality that wishes to get rid of an anti-social monopoly without exposing itself to the evils of an anti-social bureaucracy. But what has it to do with Socialism? Would a Socialistic régime create such quasi-independent corporations and permit them to borrow their methods from private industry? If not, then we are entitled to know from the reformed Socialist school what methods they propose and what manner and form of industrial organization they favor.

Mr. Vandervelde, "further answering," points out, however, that today the State is the instrument of the ruling classes; that the conquest of political power by the proletariat is to be followed by "the transformation of society into a great economic co-operative by the socialization of the means of production," and, hence, that the fusion of now hostile classes into one class will make disinterested public service possible for the first time in the history of civilization.

So far so good. A militant, enlightened proletariat will first conquer political power, socialize capital and industry, pension off or otherwise dispose of the private capitalists and proprietors, and abolish all class distinctions. The land, factories, warehouses, shops, transportation systems, etc., will

be declared the common property of the community. Then—what? How will this railroad, this factory, this bank, that great store, be managed and operated? By bureaucrats? By men appointed by some minister or president? No, explains Vandervelde. The French *Parti Ouvrier*, he tells us with satisfaction, has adopted this article:

Operation of state factories to be entrusted to the laborers who work in them.

“Can anything be more democratic and less statist?” asks M. Vandervelde. No elections by outsiders; no appointments by bureaucrats; the workers of each factory will form a council, elect directors and managers, adopt rules and regulations, and then go to work under these rules and regulations. Perhaps the regulations will be unwise at first, but the opportunity to change and correct them will always be present. At any rate, the workers will know that they themselves are the court of ultimate appeal, and that the managers are their agents and representatives, not their masters.

It must be admitted at once that this picture of a democratized factory is strikingly different from the picture usually painted by the critics of Socialism. The alleged vicious element of Statism, of bureaucracy, is certainly eliminated.

Unfortunately, neither Vandervelde nor any other of the neo-Socialists—if one may call them by that name—has yet cared to put and answer the following

question (which cannot have wholly escaped them):

“What is to be the relation of the autonomous group of workers in the democratized factory to the rest of the community—to other workers, engaged in producing other goods, and to farmers, to merchants and to the professional elements? Are the various groups of workers to be free to follow their own judgment, to fix prices, hours of labor, and so on, as they may see fit, or are they to be controlled in a measure by some other body—perhaps a legislature elected by the whole community, or a central Soviet?”

Mr. Bertrand Russell, a social radical who leans toward what he, with others, calls Guild Socialism, or a modified Syndicalism, but who has vigorously and straightforwardly criticised all orthodox forms of Socialism, stresses this important point in his recent writings. He is right, of course, in asserting that complete autonomy or independence of groups of workers spells Anarchism, or Syndicalism, not Socialism in any familiar sense. The Socialist must emphasize and provide for the interests and needs of the society as a whole, as well as for the rights and liberties of the various social groups. It is highly probable that the neo-Socialists, when they face the difficulty candidly, will adopt the solution of the Guild Socialists, which is thus roughly indicated by Mr. Russell in his stimulating and timely, though

not in the least original, little book on "Proposed Roads to Freedom":

Every industry will be self-governing as regards all its internal affairs, and even separate factories will decide for themselves all questions that only concern those who work in them. . . . Relations between different groups of producers will be settled by the Guild Congress, matters concerning the community as the inhabitants of a certain area will continue to be decided by parliament, while all disputes between parliament and the Guild Congress will be decided by a body composed of representatives of both in equal numbers.

Add to this machinery—as American, Swiss, Australian and Canadian Socialists undoubtedly would add—some provisions for the referendum and the initiative, and we have a fairly democratic and flexible scheme of administration. We have a scheme that an orthodox Marxian Socialist would hardly recognize as the object of his contemplation and planning. We are far indeed from the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, from Economic Materialism, from the characteristic sneers at "bourgeois" solicitude for minority and individual rights! We are almost equally far from Fabian glorification of Efficiency, of the government of experts, of the scientifically organized State. The individual has come into his own once more. The principle of personal liberty, of

spontaneity or voluntarism, so long derided and scorned, is again acknowledged as paramount. Few Socialists, one fancies, would today take exception to the following dicta of Bertrand Russell:

The glorification of the State, and the doctrine that it is the duty of every one to serve the State, are radically against progress and against liberty. The State, though at present a source of much evil, is also a means to certain good things, and will be needed so long as violent and destructive impulses remain common. But it is merely a means, and a means which needs to be very carefully and sparingly used if it is not to do more harm than good. It is not the State, but the community, the world-wide community, of all human beings present and future, that we ought to serve. And a good community does not spring from the glory of the State, but the unfettered development of individuals. . . . It is the individual in whom all that is good must be realized, and the growth of the individual must be the supreme end of a political system which is to re-fashion the world.

The same idea is expressed by G. D. H. Cole, an able and progressive English writer on labor and social topics, when he says in his "Self-Government in Industry":

What . . . is the fundamental evil in our modern society which we should set out to abolish?

There are two possible answers to that question, and I am sure that very many well-meaning people

would make the wrong one. They would answer, Poverty, when they ought to answer, Slavery. . . .

Poverty is the symptom; slavery the disease. The extremes of riches and destitution follow inevitably upon the extremes of license and bondage. The many are not enslaved because they are poor; they are poor because they are enslaved.

Now, it is unquestionably true that at no time in human history were these truths or principles *wholly* obscured and forgotten. The significant fact to bear in mind is that the schools of thought and reform that have been disposed to emphasize material and economic considerations are today desirous and even anxious to disavow indifference to the demand for the unfettered development of individuals and for such appropriate social machinery and forms of organization, political and industrial, as shall—to use Mr. Russell's words—"reduce to the lowest possible point the interference of one man with the life of another."

It is sometimes said, half-facetiously or half-paradoxically, that "we are all Socialists now." Certainly the rigid, dogmatic opposition to what is called restrictive and regulative social legislation that was characteristic of Individualist and Philosophical Anarchists two decades ago is hardly ever met with in reform circles and reform periodicals. But it is almost equally true that "we are all Individualists now," in the sense that few of the Socialists and Com-

munists rail at Individualism or profess much confidence in or affection for the Socialist State.

The change that has taken place in radical thought is primarily ethical and secondarily political. Certain systems of philosophy have suffered shipwreck. Ideas and formulas that were unpopular for a long time have regained their former hold and appeal. We no longer worship the State or the Majority. We are good practical democrats, but we treat democratic forms of organization as wise compromises. The most valuable thing, we realize once more, is personality, and personality abhors bureaucratic routine, straitjackets, artificial and mechanical arrangements. We cannot dispense with machinery, but we must not make a fetich of machinery. The essential object in all our contrivances is to free, elevate and ennoble the individual. We are advocating coöperation in a hundred directions, but we want the coöperation to be voluntary, at least as far as possible. We are transforming our industrial system—slowly, perhaps, but steadily and surely—not so much because it produces a “submerged tenth,” not because it does not afford a living wage to all, but because it has killed joy in work, has deprived even the well-paid mechanic of a stake and voice in the industry that monopolizes his energy and time, and because it has destroyed the freedom, dignity and independence of the working masses. We are democratizing our industries in various ways, but the aim

is the same—the emancipation of the laborer. Democracy in industry means that the employe is his own employer or master—that he works for himself and obeys rules which he has himself helped to frame and adopt, after the manner of the members of a social or scientific club that makes rules without enslaving the membership.

We are transforming our political organization because the individual has become too insignificant and because so-called representative government has largely broken down. The referendum, the initiative, the recall, proportional representation, Industrial Councils—"British style"—to advise and guide Parliament, or the political council—all these things are designed to increase the importance and the power of the individual under modern conditions. The individual will insist on justice and freedom, for without these he cannot have self-respect and manliness. He will have economic justice, not because he has any "materialist interpretation of history," but because a sense of wrong, injustice, undeserved inequality, subjection and exploitation is intolerable to a free man. He will have political justice for the same reason. Under a just and fair system the individual will be eager to work with other individuals for the common good. Under a just system he will even surrender a certain amount of freedom of action, because give-and-take, compromise, provided it is open, honest, based on antecedent general consent,

is indispensable in any civilized society. But the basic condition of voluntary coöperation and mutual concessions is justice.

May we not, then, be witnessing a remarkable rapprochement between Socialists and Individualists? Is not a common ground being prepared by the latest formulators of social creeds? The Socialists have in the past emphasized coöperation, the Individualists—freedom. The Socialists were betrayed into dogmatism, into worship of the State, into blind trust in mere machinery, organization, external changes. The Individualists were betrayed into a narrow sectarian, holier-than-thou attitude toward the State, into professed abhorrence of all “compulsion,” into blind worship of competition, of personal liberty. Today the scales have fallen, or are falling, from the eyes of Socialists and Individualists alike. Both schools have learned something in the last decade, and especially in the last quinquennium. No one who thinks wishes to sacrifice the individual, the human spirit, to the Moloch of efficiency, or to the State, or to organization. On the other hand, the necessity and utility of coöperation is universally recognized. There is at last, after a century of polemics and conflicts, an opportunity for a radical *entente*. The march of thought leads to differentiation, but it also leads to unity, to synthesis. Are we approaching unity in social thought and reformatory activity?

WHAT SHALL WE DO WITH THE STATE?

ONE of the remarkable effects of the Great War has been the revival of the long-suspended campaign against "the state." Sentiments that remind one strongly of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century political thought have been rather freely expressed of late. Individualism and philosophical anarchism may well claim substantial victories and significant conversions. "The state—that is the enemy," the radical individualists said and wrote in the eighties and nineties of the last century. Among their authorities—in a scientific sense, of course—were British, French and even Teutonic thinkers who had deplored the steady extension of the state's functions and the growth of "paternalism" and "compulsion" at the expense of the individual citizen or the dissenting group. *Laissez faire* was the popular liberal doctrine in those days, and while it was admitted that the existing social-economic order was by no means perfect, and that much injustice and special privilege existed which demanded the attention of sincere and progressive men, the remedy for all the social ills was declared to be "more

liberty," more competition, and less governmental intermeddling with "natural" human activities.

A few years ago these phrases would have sounded very strangely, had any prominent thinker cared to use them. They would have been received with amusement and astonishment, as something ancient, irrelevant, and meaningless. New ideas of the state, of government in relation to the citizen, were in full possession of the field of thought. The individualistic school was hardly more than a memory. Governmental interference, regulative and protective legislation in the interest of the weak, the disinherited, the ignorant, and the poor were all but universally favored. Children, women, laborers, mechanics were held to be entitled to the especial care of the modern democratic state. What was government, the argument ran, but co-operation for common benefits, and what could be more natural than that victims of past iniquity or present maladjustment should invoke the aid of the state in their own behalf? After all, what they demanded was simple justice, and justice was the business of the state, because it was essential to the general welfare, to social harmony and security. Only selfish, reactionary groups or classes, determined to preserve artificial, injurious privileges and opposed to justice, could object to such state intervention.

The Great War, however, has brought about a remarkable change in the attitude of many thinkers

and philosophers, not excepting socialists, toward the state and government. A man of the intellectual standing of Editor L. P. Jacks, of the *Hibbert Journal*, confesses alleged guilt in having believed human nature capable of such atrocities and brutalities as the war produced, and moves to quash that indictment. Not human nature, he says, but *state nature* is the author of these monstrous crimes and bottomless woes; state nature overrides and stifles weak human nature and makes us cruel, savage, bloodthirsty. State nature absolves us from moral responsibility. We "obey orders," the orders of the state. Hence the true task of civilization and humanity henceforth is to weaken state nature and exalt human nature. We must, then, reduce the power and importance of the state, "the coldest of monsters," as Nietzsche called it. Another philosopher, Bertrand Russell, while admitting that in certain directions the power and functions of the state have properly been increased and should indeed be further increased, is yet vigorously belaboring the state for alleged usurpations in realms which it cannot invade, according to him, without spreading evil and disaster. Mr. Russell's distribution of emphasis is different from Herbert Spencer's, but the spirit is the same in the respective writings of these British thinkers. Emile Vandewelde, the Belgian socialist leader, has been writing about "Socialism versus the State"!

It is not surprising that lesser lights should also be indulging in speculation concerning the future of the state, the amount of state-ism that may safely be permitted to survive when the stricken and exhausted world is regenerated and rehabilitated, and the changes in political methods and machinery that should be pressed by the democratic and progressive forces of society.

To some extent the revival of the critical and hostile treatment of the state is merely the natural reaction from the superficial and rhetorical German eulogies of the semi-divine state that have purposely and rightly been circulated among us and among our allies. Germans too often blindly worship the state; they are ready to die for it or to revert to savagery for its sake. To them the state is a mystical, unknowable institution; the glory and strength of the state would justify any conduct on the part of its instruments. The state is above and beyond our ethical conceptions, or right and wrong. Piracy, treaty breaking, treachery, betrayal of friends, brutal treatment of neutrals, merciless destruction of enemies—all these things are permissible when decreed by or in the name of the German state. It is not strange that the practical, pragmatic, hard-headed Anglo-Saxons or Americans should shudder at this superstitious worship of a mere abstraction and should be led to emphasize, or overemphasize, the utilitarian view of the state, the

idea that the state is an organization maintained in the interest of order and peace, and pledged to carry out the ascertained will of the greatest number of qualified votes.

But a little reflection will convince the thinking person that the Anglo-Saxon world has by no means solved the problems connected with the state or got rid of the conflicts between the state and the individual or the minority. The distinction between state nature and human nature, for example, is not a German distinction, nor was it meant to be limited to Germany. In the freest and most democratic state individuals will do things for the state that they would never consent to do for themselves or their families. The shifting and evasion of moral responsibility, with all the consequences thereof, may be observed in corporations as well as in states. Men do as officials, as trustees, as representatives, what they would refuse to do as individuals, in their own interest. This is as true of executions of criminals by deputy sheriffs as it is of the misuse of funds and dodging of taxes by directorates of private or quasi-public companies.

Surely we cannot contemplate the dissolution of all forms of corporate and organized social action. We cannot revert to the mythical state of nature in which simple human nature always confronted like human nature—for good or for ill. We cannot denounce and abrogate that unwritten "social con-

tract," though, after all, it never was formally negotiated. We must and shall maintain all sorts and conditions of political, social, economic, and other organizations for the sake of the undoubted advantages of coöperation and collective action. We shall not abolish the state as a form or organization, for there is nothing we could put in its place—unless it be mobocracy, lynch law, which, assuredly, the most vigorous critics of the organized modern state cannot regard as an improvement thereon. But, if we are to preserve the state, the question that faces us is, How much power shall we give it, and what scope?

Let us assume that we have made the state as free and democratic as possible. Let us assume that the franchise has been extended to all men and all women of sound mind and average honesty; that proportional representation has been adopted in order to give every class, party, and group its proper weight in government; that the upper house of the legislative body has been radically mended or ended; that the people nominate and elect every important official; that they have all the safeguards and checks that are now deemed essential, or at least desirable, if popular and democratic government is to be a reality; and that so far as organic law, form, structure, and machinery are concerned, we have made the state safe for democracy. The question still remains, how much power shall we

intrust to and confer upon our completely democratized state?

If it is state nature, and not human nature, that is responsible for war, or for provocative diplomacy, shall we take away from the government the power to declare war or to recognize the existence of a state of war? Some prominent pacifists have actually favored such a limitation as this; they have advocated a popular referendum on so vital an issue as war versus peace. They have favored this as the logical corollary from open, above-board, democratic diplomacy. But, as a matter of fact, the two proposals do not belong to the same category. Open diplomacy undoubtedly is a check on selfish, tricky or arrogant politicians clothed with a little brief authority. Open diplomacy is a safeguard because it implies public discussion of international problems and projects and because secret diplomacy means distrust and fear of the electorate of the democratic principle in government. To demand truly democratic government is to demand, tacitly, open and frank diplomacy. The question of the limits of state activity is not involved here at all. The government is not the state, nor is the state the government. Suppose we say that under the truest and most complete democracy "the state—it is the People." What do we mean by "the People"? Not the whole people, for unanimity

among the people is almost unthinkable. The majority rules and must rule in a democracy, and when the minority submits its submits to "the State," for the majority has spoken for the state. A referendum on war would give us nothing more, at the best, than the decision of the majority. Should a majority of the voters decide for war, the minority would be forced to fight, to suffer, to pay heavy taxation, to mortgage the future, just as it is forced today, when war is decided on, not by a referendum, but by a vote in Congress of a majority of the agents and representatives of the electors. It may be true that an absolutely democratic state would not be as apt to vote for war as a limited democracy, although that is distinctly a debatable proposition. Pacifists who are working for greater democracy, for the extension of the initiative and the referendum, cannot be charged with inconsistency, provided they are satisfied that greater democracy means fewer wars and less aggressiveness and imperialism in foreign affairs. But pacifists and "unterrified" democrats should not deceive themselves as to the relative strength and importance of state nature and human nature in a pure democracy. A war decreed by a majority of the people may be as sanguinary, as cruel, as remorseless, as a war decreed by a congress, or by an aristocratic clique, or by a single ruler. War itself is incompatible with democracy. War demands centralized control, unity, strict discipline. There can be no referendum on

such questions as military organization, the use of poison gas, the attacking of cities from the air, etc. It should not be forgotten, by the way, that fierce and angry demands for reprisals have come, in the recent war, from the press and the public, not from the responsible men in high positions. A referendum at a time of panic and resentment of some new atrocity might—nay, would—result in a manifestation of “human” nature that would cause state nature itself to shudder.

After all, if state nature is bad, why does human nature tolerate and submit to it? The greater includes the less, and evidently state nature is humanly natural. Our quarrel, then, is at bottom with human nature, and nothing could be more futile and idle than an indictment of human nature at large. *From human nature no appeal can be taken except to the same nature.* We usually appeal from nature drunk to nature sober, from nature wild to nature chastened, restrained, elevated. In this we are perfectly well advised. Human nature is still a house badly divided against itself. There are lower impulses and higher, selfish sentiments and unselfish, ignoble and noble. Moral evolution is as much a fact as physical, or scientific, or mechanical. It is possible to stimulate, quicken, strengthen the better nature of man, just as it is possible to stimulate and strengthen man’s lower nature. How to identify ourselves with our better nature, how to oppose and silence the demands we know to be wrong and un-

worthy, and more successfully conform our conduct to our professions and ideals, is, indeed, a most difficult and serious question. But the point is that *that is the question*, the only question, that concerns those of us who are disappointed and dissatisfied with the present state of our civilization.

Of course, the appeal to the better nature of man is in part an appeal to his reason, which is regarded by some thinkers as our "supreme inheritance." What, we ask ourselves, can reason suggest in the way of preventives, safeguards, checks, in a word, mechanism, with a view of preventing needless and immoral war in the future? Can we deter governments, parliaments and nations from wrongful, predatory, immoral acts, as our criminal law and penal institutions are believed to deter individuals from committing antisocial acts? Are there any lessons in history and in our own experience that we have not sufficiently taken to heart in the sphere of politics and foreign relations? What can we do in this sphere that we have not done?

Only when we conceive the problem in some such terms as these does light break upon us. Only then do we realize that by taking thought, by planning and contriving, and by deliberately undertaking to obstruct and discourage systems and policies that lead to war can we effectively promote the cause of peace and international amity.

Thus no one can doubt today that secret diplo-

macy has been in the past a fatal source of friction and danger. It has become clear to all that so far as possible secret diplomacy should be abolished. Many naïve persons imagine that when this has been said, all has been said. In truth, however, very little has been said. It will not be easy to wipe out all the diplomatic traditions and habits and to make a fresh start. One nation, or even a group of nations, could not abolish secret diplomacy. Advanced nations might refuse to make secret treaties, but how long would they be able to adhere to that virtuous and fine resolution if other important powers continued to negotiate secret treaties? No nation can isolate itself and ignore the realities of the present world. A nation has vital interests to protect and safeguard, and if it finds that it cannot do this without forming secret understandings, because the other powers are not advanced or democratic enough to renounce secret diplomacy, it is not too difficult to see what will happen.

Open diplomacy must tend to square and honorable dealing. It implies public discussion of foreign affairs and trust in the people. It presupposes the democratization of the diplomatic service itself. Aristocrats, as a rule, do not understand or sympathize with democratic principles. Even in England foreign affairs have been treated as a sort of special preserve for titled and distinguished personages. In the United States a John Hay could say

sincerely that "our foreign policy is merely the Golden Rule applied to foreign affairs," but how many Americans accepted that affirmation without a skeptical smile or mental reserve? Is American diplomacy completely democratized? The national House of Representatives has no voice in the making or unmaking of treaties. The Senate holds secret sessions to discuss treaties or foreign affairs. All this may have been unavoidable in the past, but that is beside the point. Suppose we take the position that henceforth foreign affairs should be discussed in open session, and that the House of Representatives should have as much power as the Senate in the domain of treaty making; will that go unchallenged? We must expect considerable and stubborn opposition, open and democratic diplomacy, even in the United States. Nevertheless, the idea is sound, and the progressive, democratic forces everywhere should fight for open diplomacy. It is a modest means, perhaps, yet a means to that devoutly wished-for consummation, peace, and good-will among the nations.

Another means to that same end is the creation or development and improvement of international conciliation and arbitration machinery. Such machinery existed in the fateful year 1914, and Prussian junkerdom haughtily and arrogantly frowned down every effort to procure a settlement of the so-called Serbian question at, and by, the international

court at The Hague. Nevertheless, machinery and agencies that make for delay, for discussion, make for peace. The world needs more and better machinery of this type. It may or may not be possible to form in the near future a strong League of Nations to Preserve Peace. To propose such a league we have seen was to raise a hundred and one knotty questions. But it is obvious that the sincere friends of peace must seek the partial solution of the problem in that general direction and must be content to make short, experimental steps.

In so far as imperialism, colonialism, and exclusive trade advantages in backward countries have produced conflicts of supposed national interests, "the open door" is clearly a preventive of war. The power that opposes the open door serves notice that it will fight rather than accept equality of rights and opportunities. If such powers still exist, mere machinery will not remove the difficulty. These powers will have to be converted or coerced. If converted, well and good. If coerced into accepting the open door doctrine, then, manifestly, the coercion will be a species of warfare—perhaps economic warfare. At any rate, to establish and secure general acceptance of that principle would be to remove a most prolific source of irritation, controversy, and war.

Even more potent a preventive of war than the open door is free commercial intercourse among the

civilized and industrial nations. The freer the commercial intercourse, the better. The leveling of all tariff walls, the destruction of all customs houses, the complete freedom of international buying and selling, is the goal to be kept steadily in view; but it would be folly to assume that the recent war has destroyed, or will destroy, the protective system. Many economists and intelligent men of affairs adhere to protection in principle and deem it essential to national welfare and prosperity. To these protection is not a feature of "preparedness" for war that will be rendered needless by a permanent peace. It is not likely that they will change their view regarding such purely economic, domestic, and national questions as the effect of high tariff rates on wages, productive efficiency, industrial stability and diversification of industry. Those who say enthusiastically that free trade would prevent war forget that only convinced free traders would entertain the idea of repealing protective tariff legislation in order to remove that particular cause of war. The convinced and honest protectionist accepts neither the conclusion nor the premises of the free trader. The issue, therefore, will long remain a domestic and national one, not to be for a moment bracketed with such questions as colonial open doors, arbitration machinery, international courts, or open diplomacy.

Self-determination for or by subject nationalities

or territories is a principle that, if generally accepted by the strong powers, would undoubtedly go far to advance the cause of universal peace. But none of the strong powers has accepted, or will accept, once for all the policy of self-determination as being applicable to any conceivable territorial dispute. Only the fanatical and visionary Bolshevik leaders could imagine that in self-determination they had discovered a miraculous, sovereign remedy or preventive. It was altogether sound and reasonable to suggest self-determination as a compromise applicable to Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, Italia Irredenta, and Armenia. We know how the military caste of Prussia received that suggestion. But we should not delude ourselves about the attitude of the more liberal powers toward self-determination. It will not be applied generally to correct ancient or theoretical wrongs. It will be applied to rectify past aggressions for the sake of consistency, logic, or abstract morality. Not even the radicals and advanced laborites of Great Britain have entertained for a moment the idea of applying self-determination to Egypt, India, or Ireland. As for the United States, how many of our anti-imperialists would seriously demand of the government the immediate application of self-determination to Porto Rico and the Philippines? Radicals should clear their minds of their own cant, if they expect the conservatives to clear their minds of hollow professions

and made-to-order excuses. Bolshevism in international, as in national, affairs leads to chaos and retrogression.

Federalism in place of a tyrannical and arrogant nationalism is another wholesome and genuinely progressive and constructive principle which should be vigorously and tactfully promoted wherever conditions warrant or enjoin its application. The idea of federalism, of ample local autonomy and freedom for cultural development combined with a well-defined surrender of certain powers and functions to a central authority, does in truth carry balm and hope to many oppressed and embittered elements in Europe, and especially in the Near East. A rational federalism does away with the supposed necessity of "nationalizing" annexed or acquired populations, of suppressing manifestations of racial or cultural independence. Federalism makes unity and loyalty possible despite variety and heterogeneity of component elements. Federalism would have saved Austria and Hungary from the sanguinary conflict they precipitated because of Serbian designs on some of their Slav territory or populations. Federalism would have saved the Balkans from devastation and appalling waste of human resources. Federalism may yet save Russia, as it certainly has saved the United States. Federalism, therefore, is one of the surest ways to peace and guaranties of peace.

In the light of all that has been said, is it not clear that, instead of asking the barren question, What shall we do with the state?—instead of setting up an unreal distinction between wicked state nature and benevolent human nature—the true and pertinent question to put to ourselves is, What can friends of peace do other than, and additional to, that which has been done, to limit, localize, avert, and prevent armed conflicts between states? In other words, how can we put an end to anarchy, the reign of brute force, in international relations and substitute as much law and reason in that sphere as we have succeeded in substituting for anarchy, strife, and force in the relations of the citizens or subjects of any fairly efficient modern state.

If these citizens or subjects do not want peace with their neighbors in other states, no effective machinery, no safeguards and checks, will be installed by them. If they have racial and nationalistic antipathies that cloud their reasoning powers and impel them to fight on the least provocation, or without any provocation at all; if they are jealous, envious, and malicious toward such neighbors; if they covet the goods or territories of such neighbors and are not ashamed to embark on predatory enterprises, on what Spencer called international burglary, in order to grab such goods or territories, then it is safe to say that appeals to their “human

nature" will be as vain as appeal to the nature of the animal or bird of prey.

Again, if there are multitudes of citizens or subjects who rather welcome war, openly or secretly, and who cannot be counted on to support any genuine peace movement, it is necessary to determine scientifically the approximate strength of these elements in a modern industrial and civilized community and to ascertain the cause of so strange, reactionary, and socially pernicious an attitude. How can sane and normal human beings rejoice in wholesale murder, waste, destruction, torture, anguish, misery? After all, this is what the little word "war" means, and can anyone who is not a ferocious barbarian contemplate such things with satisfaction or even equanimity and indifference?

It will not do to say that there are no such human beings. The facts are too glaring and too well established to be overlooked. There are men to whom war is a great, high adventure. There are men to whom war is a temporary relief from drudgery, monotony, and a hopeless struggle against want and privation. Exhortations and propaganda by pacifists never reach such men. To change them, we must change the whole social atmosphere first. Society must provide "moral equivalents of war," to use a phrase of the late William James. The conditions of life, labor, and recreation for hosts of men—and women—must be radically changed, and

the changes required cannot be decreed by rulers or revolutionary assemblies. They will be the product of slow evolution.

In short, and to sum up, a little candid analysis and reflection will satisfy the thinking person that an attack on state nature by the pacifists and philosophers who are appalled by the awful slaughter and waste of the world-war is an attack on phantoms or empty abstractions. Neither the abolition nor the complete democratization of the state will abolish war. The distinction between human nature and state nature is superficial and arbitrary. The problem of war and peace is so fundamental and so broad that its solution presupposes and involves the solution of a score of knotty, complex, and historic problems—problems of social and economic organization, of domestic and international law, of education and of ethics and philosophy. To fight war is to fight imperialism, nationalism, and militarism. Several scholarly writers have pointed out that militarism is more than an institution—it is a state of mind, a body of ideas and prejudices. The same thing is true of imperialism, of nationalism, of protectionism. The democratization and purification of the political organization called the state is only one of the problems, and by no means the most difficult one, faced by lovers of humanity and peace.

So far the discussion has dealt with certain recent indictments by humanitarians and philosophers of

so-called state nature—indictments based on the foreign policies of the great nations—and the criminal, aggressive wars directly or indirectly attributable to those policies. The attempt has been to point out the superficiality of those indictments and the necessity of a very different analysis of the international situation than that which underlies the notion that the state as such, or state nature, is somehow responsible for the diplomacy of intrigue, conquest, aggression, and greed.

In the following pages the alleged responsibility of “the state” for political, social, and economic evils “at home” will be discussed. Shall we abolish the state? *Can* we abolish it? Should we get rid of the evils and maladjustments complained of by liberals and radicals if we could, and did, abolish the state?

First of all, what is the state? A correct answer is clearly essential, yet is hardly ever given. The proper answer is, The state is another name for compulsory co-operation. A certain community, or state, or nation, organizes itself, a government is created, legislation adopted, and the individual, or the minority, has no choice, no alternative, but to obey the law of the state. In the freest and most democratic modern state, despite such devices as the initiative, the referendum, the recall, local home rule, the element of compulsion is necessarily always present. If all co-operation were voluntary; if the majority had no right to coerce the minority; if gov-

ernment actually, and in the literal sense, rested on the "consent of all the governed," there would be no state. There would be spontaneous collective action along many lines, no doubt, just as today there is co-operation for religious, social, ethical, political, and æsthetic purposes *sans* the slightest suggestion of physical force or compulsion. But the state, as we know it, would have disappeared.

Now, this is exactly what the pacific and philosophical anarchists mean by "abolition of the state." They would gradually restrict the authority of the state, increasingly free the individual and the minority, and at last make even taxation and military service entirely voluntary under all conditions. They accordingly insist on the right of the individual to secede from, or ignore, the state. They would, of course, use force to prevent aggression or invasion by any individual; they would punish "crime"—that is, violations of the principle of equal freedom and equal opportunity—but with the inoffensive, peaceable individual, no matter how selfish, unsocial, unyielding he might be, they would not interfere—except, possibly, to the extent of boycotting him and impressing upon him the fact that he is deemed an unpleasant and undesirable neighbor.

This is the general idea Thoreau, the New England recluse and intense individualist, vaguely entertained when, for example, he wrote the following lines:

I heartily accept the motto (of Thomas Jefferson): "That government is best which governs least"; and I should like to see it acted up to more rapidly and systematically. Carried out, it finally amounts to this, which also I believe: "That government is best which governs not at all"; and when men are prepared for it, that will be the kind of government which they will have.

The progress from an absolute to a limited monarchy, from a limited monarchy to a democracy, is a progress toward a true respect for the individual. But is a democracy, such as we know it, the last improvement possible in government? Is it not possible to take a step further toward recognizing and organizing the rights of man?

There never will be a free and enlightened state until the state comes to recognize the individual as a higher and independent power, from which all its own power and authority are derived, and treats him accordingly. I please myself with imagining a state at least which can afford to be just to all men, and to treat the individual with respect as a neighbor; which even would not think it inconsistent with its own repose if a few were to live aloof from it, not meddling with it, nor embraced by it, who fulfilled all the duties of neighbors and fellowmen. A state which bore this kind of fruit, and suffered it to drop off as fast as it ripened, would prepare the way for a still more perfect and glorious state which also I have imagined, but have not yet anywhere seen.

Who will object to these ideals and conceptions? But the difficulty with them as expressed is their strange, complete irrelevance to any actual prob-

lem of which we are conscious and which presses for a solution. Suppose we accept the view that the society of the future will be held together in the way outlined by the logical and uncompromising individualists. What follows? What is the bearing of that admission on our own situation? What practical program is suggested by the ideal of a free, state-less society? What are the steps to be taken today—this year, next year, the year after, ten years hence, and so on—with a view to reaching, at some distant day, the remote goal?

We know what the answer is: Repeal, repeal, and again repeal. Society can only become free by removing one restriction after another, destroying one barrier after another, to the freest human intercourse. Free trade, free access to land, free banking, free issue of notes to circulate as currency, free association for any and all purposes not inherently immoral or criminal—this is the individualist platform.

Sound or unsound, this platform is certainly definite. But how many of the men and women who are discontented and rebellious, and who talk about radical changes in the organization of "the capitalistic state," accept the individualist views concerning protection, monopoly, banking, currency, and land tenure. Metaphysical discussion of the nature of sovereignty, limitations upon the power of the state, or the natural rights of the individual

throws no light whatever on questions of economics. So great is the confusion of thought that a man may in the same breath urge the abolition of the state and propose high protective duties, or a government monopoly of coinage and currency! It is futile to paint alluring pictures of a free, state-less society when, as a matter of fact, only a most insignificant minority is prepared anywhere to take the first steps toward the alleged goal—namely, to repeal tariff laws, banking laws, currency laws, patent and copyright laws, and a hundred other regulative and restrictive laws supposed to be necessary for the protection of the poor, the uneducated, the credulous, the weak!

The problems of our period are primarily economic. The revolt being witnessed is a revolt against poverty, gross inequality in the distribution of wealth, chronic unemployment, and the like. How many of the radicals believe that "the abolition of the state" in the anarchistic sense would do away with these evils? To be sure, the socialists of the Marx school, too, have attacked "the state" and professed a desire to kill it. Under socialism properly understood, we have been assured in books and periodicals, the state dies, or dissolves into something totally different. When we analyze these affirmations, what do we find? A totally arbitrary assumption that the state is a capitalistic device, an instrument of oppression and enslavement, and that

to abolish capitalism, nationalize industry, make everyone an employee of the community, is to kill the state.

Nothing can be more absurd and empty than this. The implied definition of the state in the socialist declamations against it is erroneous. Granted that there is such a thing as a capitalistic state, as there was such a thing as a military and aristocratic state, it clearly does not follow that to destroy any particular type of state is to destroy the state. There is also a democratic state, and a socialistic state. The Russian Bolshevik leaders are Marxian socialists, but *they have certainly not destroyed the state*. They lost no time in setting up a proletarian state, as they called their non-proletarian tyranny. They dispossessed and disfranchised the *bourgeois* elements, but they had the decency to refrain from pretending that they were abolishing the state. They admitted that they were setting up a dictatorship, a despotism, a state after their own heart. They had all manner of excuses, of course; the dictatorship was to be temporary; the revolution had to be saved at any cost, and the enemies of socialism were wicked counter-revolutionists, who deserved condign punishment and effective restraint. The intention was to usher in a reign of brotherhood and equality, to replace capitalism by harmonious co-operation. Meantime Lenin and his

fanatical followers were to be "the state"—and a ruthless state in truth it has been.

Let us, however, recognize the distinction between emergency, or war, policies on the part of socialist or communist reformers, and permanent policies that are to obtain under normal conditions. Would socialism under normal conditions dispense with the state—kill the state? "No" is the answer, if, as has been shown, the essence of the state is compulsion. Would a socialist state permit the individual to secede from it, to ignore it, to cultivate his little patch, and exchange his products with his neighbors without paying the state any kind of tax or tribute? Would the socialist state renounce the right to conscript men into military service, or the right to impose taxes on dissenting minorities? Where and when has any socialist author or leader proposed to kill the state *in this sense*—to depend entirely and undeservedly on voluntary co-operation, and to base government on the actual consent of all of the governed? There are individualist writers who assert that the socialist state would revert to involuntary servitude and would coerce the workman to a far greater degree than the capitalistic state has done. Let us not hastily subscribe to such charges as these. Certain it is, however, that the socialist state would not even attempt to dispense with compulsion and coercion of non-invasive individuals. The majority

would rule—at least in respect of essentials. How, then, can it be maintained that socialism would destroy statism?

At this point the Guild socialist may be imagined as appearing on the stage and making his plea. No, indeed; orthodox socialism is incurably statist and tyrannical, and this very fact explains the advent of the guild socialists. *They* are not juggling with words; *they* are not guilty of inconsistency. They distrust the state and would reduce it to a minimum. For this reason they would give industrial guilds the maximum of autonomy, they would encourage the formation of other associations for various purposes; they would stimulate voluntary co-operation in a hundred directions. The jurisdiction of the state would be so limited that its present claim to a mysterious sanctity, to metaphysical authority, would appear ridiculous, and utility would become the sole title of the state to respect. Within its sphere, however, the state would use compulsion and possess sufficient authority to prevent usurpation or abuse of power by the autonomous guilds, or other local and functional organizations.

Manifestly, the guild socialists, though sincere in their libertarian professions, beg the real issue, or at least ignore it. They do not propose to kill the state, but merely to limit its jurisdictions and force it, as one writer has said, to come down from its present "sovereign" pedestal and surrender some

of its powers and functions to guild organizations. Their plan may indeed promise greater efficiency than any reasonable person can expect from a bureaucratic and despotic state; it may, too, prove more alluring to lovers of freedom and appreciative students of human personality. Still, the state would be perpetuated by guild socialists, and on supreme questions its fiat would be law.

The syndicalists assert that this would abolish the capitalistic state and prevent the establishment of a democratic or socialist state, but what would be their syndicate if not a small state, and what their federation of syndicates but a confederation of small states. As a matter of fact, syndicalism is a paper scheme that would break down at the first touch of reality—that would spell confusion worse confounded, and sooner or later lead to the restoration of a despotic state. As Mr. Bertrand Russell argues, the syndicalists have outlined no *modus operandi* to settle controversies among the autonomous industrial organizations, or between any of them and the consuming public. To affirm that the syndicalist directorates would be at all times amenable to reason and properly regardful of interests other than those of their particular industrial group—the miners, say, or the railroad workmen, or the able seamen—and that justice would be done in every case without prejudice or passion, is to revert to utopian socialism with a vengeance. But even if

we should admit for the sake of the argument that syndicalism is practical, all that would be implied by the admission is that the modern or the traditional state is too powerful and therefore too dangerous, and that the time has come to replace it by a congeries of small, weak states. For, manifestly, the syndicate would be neither more nor less than a small state. The syndicate would have its directorate, its officers, its representative assembly, its referendum system, its rules and regulations. The majority would govern the syndicate within certain constitutionally prescribed limits, and the minority would have no choice but to obey. The majority might allow individuals to withdraw from the syndicate, but this right would have to be qualified and reconciled with the requirements of efficiency and stability. The advantages of such withdrawal would be problematical, moreover, since the seceding individual or group would, in order to live and earn wages, be forced to join some other syndicate.

Syndicalism would abolish, to be sure, the "political" state, but it would substitute for it the "administrative" state. There are writers and thinkers who derive great comfort from this anticipated change, but it is to be feared that they are the victims of illusions and verbal juggles. Cannot an administrative state be even more tyrannical and ar-

bitrary than our political state? Cannot a trade union be oppressive and despotic? Is "administration" protected by some magic, invisible shield from the vices and evils of political and bureaucratic government?

We must conclude, then, first, that none of the modern schools of thought really purposes to abolish the state, and, second, that the individualistic and philosophical anarchists, who would like to abolish it, and know exactly what is meant by the phrase "abolishing the state," admit that their goal is very distant and from any practical viewpoint utopian, since more than sufficient unto the day are the very first steps suggested toward that goal.

Is there, then, no problem before us that concerns the state, its structure and form, its basis and pillars? Are those who are asserting that the state is undergoing profound modifications imagining vain things? Does the state require no substantial changes? Has it adapted itself to the needs and conditions of our age and is now functioning as it should? By no means. It is true that the State is "in transition," and that vital and important changes are clearly ahead of it. The nature of the changes is doubtless indicated by recent developments. They are, however, often magnified and even misapprehended.

In the first place, there is much confusion in

radical minds with regard to the further democratization of the state. That the state has been, is being, and will continue to be "democratized," is a truism nowadays, but in what sense is the term democracy as applied to the state to be used? With a curious inconsistency many radical writers advocate at the same time the emancipation of the individual and the complete democratization of the state! Democracy is, however, very far from being synonymous with individual liberty. If a completely democratized state means a state in which the majority rules absolutely, and in all departments of activity, and in which individuals and minorities enjoy none of the guaranties which, for example, they are accorded by the Constitution of the United States, then the democratization of the state will mean the enslavement of the individual. Minority government, oligarchical government, plutocratic government, are severally intolerable, and embattled majorities are now rightly seeking to destroy such forms of government. But majority government is not necessarily just or free government, and within certain limits the individual and the minority must always be protected from majority aggression. On this point the alleged *undemocratic* features of the American system are sound in principle, though no doubt far from perfect and open to much improvement. We cannot, in the name of democracy, suppress freedom of speech or of the press, or religious

freedom, or artistic freedom, or freedom in personal and domestic conduct up to a certain point. To exalt and free the nonconforming individual is to restrain and curb the majority or the democratic state.

Again, the very people who are condemning the present state because of its arrogant assumption of sovereignty, its disregard of individual rights, the individual conscience, and the like, are clamorously demanding additional protective, regulative, restrictive legislation in the interest of the greater or greatest number, of the majority. Send profiteers to prison! is the cry. License all big corporations! Regulate prices and profits! Stop hoarding and speculation! These policies may be democratic, they may be necessary evils, but they are not consonant with individual and minority freedom, with the professed intention of starving and eventually killing the state. The consistent anti-statist may not admire profiteers and hoarders and food gamblers, but he would not regulate them by statutory law. He would trust the law of supply and demand in a free market. He would suffer temporary hardship and loss, but he would not sacrifice personal and economic liberty. To favor increased regulation of industry and commerce is not to kill the state, but rather to strengthen it and give it a new lease of life.

Assuming, however, that there are democrats who are also good libertarians, and rational libertarians

who are also good practical democrats, the question recurs, What would *these* do with the state? How would *they* improve it? First of all, they would deprive it of much of its occupation by re-establishing genuine equality of opportunity and industrial democracy. When crime and criminal vice abound, the state has much to do, and there can be no talk of killing it. When artificial monopoly and iniquitous privilege militate against the equitable and wholesome distribution of wealth and enable the few to exploit the many, appeals go up from a thousand directions to the supposedly mighty state, and legislation is sought in behalf of the poor, the weak, the disinherited. When commercial warfare and tariff or other discriminations threaten war or bring it about, the state metaphorically rubs its hands in glee and knows that its power and prestige are about to receive coveted immunity from criticism. War and preparedness for war always revivify the state and silence its theoretical enemies. War tends to tyranny. War is intolerant. War makes the state sovereign.

Peace, plenty, opportunity, economic justice, on the other hand, tend to weaken the state. Free and prosperous men do not need much government. To fight poverty, involuntary idleness, and unmerited misery is, therefore, to fight the present state. Industrial freedom will pave the way for greater political freedom. This is why the enlightened liber-

tarian is not to-day greatly interested in academic attacks on the metaphysical state or the political state. He is interested in well-directed attacks on special privilege and shielded, protected monopolies, knowing that to get rid of these is to eradicate much poverty and much of the crime, vice, and brutality that poverty breeds. He who fights for economic and social reform fights for the emancipation of the soul of the individual as well, or for the curtailment of the authority of the state. Flank attacks on the state are far more effective at this stage of evolution than frontal attacks.

Yet there is no reason why in some sectors of the battle line a direct attack on the present "political" state should not be attempted. The governmental machine is breaking down, and the causes of this breakdown are not exclusively, though chiefly, economic. Representative government very often seems to represent only the tricky and seamy side of human nature. Men elected to represent mixed constituencies often lack the courage to take definite positions on important questions and "play safe" by trimming, drifting, and pretending to be all things to all men. There are too many demagogues, time-servers, shifty politicians (called "practical"), in the public life of every democracy. Such men have no intellectual or moral fitness for the functions they are supposed to discharge. The result is futile, insincere, and ineffective legislation, evasion and palter-

ing and endless delays in attending to ripe problems that demand earnest discussion and statesmanlike action.

Even the average man, who is no philosopher, is disappointed in the conditions or prospects of modern democracy. He rails at politicians and politics. He does not expect efficiency or integrity of democratic government. He refuses to take seriously campaigns against waste, extravagance, or "graft." He sneers at party platforms, made, as he says, "to get in on but not to stand on." He is skeptical regarding the success of proposed reforms of the familiar type—for so many of them have been tried and found empty and fruitless.

This aspect of the democratic situation cannot and need not be ignored. It is responsible for much of the sympathy, interest, and enthusiasm which the Russian soviet system has aroused in liberal and progressive circles. The Russian Bolshevik idealists, we are assured by many, have shown us the way out—have evolved what Lenine calls "a higher form of democracy" than that of England, France, or America. Let us abolish our legislatures and executives, and "sovietize" our state and national governments, cry some superficial radicals.

The soviet system has nothing to do with Bolshevism, terrorism, Leninism, or the dictatorship of a class. It does offer hints to advanced democracies,

and its failure in Russia, which is certain, will not prove its total want of merit.

We must make our legislatures more representative and more efficient. This can be done, undoubtedly, by substituting, at least to some extent, representation of industries, social groups, schools of opinions, vocations, and functions for the representation of geographical areas, heterogeneous populations, and nebulous partisan policies. *This substitution is the essence of the soviet system*, and it is worth studying and experimenting with under favorable circumstances.

There is no reason why those American states that have been discussing the possibility of applying the commission plan of government to states, or of abolishing the upper chamber of the state legislature and experimenting with a unicameral general assembly, should not seriously consider an experiment along the Russian soviet lines. They might retain the state senate, but provide for the election of its members not, as now, by the body of voters, but by electoral colleges representing industrial guilds, commercial associations, bankers and brokers, merchants, trade unions, professional and scientific bodies, etc. Years ago Herbert Spencer, if memory serves, suggested the reformation of the British House of Lords after the manner just indicated. He would not have favored the soviet plan in its en-

tirety, but he recognized the defects of Parliament—Carlyle's "Talking Machine"—and the necessity of such changes in the electoral system as might insure the adequate representation of the ability, the enterprise, the intelligence, the character, and the industry of the nation in the parliament. A revising chamber of experts, of men who "do things," who have had special training for constructive and positive work, would undoubtedly give a much better account of itself than a chamber of lawyers and politicians—especially of lawyers and politicians nominated and elected by partisan machines and local bosses.

In addition to a revising chamber of the type suggested, or pending the adoption of constitutional amendments permitting the creation and election of such a senate, national, state, and local councils might be organized for the purpose of deliberating on industrial, social, and mixed problems, carrying on investigations and tendering formal advice to the legislature. Such industrial councils are being organized, or at least proposed, in Great Britain. As some enlightened newspapers have pointed out, British progressives, with characteristic sense and sobriety, have modified the Russian soviet plan and adapted it to the institutions and traditions of their own country, whose genius for timely compromise and accommodation is universally admired. It is no humiliation to the sovereign

Parliament of Britain to admit that it often fumbles and muddles because it lacks scientific and practical knowledge, and because it is hampered by partisan politics and supposed partisan strategy. But, humiliating or not, the admission that parliaments and congresses and legislatures of the conventional type have developed weakness and faults and require extensive "mending" will have to be made. And it is fortunate that sober-minded students of the problem are beginning to develop a sort of consensus of opinion respecting the sort of mending that needs to be done. Extreme, superficial notions are being discarded. The silly demand for the sudden, immediate "sovietizing" of our so-called *bourgeois* governments on the Moscow, Petrograd, and Budapest models was confined to ignorant and shallow editors of the yellow radical press. We shall hear little of that nonsense after a while, but we shall and ought to hear much about genuinely representative legislative assemblies, as well as about electoral machinery and electoral laws that are intentionally designed to produce such assemblies.

It is certain that even plain business men who would warmly repudiate any charge of sympathy with radicalism will increasingly insist on changes in the composition, personnel, and atmosphere of our legislative bodies. The complaint that "there are too many lawyers" in Congress is familiar and symptomatic. There are too many lawyers in every

legislative body in the United States. Lawyers have a strong bias toward legalism. They are more adept at raising objections, drawing fine distinctions, splitting hairs, finding reasons against proposed courses of action, than at removing difficulties and making constructive suggestions. The business man is right when he asserts that we need, in public life, more men who know how to get results. We need farmers, merchants, manufacturers, engineers, physicians, educators, practical sociologists, mechanics, labor leaders, in our legislative bodies. This is in strict accord with the true democratic principle; there is nothing wild or extreme about the idea. We shall have a better state, a more efficient and democratic state, when the men and women who speak and act in its name represent industry, commerce, science, the liberal professions, the arts, practical benevolence, and the like. That state will be as good as the average character, intelligence, and culture of the people can make it. More is impossible.

Finally, within the limits of the state's proper activities—and, to repeat with emphasis, to demand more democracy is *not* to demand the enthronement of the majority and the abolition of individual and minority rights—the voters must be armed with effective weapons of control and defense, with the referendum, the initiative, the recall, proportional representation, as against their elected representatives. A golden mean must be found between the chaos and

emotionalism of so-called "pure democracy," which, in truth, has become impossible in large and heterogeneous societies, and a too rigid system of representative government, which has so often resulted in anti-democratic, anti-popular, misrepresentative government.

Changes still more fundamental than those sketched may and must be left to the future. It is unprofitable to speculate upon their nature, for the data available are wholly insufficient. Mere technical and mechanical progress may react powerfully on the modern state. The further development of a sane and sound internationalism, which is inevitable, cannot fail to affect the nationalist state. But such changes cannot be foreseen in the concrete; to predict them in vague generalities is not to facilitate them. The course of wisdom and sane, philosophical radicalism is to interpret and facilitate such changes as are surely coming, as are actually casting shadows before them, and as we can afford to encourage and welcome.

HUMAN PROGRESS: THE IDEA AND THE REALITY

I

WHATEVER else the great world war has done, it is certain that in thousands of sad and thoughtful homes, the globe over, some such questions as these have been asked and pondered: Is human progress a mere illusion? If such things can be, what and where is our vaunted culture, our civilization? If the terrible and apparently needless and futile struggle is compatible with civilization, and does not reduce so-called progress to a mockery and sham, what is the true definition of progress? Finally, does a "progress" which renders such horrors possible, or which fails to prevent or exclude them, signify or contain anything worth while?

It is doubtless safe to say that the sad and quiet homes alluded to have not satisfactorily answered these grave questions. They are anxiously waiting for light, and expecting the philosophers and moralists to give them such light and comfort, to renew their faith or allay their painful doubts and misgivings. Some of the American and European philosophers have attempted to grapple with the questions

indicated; others have apparently been too stunned and bewildered to venture on the attempt. The City Club of Chicago, conscious of this situation, conceived the admirable idea of arranging a scientific symposium on "Human Progress" for the benefit of its own members as well as the wider public. This notable event was participated in by Dr. John Dewey, the eminent American educator and philosopher, Dr. Jacob P. Hollander, political economist, and Professor James Harvey Robinson, of Columbia University, historian.

II

In this paper the views and conclusions of these thinkers, and of some others will be summarized and considered. To facilitate a better understanding of them, however, there is a preliminary question of importance and historical interest that invites attention—the question as to the evolution and genesis of the very idea or conception of human progress.

To many educated but "general" readers it will be a distinct surprise to hear that there *is* any preliminary question concerning the idea of progress. Our own age is so familiar with this idea, and the term is so cherished a household possession, that few stop to ask anything regarding its past, its origin, and development. Yet, as Auguste Comte and other sociologists have pointed out, the idea of progress

as now understood is not only modern, but astonishingly recent. According to Comte, it dates from Fontenelle and Condorcet. Antiquity knew nothing of the idea. The seers, innovators, emancipators, reformers of antiquity, Comte contends, merely rebelled against tradition, authority, and blind obedience. In offering the world new truths and new principles, however, these leaders and guides did not explicitly affirm any general idea of progress, and hardly so much as suspected that such an idea was implicit in their views and attitudes. To come to destroy the old and proclaim a new gospel—a revolutionary one—is not to lay down a “law of progress.” To advocate change or even improvement is not to imply that there is such a thing as progress, in the strictly modern sense of the term. To paint or sigh for a Utopia, to dream of a new heaven and earth, to believe that human nature can be suddenly modified and a social order revolutionized, is not necessarily to accept the conception of progress.

What is that conception? In the words of M. Emile Faguet, the French academician, critic, and author, to believe in progress is to admit or assert that humanity steadily, if slowly, marches toward the Better, or the Best—tends toward the Best, undergoes constant improvement.

To be sure, there are those who admit or recognize reactions or retrogressions; who believe that nations, communities, even the whole civilized world, may

cease to advance and even temporarily lapse into lower, outgrown states, perhaps even into barbarism. Herbert Spencer and others were of the opinion, in the late years of the last century, that modern society was seriously threatened with "rebarbarization." Governments, parties, labor organizations, schools of thought, single philosophers, have been accused from time to time of preaching and practicing reactionary doctrines, of seeking to undo the great work of decades or even of centuries. But there is invariably in these complaints or indictments the tacit assumption, if not the expressed conviction, that the reaction is but temporary, and that the march of humanity toward its goal will and must be resumed sooner or later.

Thus the essence of the modern conception of progress is continuity—relative, perhaps, rather than absolute, but continuity—steadiness, persistence, and certainty. The conception implies that progress is in a sense *the law of humanity*; that human beings as such tend to perfect themselves, to grow and improve in certain directions; that they are better now than they were in the past, and will be better tomorrow than they are today.

It is plain that the shock administered to us by the great and cruel war—responsibility for which every nation is so eager to disclaim—is directly attributable to this modern conception of progress. Even those of us who are prepared for lapses, for

reaction and retrogression, somehow assume that any reaction must be "a little one" in this day and generation. A bad act of parliament; the repeal or emasculation of a good act; a blunder or crime on the part of a cabinet or diplomatic clique; a "sort of war" in some remote part of the world; even a war between two great but not quite civilized powers—such things we can account for and understand. They do not militate against the very idea of human progress. But this Pan-European or world-war, this tragedy of blunders, aggressions, failures, and jealousies, of suspicion and fears and alarms, we cannot, at least at this time, bring ourselves to regard as nothing more than lapse, an exception to the rule of human life. We sorrowfully say to ourselves that if this be an "exception," the alleged rule itself would seem to be valueless and a piece of bitter irony. Some thinkers are so buried in gloom and pessimism that they are led to dispute the modern idea of progress and to hark back to the ancients. Others feel that the time for rational and sober conclusions has not come and therefore deliberately lay the whole question aside, to be taken up a decade hence, perhaps.

Without speculating on the probable results of future controversies, however, deep interest is felt in many circles in the views expressed today by earnest, informed, and cultivated persons concerning the nature and meaning of progress.

M. Faguet, the eminent Frenchman already quoted, in an article or critical review of a work entitled *L'Histoire de l'idée de progrès*, by Jules Delville, a compatriot of his, treated the subject in a fresh, candid, and thought-provoking manner. The article was contributed to the Paris magazine, *La Revue*, in April, 1913, and we may feel sure that the author, in view of the things that have happened to France,—wistful, pathetic France—since that time, has not revised his somewhat depressing conclusions. M. Faguet's method of treatment is so clear and intelligent that the final pages of his paper amply deserve, and will repay, reproduction in a rather free translation. Such a translation follows:

What do I think of the theory of progress taken by itself and as it stands—the theory of continuous, or almost continuous, improvement? I think it is absurd by its very definition. To know whether anyone is advancing toward a goal, it is necessary to know whither he is going. If you see a man walking along a route toward a point *A*, and getting farther and farther away from a point *B*, you do not know whether he is progressing or retrogressing until you find out whether his object is *A* or *B*. If you do not know that, all you can state is one thing—that he is changing his place. Hence, to know whether humanity is progressing or retrogressing, it would be necessary to know what its goal is, its true and real goal—and also whether it is or is not deceiving itself regarding that veritable goal. But we do not know which is the real goal of humanity, and conse-

quently we do not know whether it is advancing or retrogressing; we know only that it is moving.

Only a man placed at the extreme end of humanity and in possession of full knowledge as to the ways traversed by it would be able to tell, comparing its point of departure with its point of arrival, that it has marched from improvement to improvement; or that it has advanced with numerous digressions and retrogressions; or that it has deceived itself all along. But a man living in an indeterminate epoch of history, in the sense that one does not know whether the epoch is nearer the end or the beginning of history—such a man has no illumination on this question of universal history, and lacks sense even if he puts such a question.

However, not to take things too abstractly, suppose we ask ourselves simply whether humanity is in a better state than formerly; have we not sufficient historical knowledge to answer—and to answer “Yes”? This depends on the point of view. Is humanity greater than formerly by reason of its superior art? The adherents of the theory of progress are bent on proving this to be the case, but they are actually at their weakest in this line of demonstration. Is humanity happier? We do not know; for if there be one incontestable thing, it is that man advances in happiness, or in capacity for happiness and therefore in happiness, to the extent to which he advances in morality. But, are you quite sure of moral progress? There it is that we see waves, crises followed by formidable retrogressions. Nothing, in fact, is less certain than moral progress through the ages.

Does humanity know more? Well, humanity

knows more, but man knows less. Humanity has amassed an enormous sum of knowledge, but the most learned knows but a small part of that knowledge, and every man is relatively more ignorant than he was in ancient times, when there was less to know. Man is grand, but men are small; every man is small and ignorant; this is tantamount to saying that Man knows nothing.

If we regard knowledge as an instrument or means of forming general ideas, and as a source of inexhaustible pleasure to him who knows, we still find that the most ancient of ancients had a host of general ideas that satisfied them and that we cannot see were so miserably inferior to our general ideas. As for the pleasure, the joy, of knowledge, the most ancient of ancients had enough knowledge to give each of them pleasure during the course of a long life.

But the question of happiness persists in returning. Does not science contribute to morality; and if there is more science, there must be more morality and therefore more happiness?

Does science contribute to morality? If we have in mind the science or knowledge possessed by the individual, it may be admitted that very often the educated man is more moral than the ignorant; but the truth is, the educated man is more educated just because he is more moral, and not more moral because he is more educated. There are but two classes of instructed men: those who acquire education because they wish to "arrive," because it is a means of material success, and those who educate themselves out of pure love of knowledge. The former are merely ambitious and worldly, and knowledge does not give them superior or higher morality than the morality

with which they start. The others, who educate themselves, not because of their desire to prosper and succeed, not from vanity or greed, not from love of power, but out of pure, disinterested love of knowledge, these are evidently moral at the outset; they were born moral, so to speak. It is their morality that impelled them to acquire knowledge. If they had not been able to acquire knowledge they would have been peasants or workmen of that strict integrity, that high morality, that profound virtue, which sometimes astonish and humiliate us—peasants or workmen that belong to the *élite* of humanity; since it hardly needs saying that the *élite* is not restricted to any class, and that there are princes of humanity even among the illiterate and the ignorant. As for the general spread of knowledge and literacy among the masses, in France the number of crimes committed has doubled since the introduction of universal and compulsory instruction. The connection between knowledge and morality has not been demonstrated at all and is more than doubtful.

What, then, becomes of the hypothesis of progress? Artistic progress is non-existent; scientific progress is a fact, but it is a progress that neutralizes itself in the process; moral progress, the only thing that matters, if we consider human happiness to be our true end, would exist if scientific progress had any perceptible influence on morals—but that is a proposition that has not been demonstrated.

M. Faguet concludes that the theory of continuous and uninterrupted human progress is a sheer delusion, a prejudice, not only useless, but dangerous. It is a dangerous prejudice or notion because, M.

Faguet argues, it begets indifference, inaction, fatalism. It is just as bad and paralyzing as the belief that things are going from bad to worse and that no human effort is of any avail, or as the belief that, by a sort of law of compensation, things always remain the same, and that no change that takes place affects anything vital or fundamental in human nature and conduct. For if progress is assured, if it be a law of humanity, if it is automatic or spontaneous, why toil and suffer and make sacrifices?

What, then, we should believe in, and what we have evidence to support, is the modest, unsensational doctrine that in certain directions improvements and ameliorations are possible. We should, in other words, believe in certain *kinds* of progress, but not in *progress*. We have a passion for effort, a mania for invention, and this is largely the cause of our zest for life, our joy in life. "Inventionism" is not necessarily good for us; it does not necessarily make for happiness, but it seems to be a law of our being. Some of the things we regard as progressive are not progressive at all, but humanity is like a sick man who seeks relief in turning from side to side, or from side to back. The relief is temporary, but it is real relief for the time being. At any rate, if not all change is progress, some change is, and to believe in amelioration and improvement is to have a motive for effort and action.

IV

M. Faguet's views are not very cheerful, as we see. Even the admission he finally makes is made grudgingly and with reserve. Some advance, some improvement, in certain directions he declares to be possible. This may be sufficient basis for various reform movements and liberal or radical schools or parties. But it cannot excite enthusiasm or zeal. Such a conception of progress in society and humanity may give us patient, useful workers, but it will not give us inspired and inspiring leaders, martyrs, generous and noble pioneers. Of course, if the conception in question is the best that science and experience will warrant, it is idle to complain. But *is* it the best thing we can hope for? Is M. Faguet as scientific as he is sobering and dispiriting?

Dr. John Dewey, in his contribution to the City Club symposium above mentioned, had more to offer us. He shares some of the negative views of Faguet, it seems. He believes that we have been far too shallow and complacent in our notions of progress, assuming that it is all but irrepressible and inevitable; that we have attributed human progress to Providence, or Evolution, or the Nature of Things, and have mistaken change, and especially rapidity of change, for wonderful progress. He holds that the technical, scientific, and material advances of the

last one hundred and fifty years have merely provided *opportunity* for progress in the true sense of the term, instead of representing or being progress itself.

Progress, according to Dr. Dewey, is a human task and a "retail job" at that. It is by no means a foregone conclusion. It is possible, but it is only possible under certain conditions, and these conditions are not all material and technical. They include "hard wishing," constant planning and contriving, the exercise of foresight, the devising and adopting of means, laws, methods, and social arrangements. Humanity has now the technique, the method, the resources and facilities that are demanded by what we call progress, but it cannot have progress unless it deliberately goes to work to insure it. Humanity has the intelligence as well as the sentiments and emotions that are requisite to progress. While we have predatory and malevolent feeling and instincts, and while the sum total of these anti-social and selfish sentiments is great enough to keep any person, any group, any nation, any alliance of nations, in perpetual trouble, at war with others, it is equally true that we have sufficient benevolence, kindness, justice, and tenderness to give us peace and neighborliness and brotherhood, just and equitable arrangements, if we but make proper use of this part of our endowment, our assets.

Progress, according to Dr. Dewey, is not a matter

of intelligence generally, and still is it a matter of emotion, of so-called altruism and good-will. We may have plenty of intelligence and of right feeling without being progressive or doing anything for progress. We may use our intelligence destructively or in entire indifference to progress. We may stifle or neglect our right feeling and cultivate the wrong sentiments and emotions, those that breed discord and enmity. What progress depends on, what it presupposes, is the systematic thinking and planning of progress. If we want justice, for example, we must carefully think out and enact laws designed to give us just decisions; and we must establish courts and other agencies that could be trusted rightly to interpret and enforce the laws passed in the interest of justice. If we want conciliation and arbitration, industrial or other, we must establish the proper agencies and arrangements for that end and object. If we want a certain amount of internationalism, we must establish certain useful, vital, and vigorous international agencies that will not only exemplify and further internationalism, but that will make internationalism serviceable and interesting to powerful groups of persons.

Dr. Dewey did not provide any exact definition of progress in his brilliant paper at the City Club. But, of course, it implied a clear definition throughout. By progress Dr. Dewey meant national and international peace, concord, justice, as well as so-

cial justice and equality of opportunity in every direction. His views, therefore, may be summed up thus: If we want equality of opportunity, freedom, justice, reasonable comfort for all, and intellectual and spiritual joys for all, we must do exactly what men of physical science do when they have certain problems to solve: We must think earnestly and long; we must experiment, plan, observe, compare, rearrange, restudy, experiment again, until we obtain the result desired. Progress may not be ours for the asking, but it is ours for the working. Vigorous and constant contriving and planning of progress is what will give us progress. Notoriously, the modern world has not done any such planning and contriving. Hence the lamentable and melancholy spectacle in Europe. Hence other lamentable and discreditable spectacles—undeserved misery, widespread want in the midst of abundance, involuntary idleness of armies of men eager and able to earn a living, degradation and delinquency due to lack of vocational training and fair opportunity, and the like. If the great war has shocked us, it has also brought home to us the truth that progress must be planned and worked for, not taken for granted. Even the war is not too great a price to pay for this awakening, this discovery. Even the war, on the other hand, discouraging as it is, does not disprove the possibility, or even the certainty, of progress, provided men want it and are willing to contrive and work for it.

The difference between Dr. Dewey's view and that of Faguet is this, then—the latter expects little progress at the best, while the former leaves both the quality and the quantity of progress in our own hands, so to speak. He assigns no limits and thinks none assignable from any reasonable point of view. Dr. Dewey's message is one of hope and cheer, but also one of action and work.

It may be added here that Professors Hollander and Robinson, each from his special angle, confirmed and indorsed this message. Professor Hollander, as an economist, expressed his conviction that poverty and socially created want can be abolished, and that the means and agencies of reform are at hand. Professor Robinson, as a student of history, declared his conviction that culture and civilization are so unique and so purely human that we need draw no disheartening "biological" parallels; that we have it in our power to improve social and economic and political relations "at will," and that our failures and lapses are due to intellectual indolence, to superstition and blind reverence for tradition and authority, to erroneous notions of "human nature" and human destiny.

V

Now, while such conclusions as there are cheering and revivifying, they leave one very important ques-

tion unconsidered and unanswered. We can easily imagine thinkers like Faguet putting this question as a veritable "poser" to Dr. Dewey and his adherents. It is this: If progress is "a retail job" to be successfully performed by patient and infinite toil, by hard thinking and contriving, why should the selfish, the comfortable, the powerful, the secure, the happy, wish it hard and work for it even harder? If progress is *not* a law of humanity—if we must, as it were, bargain and contract for it—to what elements or properties of human mind and nature are we to address our demand or prayer for coöperation in the cause of progress? What inducements have we to offer them? The contractor works for profit; if we wish to contract for progress, what profit can we promise to those who are well off here and now? Shall we appeal to their sense of expediency? Shall we tell them that they would be happier and safer than they are under a régime of progress? M. Faguet would smile at a suggestion of this sort; there are hundred of thousands who would not respond to any argument from expediency. They live in the present and care little about their grandchildren or more remote posterity; they will tell us that the existing order is certain to outlive them and those that are dear to them, and that there is no earthly reason why they should work hard for social progress, for the welfare of others. Shall we appeal to the sense of justice, of sympathy, of generosity?

Shall we argue that there is a great joy and satisfaction in well-doing, in service, in disinterested labor, and that the promotion and realization of progress will be its own reward? Shall we, in short, appeal to the altruistic sentiments and emotions? If so, and if we expect our appeal to be successful, what is the necessary implication? Clearly, the implication is that the altruistic sentiments are stronger than the egoistic ones, and that even the selfish, the callous, the indifferent, the beneficiaries of unjust privileges or accidental good fortune, may be aroused and stirred to action by tales or pictures of suffering, of want, of inhumanity, of avoidable degradation and degeneration. And if we admit that this is the implication of the appeal, do we not admit, in reality, that man is distinguished *by* his altruism, *by* his sentiments of justice and beneficence? And, finally, if we admit this, do we not admit that progress *is* the law of human nature? If we can have progress by appealing to altruism because altruism is stronger than egoism, then progress is a law of our being, since it is inconceivable that the appeals in behalf of progress and of altruism—and to altruism—should ever be suspended for any considerable period.

To say that the appeal is not to altruism, to the sentiment of justice and generosity, is to say that there is nothing to appeal to, for there is no third set of qualities in human nature. If enlightened

self-interest or expediency is insufficient, and if altruism is also insufficient, then M. Faguet is right, and we need expect no very great advance in any direction save that of material prosperity and mechanical invention. A little social or moral improvement may, indeed, be expected as a mere by-product of such progress, but in such a by-product there is little to glorify.

The Spencerian evolutionist, it may here be pointed out, regards the questions just discussed as unanswerable from the viewpoint of strict utilitarians or pure intellectualists. He holds that the only basis for a rational theory of progress is the doctrine that social development and social discipline *have* steadily strengthened and *are* steadily strengthening our sentiments of justice and beneficence; that, although altruism is as primordial as egoism, and is by no means confined to man, it is not a fixed quantity, and that human progress depends on the growth and intensification of our altruistic sentiments. He holds that what we call character and goodness are the highest and finest products of evolution, and that intelligence and knowledge are only tools and instruments used by the emotions and the will of humanity. If the Spencerian evolutionist is right, progress may be said to be a law of our being, albeit education and environmental influences are extremely important.

But if we deny that altruism is and has long been

increasing, and if we assert that there is no more evidence of any increase in innate altruism in a hundred thousand years than there is of an increase in the mental power and capacity of man in the last six or seven thousand years, then the burden of proof falls on us and we must demonstrate by reference to history and to contemporary experience that, weak and frail as we are, divided against ourselves as we are, sadly deficient as we are in qualities we deem admirable, the amount of right thinking and right feeling in us is, and long has been, quite sufficient to assure progress if we but take the necessary pains with it and deliberately make it our object and goal. Can we sustain this burden of proof? Is the proposition demonstrable? *Can* it be shown that "we have as much progress as we deserve"; that we have always had as much progress as we "bargained for," worked for, sought, in a "retail way," to achieve and nail down, as it were?

Let us see to what lame and impotent conclusion a great naturalist and biologist—Alfred Russel Wallace—was finally brought by his disbelief in the inheritance of acquired traits, his assertion that natural selection and sexual selection are the only actual factors of evolution.

Wallace, as his last books show, believed that "our whole system of society is rotten from top to bottom," and that "the social environment as a whole, in relation to our possibilities and our claims, is the

worst that the world has ever known." He ascribed the rottenness of modern society to the competitive régime and to the failure of governments to substitute coöperation for competition. He also recognized the fact that the so-called competitive régime is only competitive in part; that many monopolies and special privileges enjoyed by the few render the field far from free or fair, and that equality of opportunity is the first condition of really legitimate and fair competition. His remedy for our ills may be stated in one word, "coöperation." By coöperation he meant "economic brotherhood," industrial democracy, freedom of access to land and capital by all, under capable direction.

Of course, Wallace could not and did not ignore the question which such views inevitably suggest—how, if society is appallingly rotten and things are going from bad to worse, we can expect to change our immoral environment into a moral one and to initiate an era of sound and healthy progress. That is, to whom and to what are those of us who are dissatisfied and restive to appeal in the name of progress?

Wallace's answer, however, was so strangely and singularly superficial and unscientific that it has puzzled many of his admirers. It amounts to this—that in the first place, "the more intelligent of the workers" are now prepared to attack the root-causes of our social and economic ills and to demand

the appropriate remedies, and that, in the second place, the creation of a new and moral environment *through* coöperation and social justice will release certain purely natural and biological forces, now dormant, that make for human improvement and progress—the forces, namely, of sexual selection. Today woman is not free to choose; the emancipated and independent woman of the coöperative order will refuse to marry the ugly, the mean, the brutal, and the anti-social man, and her rejection of the unfit will gradually lead to the selection and further improvement of the morally fit.

It is not in the least necessary to discuss the claims and hopes based by Wallace on sexual selection, for he tells us himself that this factor is inoperative at present and will come into play only *after* the creation of a new and moral environment. Woman, when free, will do this or that; but only a coöperative and just régime will free woman, and our problem is how to abolish the presnt régime and usher in the new one. Here sexual selection will not help us, and we are left with nothing save the fact that, in the words of Wallace, “the more intelligent of the workers” realize the evils of monopoly and wage-slavery, and are ready, or almost ready, to fight resolutely for equality of opportunity and coöperation.

Verily, the mountain has labored and has brought forth a mouse! That *some* intelligent workers favor

coöperation is true and of good augury; but if all our hope of reform and progress rests on that fact, and that fact alone, the social and economic outlook is dismal indeed. How long will it take to convert the millions of the "less intelligent workers"? And are we sure that the conversion of even a decided majority of the workers would suffice? Are we reduced to the class struggle and the class consciousness again, and after all? And what would Wallace have said about the collapse of the class struggle and of international socialism in Europe as a feature of the great war?

The truth is that those who deny that the altruistic sentiments are developing and growing stronger as the result of social discipline and adaptation to the social state, those who base their hopes of progress on intelligence alone, are left with broken reeds to lean on after an analysis of the whole situation and the various factors involved.

Fortunately, not all thinkers reject the theory of the transmission of acquired psychological traits, of the inheritance of the effects of education, culture, and social discipline; not all thinkers reject the doctrine of the continued adaptability of mankind and the growth of the altruistic sentiments. The belief in human progress rests on something more than class interest, on something more than the ideas of "the more intelligent workers," on something more than the existence of scientific method and technique,

on something more than the possibility of more systematic planning and contriving of certain desiderata in social, economic, and political arrangements. All these are factors, no doubt, but the greatest factor is the growing sentiment of justice. Progress is a resultant of several forces.

Illustrations of this truth abound. Slavery was not abolished in the United States by any single set of influences. Self-interest, reason, emotion, military necessity—all these conspired to bring about the step—certainly a progressive step. Industrial coöperation is progress, but it is clear that it will not displace the wage-system and capitalism solely because of the “intelligence of some of the workmen.” Prison reform, the abolition of the capital penalty, and like improvements are slowly being realized largely by reason of successful appeals to and stimulation of the altruistic sentiments. On the other hand, for some proposed reforms we say that “the time is not ripe,” or the average human being “is not ready.” We imply that at some future time the average human being will be prepared to accept the now “utopian” proposal. We expect that events, experience, and propaganda will educate him—educate him not intellectually alone, but emotionally as well. If, however, we can purify and refine human emotion, do we not thereby facilitate progress, render it less difficult for the future?

Progress is not automatic, to be sure. Changes

are effected in time, not by time, as Morley said long ago. If humanity went to sleep for a century there would be no progress. Progress, as Dr. Dewey holds, is a retail job, to be bargained for and carefully planned. But if we are to enlist the hosts of the indifferent and the prosperous, the doubting and the hostile; if we are to treat progress as a human and not as a class problem and task, our appeal must be increasingly to the best qualities of our evolving and improving human nature.

The war has been a bitter dose to swallow. We must revise a good many particular opinions, but we shall find ere long that even the terrible war has not seriously shaken the profound belief in progress. For are not thoughtful men and women already saying that the war itself may become a potent instrument of progress? Are we not already planning better peace and arbitration machinery, greater publicity for and democratic control of diplomacy, and other safeguards and preventives of war? Out of evil good may come—nay *must* come. Human nature, derided and condemned by many, will attend to that operation.

RECENT ASSAULTS ON DEMOCRACY

PARAPHRASING the words of a British liberal statesman, who, in defending certain so-called paternalistic and restrictive measures, exclaimed: "We are all Socialists now," one may say today, in view of prevailing political and social tendencies, "We are all radicals and democrats now." Few thinkers of note venture to espouse the cause of caste, class, privilege, hereditary aristocracy or hereditary monarchy in any form. Democracy is triumphant, although the struggle is by no means over in the practical realm. There are, of course, all sorts of survivals, vestiges, anachronisms, to get rid of—such as thrones, non-elective second chambers, meaningless titles of nobility, alien governments over dependencies or possessions, and the like. All recognize, however, that these things "must go" and are slowly going, and that the future belongs to a régime of pure democracy.

It is true that certain vestiges are regarded as harmless and rather decorative, and even the militant democratic radicals are willing to spare them for the time being. The British crown is an example. There is no formidable republican movement

in Great Britain. Stanch leaders of the labor and the advanced liberal parties carefully refrain from attacking the monarchy, while fully realizing its undemocratic character. Still, the monarch is tolerated because, as the argument runs, while a good and enlightened king or queen has large opportunities of real usefulness, a reactionary or despotic king or queen is shorn of all possibility of inflicting mischief on the nation. The people rule, as a matter of fact, and the crown is preserved for its historic, sentimental, artistic values. Democracies are human, it is explained, and are fond of symbolism, ceremonial and pomp. Knowing that their rights and liberties are perfectly safe, they are willing to retain an ornamental institution that links the present to the romantic and gorgeous past.

This view is doubtless superficial and unsound. The British monarchy is not harmless. The fact that the crown's veto is almost a forgotten thing of a forgotten past blinds many democrats and progressives to the insidious and pernicious influences of court life, manners and pretensions. The crown presupposes caste, class, artificial distinctions and vanities. These in turn imply snobbery, servility, and social inequalities having no relation whatever to personal merits or social values. Democracy cannot flourish in a soil and atmosphere so poisoned. Democracy needs the healthy air of honesty, candor, dignity, self-respect and appreciation of genuine

merit in all human relations. But, be this as it may, the evolutionist finds little difficulty in accounting for the indifference of British democrats and radicals to republican forms of government and their toleration of monarchical institutions. At any rate, he will not fall into the error of assuming intentional disloyalty to the democratic principle on the part of the British trade unions, Fabians and advanced liberals.

Even in Germany democracy is much stronger and more active and general than most of us suppose. Fifty years of militarism, profitable warfare and "glory," control of public education in all of its branches by the bureaucracy and the junkers, and, perhaps, certain painful national memories of foreign exploitation of German weakness and disunion in the past have combined to retard the growth of liberalism and democracy in the Teutonic empire. Slow growth is, however, not to be mistaken for stagnation or for retrogression. The ultimate triumph of democracy in Germany cannot be doubted by the serious student of history and of politico-social evolution.

Even in the East, where, according to certain superficial philosophers, human nature is different than in the West, democratic institutions are taking root. The wretched fallacy that certain peoples are incapable of self-government and must always be ruled by superior races is being abandoned even by

some elements of European and American toryism. India now has a definite promise of home rule and free institutions. In China efforts to restore the monarchy have signally failed. Japan has vigorous political parties that only respect the forms and shadow of feudalism in government while repudiating its substance. The Philippine Islands, thanks to the staunch American democrats and anti-imperialists, have certainly furnished a striking object lesson to the tory doubters or reactionaries. The Filipino is giving a good account of himself in the local and general elective bodies that have been created, and it is clear that all he needs is more education and opportunity.

To repeat, never has the idea, the principle, of democracy been more firmly established than today. The great world war has definitely become a war between confident, advancing, invincible democracy and decadent, discredited autocracy and feudalism. With the issue clarified and simplified, the outcome cannot be uncertain. Democracy must and shall win, and progress in every direction must and shall be resumed along democratic lines.

Yet at this historic conjuncture some writers of standing and distinction have seen fit to make systematic and deliberate assaults on the democratic principle. Their arguments are weak, sophistical, fallacious, but they may none the less confuse, mislead or at least puzzle many persons whose grip on

first principles or important historic facts is not sufficiently strong to enable them to detect rhetorical juggling, irrelevant distinctions and hollow subtleties.

W. H. Mallock, a veteran warrior of the Quixote type, an old intellectual foe of radicalism, has written a bulky volume of several hundred pages on "The Limits of Democracy." Strangely enough, a liberal American reviewer who ought not to have been imposed upon by Mr. Mallock's superficial brilliancy and dialectic skill, has described the book as "a thoughtful" study of democracy in its good and bad aspects. As a matter of fact, the study is *not* thoughtful. Thought is precisely what it lacks. The volume represents a sad waste of energy and ingenuity. It is scientifically pointless and practically valueless—except for mischief.

Mr. Mallock's central contention is that there is no such thing as democratic government; that a government of, by and for the people—a phrase, by the way, which he ridicules because, forsooth, it is inexact, repetitious and even a little ambiguous, as if the essential meaning of the phrase were not absolutely clear and instantly intelligible to all!—never has existed and never can exist, and that government necessarily involves the union or the co-operation of two opposite principles, the democratic and the oligarchic.

Let Mr. Mallock speak for himself. He says:

"All current definitions of democracy err, even before they are stated, by reason of a false assumption which underlies the formulation of all of them. They all assume that democracy is a system of government of some kind. This is precisely what, except in primitive and minute communities, pure democracy is not, nor ever has been, nor ever can be. It is simply one principle out of two, the other being that of oligarchy, which two may indeed be combined in very various proportions, but neither of which alone will produce what is meant by a government."

The last page of Mr. Mallock's book sums up the whole argument as follows:

"Democracy and oligarchy are principles not mutually exclusive. . . . In any great and complex state the one is the complement of the other. . . . In any great and complex state democracy only knows itself through the coöperation of oligarchy; the many can prosper only through the participation in benefits which, in the way alike of material comfort, opportunity, culture and social freedom, would be possible for no one unless the many submitted themselves to the influence or authority of the supercapable few."

Mr. Mallock sternly rebukes the democratic leaders of England and America, President Wilson and Premier Lloyd George, for what he calls "their great suppressio veri," or the insistent use of a

formula by which the principle of oligarchy is denied. He severely asks whether such procedure would be tolerated in chemistry, medicine or engineering! He implies that it is intellectually dishonest in statesmen and publicists to ignore the oligarchic principle and talk to the ignorant about democratic institutions, democratic government, democratic ideals, and so on.

The sincere democrat, argues Mr. Mallock, is also a sincere oligarch, for he realizes that the exercise of personal power or influence is the exercise of exceptional faculties not possessed in equal degree by all. President Wilson is an oligarch, since he has influenced the will of a great, heterogeneous nation by the exercise of his personal gifts and rare faculties. A great labor leader, a great Socialist agitator and orator, a great revolutionary conspirator and organizer are severally oligarchs. Why, then, refuse to admit this vital truth?

Because, dear Mr. Mallock, it is not a truth at all.

Whether democracy is all-sufficient as a principle, or whether oligarchy is equally indispensable in government is a question that cannot be answered intelligently unless there is first of all an agreement as to the definitions of the terms "democracy" and "oligarchy." Mr. Mallock could not have proceeded very far had he stopped to reach an understanding concerning such definitions. His thought

is confused because his language is loose, inaccurate and arbitrary.

Now by democracy and democratic government we mean neither more nor less than government based on what is called universal adult suffrage, on the principle that each voter casts but one vote that has the same weight as any other vote, and on the principle that government rests on the "consent of the governed," a majority usually, though not always, determining what the laws of the country shall be and by whom they shall be administered. These are all simple conceptions, and as a matter of fact no person of ordinary intelligence has ever been misled by them. Democracy precludes hereditary rule, whether in a legislature or in the executive; democracy precludes plural voting, democracy precludes any form or degree of governmental authority that claims any sort of sanction other than popular consent and approval.

Certain governments are more democratic than others, but there is never any mystery or difficulty about the tests that determine the degree of democracy in any given government. The British monarchy is, as we have seen, undemocratic. The British House of Lords is undemocratic. The claim of our own Judiciary to set aside legislation is undemocratic, because no such power can be shown to have been conferred upon the Judiciary by the people. Whenever the suffrage is extended, everybody

knows and says that it has been made "more democratic." Adult suffrage is more democratic than manhood suffrage.

Again, direct legislation, legislation through the referendum and initiative, is very properly considered to be more democratic than legislation by elected representatives of the people. Add the recall to a political system otherwise quite advanced, and democracy concededly has been moved up another notch. Whether or not the majority of a state or community should have their way in everything, and should have their way incontinently, without delays and obstacles, may be a most important question. But even if majority rule is limited, and minority rights are safeguarded in certain directions, the point is that under democracy the majority themselves accept such limitations. They are not imposed by any autocrat or oligarchy.

Now turn to oligarchy. The term is defined by dictionaries as the rule of a small caste or a few persons. It is a perfectly valid definition. No one has ever quarreled with it. How, then, can Mr. Mallock assert that in every great and complex state oligarchy is as essential as democracy? How is it possible to have a government that is popular, democratic, and at the same time oligarchical, undemocratic?

Mr. Mallock is guilty of a transparent verbal trick. He smuggles into the discussion a peculiar

definition of oligarchy. It means to him not the rule, government, arbitrary power of the few, but *the moral influence and moral authority of the few*, the supercapable, as he calls them. The inspiring orator who thrills an audience and secures from it an indorsement of his view is an oligarch, according to Mr. Mallock. The powerful writer, the political leader in or out of office, the organizer, the pioneer and innovator are all oligarchs. And because no government is possible without leadership, initiative, and the submission of the many to the intellectual and moral authority of the few, Mr. Mallock jumps to the conclusion that there is no such thing as democratic government, and that oligarchy is essential and unavoidable! What logic! Who has ever asserted that democracies can dispense with leadership and moral authority? Who has ever maintained that the opinions of one man must carry as much weight as those of any other men? Mr. Mallock's fallacy is as gross as would be that of failing to distinguish between driving men with a whip and leading them by personal magnetism and intellectual power.

Of course, the greater and more complex a state is the greater is the need of ability, vision, knowledge, statesmanship, wisdom and moral courage in those who are intrusted with the direction of its affairs and the shaping of its policies. A democracy cannot flourish under weak, bad or timid and un-

principled leaders. But these statements are truisms. The whole point is that under democratic forms of government the people have the power and recurrent opportunity to dismiss bad or inefficient servants, and to put better ones in their place, while under oligarchy or autocracy the people cannot throw off the yoke of bad rulers and must endure and suffer until the limits of popular patience are passed and an explosion—called a revolution—occurs.

If Mr. Mallock had arraigned democracies for their tendency to place bad and weak men in power, and for allowing themselves too often to be deceived and duped by tools of predatory privilege posing as champions of the people, the most militant of radicals and democrats would have applauded him. In the long run the people have the kind of government they deserve. In the long run the people have as much liberty and opportunity as they are educated to demand and fit to enjoy. But under democracy the people are always sure to have honest, high-minded, intelligent leaders out of power and office to direct their attention to the tyranny or corruption or ignorance of the men in office. Under oligarchy or autocracy such insurgent, unofficial leaders are suppressed and the people kept in darkness and ignorance.

So much for Mr. Mallock's politics. In attacking what is called today "industrial democracy" Mr.

Mallock is even more contemptuous of the radical position and more rapturous in singing the praises of the oligarchic principle. Industrial democracy, forsooth, rails Mr. Mallock. What would your ten thousand laborers do without a supercapable oligarch, the captain, the director, the entrepreneur, the originator and the energetic executive? Let the oligarch strike, and the shop or mill comes to a standstill. Let the laborers strike, and other laborers will be found to take their jobs. The captain is indispensable; he creates the jobs, the markets, the opportunities. Why, all the communistic and socialistic colonies and experiments have proved dismal failures, and all because the oligarchical principle was disregarded by them! The members refused to submit themselves to the guidance of the supercapable few, of captains and leaders, and the result was inefficiency—waste and friction.

Now, whatever may have caused the failure of communistic experiments, there is no sane advocate of industrial democracy today who does not emphasize the necessity of competent direction of industrial enterprises. Co-operation is not unsuccessful in Britain, in France, in Holland, and we know that the coöperative movement has had, and has, very able and competent leaders. Mr. Mallock may choose to call these oligarchs, but the members of the co-operative societies will only laugh at him. They know that they have surrendered nothing of

value in democracy, in the principle of freedom, in consenting to direction of co-operative industry by competent men selected by them for their competence with a view to the good of all. Co-operative industry is properly called democratic, because each co-operator is a partner, a member having equal fundamental rights. The contrast between co-operative industry and autocratic industry was recognized even by that uncompromising individualist, Herbert Spencer, who predicted the ultimate supersession of the wage-system by co-operation without compulsion by reason of the greater freedom, dignity, self-respect and efficiency of the workers in a well-managed co-operative establishment.

Mr. Mallock's real notion is that democracy and chaos are interchangeable terms; that democracy implies jealousy, fear and dislike of the capable, and the settlement of every question by a majority vote after noisy and disorderly mass meetings. He loses sight of the fact that even philosophical anarchists, who dream of a social organization *sans* any element of compulsion, form clubs, adopt rules, elect chairmen, and see nothing humiliating or undemocratic in submitting themselves to the moral authority and influence of brilliant or persuasive men!

In fine, Mr. Mallock has discovered no unknown or neglected limits of democracy. His attack on democracy is an attack on a figment of his own imagination. His defense of oligarchy is a piece of

sophistry, and his attempt to revive and vindicate that "principle" is pathetically futile. Quite as "good" an argument as his can be made for autocracy and aristocracy. Juggling and arbitrary definitions will accomplish almost anything—on paper, and to the satisfaction of the sophists. Only by grossly and unwarrantably misrepresenting democracy does Mr. Mallock make a sort of case for oligarchy.

INCOME AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SERVICE

A FIRM belief in progress is implied in the familiar quotation, "No question is settled until it is settled right." That so many men—that, indeed, the average man—should unhesitatingly subscribe to that assertion or generalization is indisputably a significant fact, one that attests the ingrained belief in the idea of progress. Taking a concrete case, if we should say that the interest question will never be settled until it is settled right, would any thoughtful man venture to challenge the affirmation? Nothing is more striking in the features of our age than the universal acceptance of the principle of service—that is, of service as the only basis of reward or title thereto. The complexities of our industrial and social order are such that our definitions of "work" or of "service" must necessarily be broader and subtler than those of a primitive and simple community; but the principle is not affected by the superficial complexities. More and more generally is the doctrine accepted as a matter of course that he who does not work or usefully serve has no right to support, to income. If this be not proof of moral advance, no such proof is in truth conceivable.

Professor Scott Nearing has in a manner wholly modern reopened the whole question of title to income. In his book on *Income*, as well as in a recent contribution to *The Journal of Sociology*, he issued a challenge to the economic and ethical champions of "property income," and particularly of interest. He would be the last man to claim that he has given this subject exhaustive or searching treatment. But he has boldly and vigorously raised a question that too many writers and thinkers had forgotten. To some of his incidental views exception may be taken; but his facts and his figures are so impressive that the most complacent and Panglossian of publicists will find it impossible to ignore them or dismiss them with the stereotyped platitudes.

Billions, Mr. Nearing shows, are claimed and collected annually by holders of titles to property in various shapes or forms. These proprietors, in the great majority of cases, render no palpable service to society; or, if they do render such service, they receive compensation for it apart from the income they derive from their "investments." What are these billions of "property income" paid *for*? What is society getting for them? If society gets nothing in return, then property income is sheer robbery, as Proudhon maintained. If society gets something, then, of course, the principle of service is not violated. But what is that something?

Professor Nearing has briefly examined and dis-

posed of certain conventional theories of property income. The present writer wishes in this paper to pursue a somewhat different line of argument and to analyze other theories that have been advanced to justify interest. Some conclusions may be ventured upon at the close.

There are three main sources of property income. Two of them, profit and rent, will not detain us. Profit is defined as the wage of the enterprising capitalist, the employer of labor. The normal rate of profit in business is not excessive, and where the employer is an active worker, his profit may indeed be his wages—and he is worthy of his hire. Where the profit is extraordinarily large we find either the element of privilege, of monopoly—legal or illegal—or the element of rare ability, of genius, or a combination of both elements. No one complains of the “profits” of the average farmer, or of the small shopkeeper, or of the small manufacturer. “Differential” profits, commanded by superior business ability or the gift for organization and administration, seldom constitute an evil or menace, since they tend to disappear where competition is really free and the laws against unfair practices or monopolistic oppression are enforced with reasonable vigor and effectiveness. Whether or not society is wise in its patent and copyright policies is a question that may be passed over on this occasion. Even if we assume that some injustice is traceable to these policies, that in-

justice is not serious enough to threaten social stability and social progress. An intelligent assault on profit is at bottom an assault on privilege and monopoly.

Rent is defined by economists as the price paid for the use of a monopolized natural agent. Now, where land monopoly or the monopolization of other natural resources begets rent, our quarrel is with the monopoly, not with any theory of rent, classical or modern. Rent will arise under certain conditions, and what society has been asking more and more persistently is whether these conditions are "natural"—that is, morally defensible and right. Where the conditions represent feudal survivals, expropriation of the tillers of the soil, inclosures of commons contrary to law or with the sanction of class-controlled parliaments; where the monopoly of land and mines and other natural resources may be traced to royal grants or perfectly arbitrary and profligate surrender of the common heritage, the case is morally simple enough, even if practically any attempted rectification may be full of difficulties and dangers. In France, a great revolution transferred the land to the peasant masses and in a terrible, sanguinary manner solved a problem that would have plagued generations. In Ireland, land purchase on an extraordinary scale is effecting a peaceable revolution and solving the "rack rent" problem and the problem of absentee and parasitic landlordism. The wisdom and

beneficence of the Irish land-purchase legislation—so fiercely attacked when initiated by a liberal cabinet and popular premier—no one now seriously questions. Wherever the land question is “up for solution,” the solution is certain to be found in the abolition of monopoly and the transfer of land to occupying owners and cultivators. Nationalization, the single tax, and other schemes severally contain the essential and saving idea of equalization of natural opportunity. None of the familiar schemes may get itself accepted in the precise form favored by its advocates, but the general direction and the true nature of the reforms that are surely “coming” are unmistakably indicated to the impartial students of the land and rent questions.

Nor is this at all surprising. The average man, who applies “mere common-sense” to everything, agrees with the most anxious and scholarly investigator of “origins” and tenures that land monopoly is immoral, anti-social, and in the long run “impossible.” The wonderful success of Henry George’s *Progress and Poverty* is due to this fact. Scientific economists found much in the book to deride and condemn; but its appeal to common morality and to the rule of reason was, as to the fundamental issue, irresistible. The land is not the product of man’s labor; the right of one man to a place in the sun, or on the earth, is neither greater nor less than that of another; no generation may crowd another off the

earth; therefore all land arrangements are subject to modification at the dictates of social need and social expediency. Arguments like these are simply unanswerable, and whoever has attempted to answer them has had to fall back on the plea that, whatever may be the case with the Ricardian "properties of the soil," native and indestructible, land today is generally the product of man's capital and labor. Land has for generations been bought and sold like other commodities; capital has been invested therein; improvements, the maintenance or even the increase of fertility are the work of man, not of nature. How, then, can we reopen the ancient question of title to the original form and quality of the property? If we wish to be honest and contemplate compensation to the present owners (as in the case of the above-mentioned Irish example), it is supposed to be demonstrable that the operation would cost more than it is worth to society.

Without analyzing these and similar arguments (in truth, they are hardly worth analysis), it is important to note here that what, after all, emerges from them is the claim that rent today is largely or mostly interest on capital invested in land rather than payment for the use of a natural agent or factor that has somehow been appropriated by this or that person.

It may be added that, as a matter of fact, a great deal of what is conventionally described and classi-

fied as profit or rent is in reality nothing but interest on capital. Professor Nearing is right in objecting to the old classification and in urging that the subject of income be considered in a new light and with reference to the notorious facts of the present economic and social order.

The knotty, the crucial, the basic question is the question of interest. If interest is wrong, the other forms of property income will fall with it; but if interest is right and defensible, then the assaults on rent and profit are generally vain and futile, except in so far as they are assaults on naked monopoly.

Now, interest has staunch and convinced defenders, not only among the scientific economists, but also among the plain, hard-headed men of affairs, and even among the working classes. Professor Nearing candidly recognizes this fact. Is it not a significant fact? May there not be a soul of good in a thing seemingly evil that is yet widely accepted as natural and right?

Perhaps the best way to analyze interest is to take first the common-sense view of the average man—the average toiler, even, who keeps his hard-earned savings in a bank, and draws interest on them at the “low” rate of 3 or $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

Now, let us approach a thrifty mechanic and tell him that interest is immoral and unjust—a modern form of exploitation and robbery. What will he be likely to think aloud? Something like this, it is

safe to say: "I have worked hard and still work hard. I have to deprive myself of all sorts of little comforts and pleasures to which I think I am fairly entitled—amusements, little trips, vacations, an extra hat for my wife or daughter, a nice little birthday dinner at a good restaurant. I have friends and acquaintances who earn no more, or even perhaps less, than I do, and who allow themselves such occasional luxuries. They have saved little, if any, of their earnings. This has been imprudent and wrong on their part, as every moralist and economist tells us. If I, on the other hand, have put my honest savings in a bank, is it not perfectly fair that I should get some interest on my money?"

This, of course, is a simple, unadorned version of the abstinence theory of interest. The mechanic demands a reward for his self-denial, his thrift, his economy. Suppose we answer him by pointing out that what, in effect, he is asking is that he be permitted to eat his cake and have it too—have it whole and unimpaired; suppose we point out to him that his savings *are* his reward, the sole and sufficient reward of his abstinence and thrift; that his less prudent friends may live to regret their self-indulgence, since they have nothing to fall back on in the event of accident or misfortune, and since old age may find them destitute and condemned to dependence on charity, while he, because of his virtue and foresight, enjoys freedom from worry and dread, is

able to sleep peacefully, and to face the future serenely. Suppose we say all this to him and ask him whether he still thinks society owes him interest; what is likely to be his rejoinder?

This, probably: that while the foregoing reasoning might be valid in a case where a man kept his little hoard at home, in a secret place, idle and useless to the body social and economic, it is not valid in a case like his, for *he* puts his savings in a bank and through the bank into circulation, and, as everybody knows, banks lend money to their customers and charge them interest on it. Why should the bank get the interest earned by the money of the depositors? It may be entitled to part of the interest, since it takes care of the money, provides safety vaults for it, and incurs expenses of administration. But under modern conditions the compensation for the bank's service to the depositor need not be large, need not absorb the entire interest earned by his money. Indeed, many commercial banks pay interest to depositors on their average daily balances. Hence, the man who puts his savings into a savings bank expects and gets interest on his money.

Again, this common-sense answer is wholly satisfactory as far as it goes. But it merely pushes the real question one step back—from the individual depositor to the bank. How does the bank earn the interest? Why is it able to charge interest?

Here the average person will perhaps pause for a

moment and then advance a more complicated theory, a compound of the two distinct theories of abstinence and productivity. He will explain that the bank is able to charge interest because its borrowers use the money productively and profitably. The manufacturer and the merchant, the exporter and the jobber, the speculator and the exchange operator—all these borrow money of the bank in order to “make” money, to make more money than they could make without the additional capital thus obtained. Our common-sense defender of interest will therefore proceed to argue thus: “He who borrows my savings of the bank hands me over, as interest, part of his increased income. He makes more because of my money, and he is perfectly willing to divide the increase with me. My abstinence and self-denial are advantageous to him; and my interest is not a reward of virtue in the abstract, but a reward of virtue that is directly and immediately useful to him and therefore to industrial society. Why, then, is this interest unjust?”

This little argument amounts to this—that interest *is* payment for service. Abstinence on the part of some enables others to do business on a larger scale than they could otherwise undertake; they realize larger gains or profits, and in paying interest they pay for a distinct service rendered them by the abstainers.

The learned political economists make the same

argument in more technical and scientific language. They do not, gifts and legacies aside, quarrel with the principle of service, or with the formula, "No work, no food"; but they contend that the man of property who lends his money to another for use in industry or commerce performs a valuable service—"works," in other words, by letting his capital work in the hands of another man.

But how do the learned economists meet the two objections that the average man, armed with his common-sense and little business experience, can hardly be expected to know how to meet?

The first of these objections is that abstinence has its reward in the before-mentioned security and peace which it brings, and is really not entitled to any further reward. To repeat the homely simile used already in the discussion with the average practical person, the man who saves his cake has it, and if he lends it to another and gets back another cake of the same quality and size, he has all the reward he would seem to be entitled to. Suppose we sit down to a rich meal and conclude that it would be improvident to consume all that is spread before us. We leave something for the next meal, this act possibly involving a little resistance to the immediate appetite. Is not the next meal our sufficient reward? Do we need an additional incentive?

The economist thinks that we do, and that, in a sense, it is quite reasonable to demand that we eat

our cake and have it too. Perhaps the ablest and keenest defense of this position was that made by Böhm-Bawerk, the Austrian statesman and financier, in his well-known work. His theory of interest is a modernized and purged version of the abstinence theory. It may be summarized thus: It is natural to men to prefer present goods, present pleasures and satisfactions, to future goods, pleasures, or satisfactions. The thing we want today has a higher value for us, psychologically speaking, than the promise of the same thing for next week or next month. We do not like to postpone agreeable things, and sometimes postponement is positively painful. Besides, the future is uncertain; we may not live to enjoy the promised pleasure; or we may not be well enough or contented enough to care for it. To defer the consumption of goods is, therefore, to make a real sacrifice, even though we eventually consume the goods. This sacrifice, moreover, we would not always make for our own sake, for the sake of future security or enjoyment. To induce us to make it, those who use our savings must pay us some compensation. Interest in this compensation; it represents the difference in value between present goods and future goods.

In this explanation, manifestly, the economist appeals to psychology, to human experience at large. It must be admitted at once that the alleged difference is not fanciful. It exists. We all feel it, wheth-

er we have to defer a visit to the theater or a trip to Europe. And it must also be admitted that the sacrifice involved in deferring pleasure or enjoyment must as a rule be paid for. But all this is hardly sufficient to justify interest as we know it. That interest, as now paid, is nothing *but* compensation for sacrifice in the sense indicated is pure assumption. May it not be altogether excessive from that point of view? May not other and less legitimate elements enter into it? As a matter of fact, we shall see that other elements do enter into interest.

Here, however, the second objection to interest above alluded to should be considered. If interest is compensation for abstinence, or for the sacrifice involved in deferred satisfactions, in giving up goods today for goods to be consumed in the future, why is interest paid to those who do not abstain and do not consciously or unconsciously defer any pleasure?

Professor Nearing in his *Income* mentions this objection among others in the following trenchant paragraph:

This income [meaning property income] is not paid in return for meritorious social service; some of those who receive it are notoriously anti-social in all their dealings. It is not paid for abstinence; many of the recipients of property income never knew what it was to abstain. It is not paid for saving; there are many people with vast incomes who during their

entire lives have never done anything except spend. It is not paid for productive effort; children, disabled persons, idlers, and wastrels are among its recipients.

Karl Marx and Ferdinand Lasalle, in their day, directed withering sarcasms at this same theory of abstinence, self-denial, and sacrifice. They used to point to the idle millionaires, or the sons and daughters of such, and ask whether any economist of the classical school would have the audacity to assert that they have practiced abstinence or denied themselves anything in a spirit of virtue and thrift.

But the economists find this line of reasoning inconclusive. They remind us of the fact that it is the mass of "marginal investors" that count, and that the multimillionaire who draws interest without undergoing hardship and sacrifice no more disproves the theory in question than does the poor washerwoman or seamstress at the other end of the social scale, whose sacrifices are so great that the rate of interest she can command at any time on her slight savings may well seem a pitifully poor compensation for her truly heroic degree of thrift and self-denial. The economists tell us elaborately that the modern theory of interest does not imply that where there is no abstinence, no deferring of pleasures, there can be no interest, any more than that it implies that in every case the interest obtained corresponds strictly to the amount and quality of sacrifice undergone in

saving the money that draws the interest. All that the theory implies is that, *as a general proposition*, interest is reward of abstinence and self-denial, and that if no interest were paid, few, if any, would defer satisfactions and save any part of their income. If nine-tenths of those who draw interest, directly or indirectly, do practice abstinence, the remaining tenth, even if they did not do so, would be able to command interest all the same, the rate being determined by the marginal investors. Once the level is fixed, we may find thereon cases that either do not deserve to be there or that deserve to be on a higher level.

It must be owned that this is sound and valid reasoning. If interest can be justified in the great majority of cases, the idle millionaire with his income from property that represents no sacrifice will cause no trouble to the adherents of the abstinence theory. But the justification intended for the majority of cases leaves much to be desired. To repeat, we may grant that the marginal investors practice self-denial and deserve compensation therefor without being under the smallest compulsion to grant also that the interest now generally paid for capital is nothing *but* compensation for thrift and self-denial. If we accuse a man of having stolen a dollar, and he proves that he has earned and saved a dime, we do not regard the defense as adequate.

Let us now make the strongest possible case for

interest under modern industrial and commercial conditions. Let us advance several illustrations that seemingly go to the very root of the matter, illustrations that the man of common-sense and the scholarly economist alike will concede to be not only typical but highly favorable to their view—illustrations, indeed, that are half arguments.

1. A man has saved money, or inherited it from a thrifty and honest father, and has bought a small farm with it. He has a chance to acquire his neighbor's small farm, and he is desirous of doing so. It would be to his distinct advantage to enlarge his holdings. But he has no money in the bank or elsewhere. He decides to borrow. He borrows of another neighbor, or of the local bank in which many of his neighbors keep their savings. He pays interest on the loan—pays it gladly. He expects to profit by the operation. The profit will enable him to pay off the debt.

2. A man of exceptional ability and initiative starts a small business with his own capital. He succeeds; his business grows; he wishes to enlarge his plant. He is accommodated by a bank, or by a private person. He pays the interest and nets a profit in addition. The business continues to expand, and he needs more and more capital. The banks are glad to extend him credit. He becomes rich and powerful—a captain of industry. He makes millions, in spite of the interest burden he has had to carry for

years. He has enough to provide for his children and relatives, and to endow charitable and educational institutions. He has had ample reward for his skill and industry, his brains and enterprise. But he has all along handed over certain parts of his income to those whose capital he has used and by means of which he has accumulated his millions.

3. Several men of business ability and sound morals discern an opportunity or industrial "opening" of which they cannot take advantage, having little or no capital of their own. They organize a corporation. They sell the bonds and stocks of this corporation. The investors who buy the bonds or stocks furnish capital and nothing more. The organizers and entrepreneurs take charge and manage the affairs of the corporation. They employ assistants and superintendents. They prosper; they pay the interest on the bonds and the dividends on the preferred stock; there is a balance left. The balance they claim as their due. It represents their wages, but it may be large enough to include a bonus, a profit.

Now, these and similar instances, indefinitely multiplied and more or less varied, exemplify our present industrial and financial system. Indirect co-operation, joint stock companies, high organization of credit and banking, the "mobilization" and use of other people's savings by captains of industry are among the salient features of this system. Rail-

roads, we know, are owned by thousands of small stockholders. The presidents, managers, and directors are really the paid employees of the true owners, and if the latter have but little power and few of the prerogatives of ownership, that fact is due to their lack of organization, training, and knowledge. But the "true owners" do no work and perform no service apart from the possible service under investigation—the furnishing of the capital.

What is true of railroads is true of banks, shipping companies, mines, mills, and factories. The owners of a concern may be "little fellows" scattered all over the land. The average holding may be exceedingly small. And the progress of what has been called the "peopleization" of industry tends to reduce instead of raise that average.

The true picture in the mind's eye is not therefore one in which a few parasitic idlers, exploiters, or "modern robbers" face a host of oppressed mechanics, laborers, and clerks; it is one of thousands of small investors arrayed against tens of thousands of workers. Not few, but many, get the property income that is on trial, and these many would be startled and grieved to hear themselves described as Proudhon described them—to be told that interest is sheer robbery.

Still, be the recipients of interest few or many, the principle is not affected. The question remains

open: Is interest paid for any real service to industry and society?

Of course, the farmer, the manufacturer, the managers of the corporation in the illustrations above given would maintain strenuously that they pay interest for real and important services. The recipients of the interest would even more strenuously maintain that it represents compensation for genuine service. With all the facts before one, what can he say at this stage of the discussion? Are the objections to interest as irrational, ignorant, and demagogical as the average capitalist thinks they are? Are they as superficial and unscientific as the conservative economist holds them to be? Is interest, in spite of the sentiments of religious and ethical teachers to the contrary, morally justifiable and economically indispensable?

It seems to the writer that the true answer is that "something" is wrong with interest as we know it, although it is not wrong *per se* and under all circumstances. To the extent to which interest is payment for risk incurred in surrendering one's capital or savings into the possession and control of another, it is just. To the extent to which it is reward for the sacrifice involved in deferring satisfactions and exchanging present goods for future goods, it is also just. But what would the *rate* of interest normally be in an industrial and civilized society if these two

items, and they alone, went into the charge called interest? It must be borne in mind that, if there be a proper charge for risk incurred, there is also a charge to offset it, in part at least, the charge properly made for taking care of another's capital. It must further be remembered that there is risk in keeping one's savings as well as in letting another keep them. As to the self-denial involved in deferring pleasure and giving up present goods in the hope of enjoying future goods, it should not be forgotten that it is not purely altruistic. Ordinary prudence and foresight will, in the majority of cases, impel men to save and provide for old age or disability. They need not, on the theory under consideration, be paid for serving themselves, but only for serving others. Now, the trouble is that they are paid more than their service to others is worth. Interest, in short, is a sum in which some of the constituent items represent something other than risk or compensation for social service. That something is monopoly.

Interest would be just if it were absolutely normal. It could only be normal in an ideally—or really—free market, in an economic and social order characterized by equality of opportunity, by equality of freedom, by the total absence of special privilege, of artificial and unjust monopoly. In such circumstances as these capital would be abundant, for more men would be able to save than is the case now. Capital would compete more actively for investment op-

portunities, and the rate of interest would tend to fall. And not only would more men be able to save, but the saving would involve no great sacrifice. There would be a wider diffusion of well-being, of comfort. Saving would not mean the giving up of necessities or of the things we regard as all but necessary to decent human existence. It would mean the deferring of pleasures and gratifications that fall into the category of luxuries. Naturally, self-denial in this sense would require and receive less compensation than the abstinence that means pain, hardship, and misery.

Our present order is not "free" in the sense intended by the classical champions of healthy and vigorous competition "in a fair field." The field is not and never has been fair. Land and other natural opportunities have not been equally accessible to all. It is hardly necessary to speak of the mediæval land tenures, of the royal gifts of vast estates to favorites, of violent or fraudulent inclosures of common lands, of the appropriation of mines and other natural or national assets by small groups. It is sufficient to allude to the fact that even in the United States, the land "whose other name is opportunity," national assets have been handed over to the few. Conservation and the fair utilization of natural assets in the interest of the whole nation are new and recent "reforms" in the sphere of American politics. It is justly felt that the profligate policy that has been

thoughtlessly followed in the past has contributed to the great evils of unmerited poverty and involuntary idleness.

Similarly, every unfair privilege, every anti-social monopoly, every serious social abuse permitted or tolerated by law and society, may be said to inure directly or indirectly to the advantage of men of property and capital. They command higher rates of compensation for their capital because of the inability of so many thrifty and industrious persons to support themselves in relative comfort and, in addition, save part of their incomes for future use and enjoyment. The first and principal remedy for poverty, according to Bastiat, the great French free-trade economist, and his school, is "abundance." The modern world does not produce enough, in spite of all our inventions. It does not produce enough because of mediæval survivals, of antiquated land tenures and laws, of indefensible systems of taxation and revenue. And a society that does not produce enough cannot save enough to devote to further production; capital, therefore, is dear in such a society and interest rates are higher than they would "normally" be.

Nor is this all. Other causes contribute to the element of iniquity and injustice that is vaguely felt to reside in interest. The interest question is, and has always been, largely a "money question." That is to say, bad and unjust banking and currency ar-

rangements have made capital dear and interest rates high. This has become a truism in our own day, and we have been reforming our currency and financial systems for the recognized and avowed purpose of preventing the exploitation of industry by the monopolists of credit and of the banking power. President Wilson has used very vigorous language in describing the effect of monopolized credit and the need of "democratizing" credit and enabling men of affairs in country and city to obtain capital at reasonable rates. What has been done by national legislation (notably by the law establishing the regional reserve banks and authorizing a form of asset banking) is, however, merely a beginning. Even conservative economists are now advocating legislation providing for the organization of rural credit facilities on a coöperative or mutual basis. For the bulk of ordinary commercial transactions in the centers of industry and trade, additional legislation is proposed in the direction of "asset banking," or the monetization of goods of certain kinds that are intended for early consumption.

The relation between capital and money—real or representative, hard or "soft"—is a difficult subject that has engaged the attention of economists for many years. This is not the place to deal with it, but it may be pointed out that the drift of liberal opinion among economists has favored the view that the old rigid notion regarding the comparative unim-

portance or irrelevance of the currency question in a discussion of interest was utterly unsound. It is true that the man who wants capital for productive purposes pays interest for capital, not for money, which is nothing but a means to his end, a medium of exchange. It is true that the manufacturer who borrows at a bank really, if indirectly, borrows machinery, tools, iron and steel, wood and brick. The money he borrows is at once paid out by him in the process of acquiring commodities and enlarging his plant or his markets. Still, as society is organized, the manufacturer cannot borrow capital. He *must* apply to the go-between, the banker or the money-lender, and what the latter can or will do to accommodate him is determined, not merely by the state of things in the goods or capital market, but also—and sometimes exclusively—by the state of things in the money market. A money panic or money flurry is not necessarily a capital panic or flurry. A money famine does not imply a goods famine by any manner of means.

The dangers to industry and commerce that result from the inflation of the currency, or from cheap or fiat money, have been dwelt on sufficiently. The danger of contraction of the currency through causes that have nothing to do with the production and movement of goods, of capital available for further production, has not received nearly the attention it deserves. For decades practically all the

measures taken to safeguard the currency were anti-inflation measures. At last it is beginning to be realized that contraction of the currency, whether deliberate or accidental, may be as disastrous as inflation. A system, or a set of banking and currency laws, that begets periodical money panics and flurries, that raises interest rates absolutely without reference to the conditions in the capital market, is bad for industry, bad for all legitimate borrowers of capital, and bad for labor.

It is no longer denied by really scientific economists that the interest question in our day is largely a currency and banking question, and even to some extent a question of standards of value and deferred payments. The advocates of a multiple standard of value—from Jevons down—have laid proper stress on the injustice inherent in any metallic standard. The victims of the injustice are usually the borrowers and the toilers, not the recipients of property income in the shape of interest.

If, then, crude, unfair, and unscientific banking and currency systems have favored the lenders and oppressed the borrowers and the entrepreneurs, it follows that they have at the same time, and in the same manner, hampered the farmer, the mechanic, and the wage-worker. This is another way of saying that interest has been higher than it would have been under proper conditions and enlightened financial legislation.

But to say that there is much injustice in interest, and that true progress will result in the steady lowering of the rate of interest, is not to say that interest will ever, in a competitive order, reach the vanishing-point. Capital will never be had "for the asking"; risk and self-denial will always have to be paid for. But abundance, true freedom, and equality of opportunity, with a rational system of revenue and high taxation of private land held out of use for speculative purposes, will combine to make the rate of payment small. Again, the substitution of coöperation for competition in productive and distributive industries—a process that, admittedly, is certain to gain steadily in momentum as well as in scope and breadth—must also contribute more and more powerfully to the reduction of the charge called interest. Today labor has to intrust its savings to corporations and institutions that are used almost exclusively by capitalists. Coöperation will enable labor to make productive use of a growing part of its own saved capital.

One sometimes hears from the most untterrified social radicals the admission that "under existing economic and social arrangements interest is not unjust." When analyzed, this admission amounts to no more than the recognition of the fact that he who lends capital performs a service to the borrower of it and is entitled to compensation for that service, as well as for the risk incurred by him. It also im-

plies, however, that, as evolutionists, we cannot throw the blame for the element of injustice in interest on the possessors of capital or the recipients of property income. There are no "conspiracies" to maintain interest or to prevent its decline. Even the bad laws that have hampered industry and restricted opportunity by creating an artificial scarcity of money and credit have never been the result of deliberate conspiracies. There is such a thing as class or group legislation without real consciousness of class or group interest. There is considerable "robbery" in interest, but the recipients of interest are not deliberate "robbers." They are the beneficiaries of a system that is supported by most of us, that has been sincerely defended by good and able men, and that is even now so defended by earnest and high-minded thinkers. The system, however, as Proudhon said long ago, and as Professor Nearing shows again, is becoming economically "impossible." Labor and enterprise cannot carry the interest burden much longer. It will have to be lightened and lifted. It is, war and calamity apart, being lightened and lifted. Only so much of it will continue to be carried as is justified and sanctioned by the principle of service.

HOW DEMOCRACY FUNCTIONS

"DEMOCRACY is inefficient. Democracy is noisy, chaotic, wilful. It dislikes discipline, and is unwilling to recognize and submit to authority. Fit men are distrusted and suspected by the rank and file, and they seldom, if ever, achieve power. Small men, trimmers, demagogues, flatterers of the crowd get elected to office, and men of the same type and calibre obtain the appointive offices. Hence democracy spells waste, jobbery, incompetence in administration of public affairs, the rule of the inferior."

This indictment, in substantially the words used, is frequently drawn against democracy, not only by reactionaries and cynical "neutrals," but also by men who believe themselves to be sound and faithful democrats. Recently certain American editors have solemnly moralized on the alleged significance of the fact that President Wilson, a radical Democrat, has been forced to call to his aid Republicans and men of affairs who were known to be extremely conservative, who were closely connected with Privilege or Big Business, and who could never have been put in charge of important national affairs under normal conditions.

"See!" these editors and their shallow correspondents have exclaimed, "President Wilson found that the abilities and rare gifts of men like Ryan, Schwab, Stettinius, Hurley, Vanderlip, et al., had to be virtually conscripted in order to organize industry and the nation for the successful prosecution of the war. A great crisis permitted the President to disregard popular prejudice against such men, and we all congratulate ourselves upon our good fortune in commanding their services. Is not the lesson one we should take to heart for application to normal conditions? Does not a democracy need talent and first-rate capacity at all times? Away, then, with stupid and vulgar prejudices against big men; let us invite the supercapable organizers and leaders, the masterful few, to govern us in an efficient, economical and scientific way. If we persist in our foolish course toward ability, disaster sooner or later will overtake us. Inefficient democracy cannot cope with efficient militarism!"

Half-truths are always more dangerous than statements wholly devoid of truth or foundation. Let us analyze the foregoing half-truths. Is democracy inefficient in the long run? Suppose we grant that a particular democracy at a given conjuncture may be unable to resist and defeat a predatory military autocracy; what would that prove? Nothing, of course. The noblest of men may be attacked and killed by a brutal footpad, but no sane man would

argue on that ground against the superiority of nobility of mind and character over brutal might.

In the long run democracy is quite able to cope with autocracy, despite the mechanical efficiency and the blind discipline on which the latter can count. Democracies submit to discipline when there is real necessity for it, when those who command are as sincere as those who obey, and when arrogant persons clothed with brief authority who are at heart anti-democratic are replaced by commanders who know how to inspire respect and admiration. Democracies must be led; they cannot be driven. In democracies the rulers must know how to create public sentiment if they wish to lead instead of being content to follow. In democracies agitation, education and discussion must precede action. The process may be slow at times, too slow to please the extreme left—or the extreme right—but who has the right to complain of this? Democracy is government by discussion, and the greater the variety of opinions the greater is the need of full and free discussion. The point is that after such discussion democracy acts with truly amazing unity, energy and efficiency.

Do democracies prefer mediocre men to fit, strong, able men? Are they apt to be misled by tricksters and demagogues?

It is true that sometimes plausible and glib talkers without ability or sincerity manage to get into office. It is true that men with showy talents are sometimes

preferred to better men of modest disposition who are averse to self-advertising and the crude melodramatic incidents of the average electoral campaign. It is true that democracy does not mean the rule of the people at all times by the wise and good. But what of all this?

The remedy for the mistakes and blunders of democratic constituencies is to be found in one thing and one thing only—more education, but more education of the heart, of the emotions, as well as of the mind. Education, however, is not a matter of schools, sermons and newspapers. You cannot educate oppressed, disinherited, degraded, servile men. You can incite their passions and hatred, you can stimulate their vague resentment and bitterness, but this is not education, and it does not make for social health and evolutionary progress. Education presupposes opportunity, leisure, a fair degree of comfort and economic independence.

A great British liberal once said that the cure for the evils of liberty is more liberty. The cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy, and the cure for the shortcomings of political democracy is industrial democracy.

On the political side the demands of the democratic principle are satisfied when and where every element, interest, opinion in the community is assured of proper—that is, proportional—representation in the law-making department of the government.

Whom a given constituency will select to represent it is a question not to be answered in the abstract. We know that there are "silk-stocking" constituencies and "plebeian" constituencies. In certain cities there are "hopeless wards," wards that always send spoils politicians, genial saloon-keepers, cheap professionals to the city council or the popular branch of the state legislature. Generally speaking, the representatives fairly represent and serve the constituency, and when they betray it, as they do not infrequently, the constituency is not aware of it, for its prejudices, if not its ignorance and indifference to certain questions, render it blind to the deeper issues and conflicts of the community of which they are part. For example, a boodler alderman may be returned again and again by a perfectly honest constituency that would never approve of franchise selling or other corrupt deals. The constituency simply does not believe the charges against its alderman, or does not take sufficient interest in the issue to understand it. To indict men wholesale, as many "good people" do, is to do it injustice through ignorance and shallow thinking. There are few depraved constituencies; there are many ignorant, misled, easily deceived or confused constituencies.

The remarkable fact is that, in spite of all the drawbacks from which democracies suffer, in spite of the lack of opportunity, education and leisure, large democratic constituencies do not often go astray in

politics. The demagogues and quacks in public life are few and far between where the people have real political power. The British House of Commons to-day is a very different body from the Commons of the rotten-borough period and the period of aristocratic, landlord and plutocratic rule. Who will assert that Gladstone, Morley, Asquith, Grey, Lloyd George, were not, or are not, the natural and fit representatives of liberal and democratic England? Who does not recognize that the extension of the franchise and reforms in public school education made possible and inevitable the rise and growth of the British Labor Party? The leaders of that Party are not all progressive; but are the millions of workers represented by them all progressive?

In the United States the people have managed to elect a surprising number of able, strong, earnest, faithful representatives to serve and lead them. We have had weak and mediocre Presidents, Senators, Governors and Congressmen. We have many small men in our legislatures. But the record on the whole does not support the charge that democracies are mean, envious, jealous and hostile to first-rate ability. The names of Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Tilden—who, of course was elected, though not seated—Cleveland, and Wilson furnish an argument in this connection that scarcely requires elaboration. The rolls of the Senate and House furnish similar arguments. If in late years

there has been—as there has—a deterioration in the average character and intellectual level of our national lawmakers, industrial conditions largely, if not fully, account for this circumstance.

The notion that democracies fear and distrust ability and genius may be traced to certain historical illustrations of the innate conservatism of human beings and their fear of disturbing innovation. The people did not save Jesus of Nazareth from crucifixion, though they had the opportunity to do so. The people did not save Socrates. The people have stoned or burned other seers and reformers. But how fallacious and absurd it is to conclude from these historic tragedies that democratic government is less safe or efficient than other forms! Did not autocrats, aristocracies and oligarchies burn and slay religious or social heretics, men ahead of their day and generation? Have men of exceptional ability greater opportunity under autocratic than under democratic governments? The strong, superior men are more likely to lead insurrections and revolutionary movements—witness Russia under the czars; witness Germany, France, Italy and Spain during the period of constitutional and revolutionary agitation in the last century—than to execute the will of tyrants. Besides, class rule and privilege necessarily prevent hosts of able and gifted men in the lower strata from developing and applying their superior faculties.

It would be idle to idealize average human nature and to deny our defects and shortcomings. But that human nature, as history and our own experience reveal, in some way militates against the success of democratic forms of government and demands the maintenance or restoration of unpopular, undemocratic forms, is a strange and bizarre conclusion indeed.

What, however, about the "significant" fact that the American democracy has been forced by the exigencies of the war to seek the aid of coöperation of men that otherwise could never hope to get into public positions of power and responsibility? What about the "conscription" of Messrs. Schwab, Ryan, Stettinius, Vanderlip and others of the same set? Have we not proof conclusive here that democracy keeps able men at arm's length and calls upon them only in emergencies? Does it not follow that democracy would be better off if it always sought and welcomed the guidance of its supercapable?

Those who ask such questions as these overlook one important fact—namely, the fact that the supercapable men whom they have in mind act in one way under normal conditions and in a very different way under the strain and stress of war. Democracies are intelligent enough to know that circumstances alter cases. The Ryans and Schwabs and Vanderlips are as patriotic as any other group of citizens, and quite capable of wholly disinterested service and sacrifice.

As a rule, they will scorn to take selfish advantage of their opportunities in war time. War produces its own resources, human and other. It transfigures men and revolutionizes their conduct, but only because they are placed in totally different circumstances than those they live and move in ordinarily. They cannot be trusted to serve the people disinterestedly, and take democratic views, under the normal conditions. Political contests and fights over legislative projects superabundantly illustrate this. Mr. Schwab would not be—was not, it will be remembered—a truthful, impartial adviser of Congress in tariff matters. Mr. Ryan would not take the side of labor in a question involving the issues between labor and capital. The bankers did not take a high-minded, impartially scientific view of the federal reserve bill when it was pending in Congress. A democratic constituency naturally prefers to be represented by men who are not identified and closely allied with special interests and privilege. No sensible student of politics will blame it or affect surprise at the fact. True, not a few men who are elected because they are supposed to be reasonably impartial, turn out to be defenders of a class or a clique; but the constituencies that elect such men generally do not know their secret affiliations and real sentiments.

The complaint is familiar that there are not enough substantial business men in politics and public life; but the fault is that of the business men.

They act and talk like narrow-minded, uninformed, prejudiced men. They fail to inspire confidence and trust. They would represent their own set or class, and under our system the direct, frank, undisguised representation of interests is neither desired nor intended. The men whom we elect know how to court the heterogeneous constituency and attract a majority composed of all sorts and conditions of voters. Most of them are opportunists and followers rather than leaders, but they are on the whole representative of the average character and intelligence of their constituencies. If we want better men, we must raise the level of the constituencies. The voters are the masters, and we must continue to attend to the education of the masters.

It is not true that democracy, by any fair, philosophical test of success, has proved a failure as compared with autocracies. But it is true that to be more successful than it is, democracy needs more education, more honest discussion, more genuine freedom and justice in the economic sphere. Political democracy we have almost realized—almost but not quite. We have to use political freedom unremittingly and methodically to realize the ideal of industrial democracy. If we fail to win that, we may lose even what we have of democracy and liberty.

SHALLOW ECONOMICS FOR THE PEOPLE

“EDUCATE your masters,” said Lord Salisbury once in addressing the House of Lords, the “masters” being the generality of the then newly enfranchised voters. A few months ago Premier Lloyd George, in discussing labor demands, expressed his astonishment at the ignorance of elementary economics shown by those who advocated higher wages and shorter hours without considering the inevitable effect of such steps on the prices of commodities and the cost of living. Here in the United States one encounters very frequently the doubtless well-meant admonition of “great editors” that the masses ought to have political economy and its essential principles brought home to them somehow.

It will hardly be disputed that millions of voters in America, England, and elsewhere are deplorably ignorant of economic principles, and that popular courses in economics for employers as well as employes would be good for the general public.

But who is going to select the teachers, the expounders of economics? How are we to make sure that the economics taught and illustrated will be

sound, scientific economics, and not tainted, "class conscious," or bias-ridden economics?

Many of our bankers, manufacturers, moralists, and "great editors"—or, more strictly, editors of great and influential newspapers and periodicals—are as ignorant of economic principles as the wage workers or "hayseed" farmers they would fain instruct and guide. When certain labor leaders in England took the ground recently that wage-workers were not benefited by wage increases that were at once shifted to the consumers, and that the traditional labor policy offered no way out of the vicious circles of higher-wages-higher-prices-higher-wages-higher-prices, etc., only some radical organs hailed these truly significant utterances as evidence of a better and firmer grasp of economic truth! The great editors either remained discreetly silent—as they often do, when the resources of sophistry fail—or else undertook to argue that the aforesaid "radical" leaders were not representative of union labor in England, and that the ordinary trade union policies were quite sufficient unto the period!

By all means let us have economics for the public, provided the economics be sound all the way through. Shallow, partisan, made-to-order economics in defense of the existing order would be worse than the ignorance so superciliously talked about in the conservative or semi-liberal press.

Here is a case in point.

The Philadelphia *Saturday Evening Post* is one of the liberal weeklies of the country. It has a rather intelligent and unusually well written editorial page. It says many good things. But its political economy is often "shaky," and as it comments freely on current affairs, lectures with an air of scholarship and depth on the fallacies and crudities of the radical schools, its unsound economics does considerable harm among its hosts of middle-class readers. Of late it has had a deal to say against socialism, Lenine, etc., but its attacks are not limited to forms of socialism. They are directed against radicalism in general. They attempt no real analysis of the present system of wealth distribution. They are only half true, and half truths are dangerous. They sneer at the radical assaults on profiteers, and assume complacently that all criticism of profiteers is also criticism of the business man who makes a legitimate profit.

After the death of Woolworth the paper in question published an editorial that has been widely reprinted. It regarded Woolworth's case as typical and said of him:

He had no monopoly of anything, but operated from first to last in a field wide open to competition. Indeed, he had many vigorous and able competitors. Hardly any of the innumerable articles he sold could be called a necessity of life. Nobody was under the slightest compulsion to buy a penny's worth of

goods of him. Millions did buy simply because they wanted to and found it to their advantage. By this special method of handling a certain line of goods he gave them a better penny's worth than they had got before, or they would not have flocked to him. No sane mind can avoid that conclusion. His patrons must have profited while he profited, or he could not have held them a day.

By socialist logic—and the logic of those who teach socialism without admitting it—somebody must have been poorer because this man was finally \$30,000,000 richer. But who, in fact, was poorer? He invented or developed a new contact between production and consumption, made it easier, for example, to get clothespins and mousetraps. The natural presumption is that the effect of his operations was to raise wages by creating new demands for labor, and at the same time to cheapen goods to the consumer.

Now, if the writer and the editor merely intended to prove that under the existing system, despite the monopolies and special privileges that abound on every side, it is still possible to make millions in the competitive field, and that, therefore, not *all* big fortunes are ascribable to legal privilege and unjust arrangements, the argument would be fairly sound, in the main. Not altogether, but in the main. For when the editorial asks, "who in fact was poorer?" it forgets that even a Woolworth may swell profits by exploiting his employes and paying them less than a fair wage. Exploited employes are certainly "poorer" because the millionaire employer underpaid

them. Ah, yes, he paid market prices for labor, but what factors and influences determine these market prices? If monopoly and privilege force wages down and keep them down—and this is undeniable—then the employer of genius, or exceptional ability, who, though not *directly* a beneficiary of monopoly and privilege, is able to underpay labor, is indirectly a beneficiary of said monopoly and privilege. To vindicate the Woolworths entirely, it is necessary to prove that they do not take advantage of monopoly and privilege, and pay labor a just wage despite the market rates they find ready made. How many millionaire employers can be so vindicated? Of course, business is not charity, and the employer can plead that he is not responsible for the system that confers illegitimate advantages upon him. This is true enough; but it is irrelevant to the main issue under discussion, namely, the clear, untainted, honest title to the millions made in “competitive” industry.

Again, if the editorial had argued that the enlightened radical should not attack profits *as such*, but should differentiate between profits that represent reward for ability, management, genius, and profits due to exploitation of labor or to monopoly and privilege, it would have been wholly and eminently sound. But while it alludes to monopolies and artificial privileges, it does not recognize the necessity and justice of making war on them and doing away with them. It does not urge a free field and no

favors. It does not plead for equality of opportunity and of liberty, and for the proper reward of merit and ability. It darkens counsel by emphasizing the exceptional case of the employer who makes millions in the "free field"—though the field is never free—and by tacitly belittling the importance of monopolies and special privileges.

Here is another instance in point:

George E. Roberts, a New York banker and a persuasive writer on financial questions, has been discussing the labor situation and the demands for higher wages and for more democratic control of industry. He urges increased production as a remedy for high prices, emphasizes the essentially coöperative character of modern industry, tells labor that its position is "constantly becoming stronger" by reason of the accumulation of capital. He advocates fair play in general terms alike for labor and capital. But he does not even mention privilege and monopoly. He sees no connection between scarcity and landlordism or the locking up of natural opportunities. He ignores the fact that "coöperative industry" may be exploited and bled by parasitic beneficiaries of indefensible special privileges. He conveys the wrong impression that it is the trade union, with its insistence on shorter hours and adequate wages, which restricts production and thus raises costs. That abundance may and should be created in modern society without overworking the laborer or

underpaying him, that injustice and exploitation are not necessary to abundance or cheapness, and that democratic management of industry under equality of opportunity may actually tend to produce abundance and decrease the cost of production, are considerations totally overlooked by Mr. Roberts. His essays, however interesting, are therefore misleading.

Nothing is gained in the long run by fallacious reasoning and special pleading. Unsound economics from the side of the employing class will provoke equally unsound economics from certain would-be leaders of the working classes. The only safe and intelligent policy is to ascertain the truth and to teach it regardless of consequences to present beneficiaries of those features in our social-economic system that are based on false and erroneous ideas or else are manifestly wrong and have to be defended by sophistry and specious argumentation.

SOCIALISM RECOGNIZES ITS MISTAKES

THERE are new and healthy tendencies in Socialism which radicals of the individualist or libertarian type should be the first to identify and welcome. No doubt some of the narrow-minded Socialists will seek to belittle the tendencies in question and to deny that a change has come over the spirit of the speculations and plans of their school, but the scientific and unprejudiced student of social reform is not likely to be impressed by such denials. What is taking place in the Socialist camp is of the utmost significance.

There was a time when socialism was frankly, if not cynically, bureaucratic. It sneered at personal liberty. It saw nothing in individualism save the mask of a discredited group of special pleaders who defended the iniquitous privileges and flagrant abuses of the present social order. If you were not a Socialist, if you expressed fear of the all-powerful State and the ubiquitous official regulator and inspector, you were a plutocrat. Socialism was the euphemism for State ownership and operation of all industry, State control of the means of production, and State control of all the channels of communica-

tion and publicity. The individual had no rights which the majority was bound to respect. Of course, the Socialists always assured us, in general terms, that the individual would be infinitely freer under their *régime* than he was or ever could be under capitalism and free competition; but specifications and proofs were never furnished. There was scorn for the "pseudo-radical" who demanded guaranties for the individual—for the spirit, the personality, the dignity, and the independence of the human unit.

This attitude on the part of the so-called Scientific Socialists, the Marxians and semi-Marxians, could not fail to arouse formidable opposition even in circles that, on the whole, were disposed to accept the cardinal doctrines and main proposals of socialism. Fabian Socialism in England, the revisionist movement in Germany, Syndicalism in France and Italy, Guild Socialism, Communistic Anarchism, Individualist Anarchism have all grown up largely as a result of deep dissatisfaction with orthodox socialism and the artificiality, rigidity, and tyranny it appeared to involve. The destructive criticism of orthodox socialism from so many quarters—all radical—slowly and almost imperceptibly caused little groups of the faithful here and there to modify their creed and shift their ground. A veritable landmark was the late Edmond Kelly's "Twentieth Century Socialism" (1910), in which State Socialism was repudiated and the reader assured that the socializa-

tion of industry would "practically consist of a transfer of the same from the hands of the capitalist to the hands of those actually engaged therein"; that fair compensation would be paid to the capitalists; that only the idle, parasitic stockholder would be eliminated, and that gently; and, finally, that in each industry a certain amount of private enterprise and competition might or would be preserved in order to keep the socialized factories or mills or refineries on their good behavior. Mr. Kelly pictured a coöperative commonwealth in which the State had little more power than that enjoyed by the British Government today, under a so-called individualist system. And he added that the kind of socialism he contemplated "need not be introduced by any sudden transfer of political power whatever."

In these remarkable views Mr. Kelly was supported by other American and "naturalized" Socialists who, under Anglo-Saxon influences and by reason of economic changes that had exposed some of the fallacies of dogmatic Marxism, emphasized their disbelief in violence, on the one hand, and in State despotism or bureaucratic stagnation and uniformity, on the other.

However, these utterances, though significant, produced little impression on the opponents of socialism. Syndicalism continued to flourish. Guild Socialism gained new converts and individualist radicals remained hostile to the whole Socialist movement.

The great war came. State socialism, under the spur of military necessity, advanced by leaps and bounds. Industries were taken over, or regulated, and managed by bureaucrats. Neither the employers nor the employees relished the methods of the bureaucrats. The armistice brought with it loud demands for the "freeing of industry." The movement for nationalization and municipalization of these or those utilities or industries suffered a severe setback. Reactionaries with limited capacity for thought are jubilant. But the Socialists, too, have abundant food for reflection. There is evidence that they are not neglecting their duty or opportunity—that they are searching their intellectual consciences and recognizing the necessity of purging their movement even more rigorously than before the war of the offensive elements of coercion, Statism, bureaucracy.

Emile Vandervelde, the eminent Belgian Socialist leader, has just published a little book entitled "Socialism versus the State." The author's intention is to remind us of the Spencerian attacks on the State, Socialist or other, in the name of the individual, and on absolute majority rule in the name of minority and personal rights. The thesis of the little volume is that socialism is diametrically opposed to Statism; that modern Socialists do not worship the State and do not contemplate the undue, unnecessary subjection of the minority to the majority, or the individual to the whole, and that, far

from seeking to place an omnipotent bureaucracy in control of industry, socialism spells the overthrow of the existing bureaucracy and proposes "the organization of social labor by the workers grouped in public associations."

Vandervelde quotes with entire approval the following plank from the platform of the French Parti Ouvrier: "Operation of State factories to be intrusted to the laborers who work in them."

It is not necessary to stop to analyze these affirmations, contentions, and disclaimers. The purpose of this article is merely to direct attention to certain symptomatic and gratifying tendencies in modern socialism. They are tendencies, to repeat, that cannot fail to interest progressives and radicals of every school. They are tendencies that should be encouraged and welcomed, for at the end of the road there may be the promise of a reconciliation between evolutionary, rational socialism and consistent, sincere, philosophical individualism.

The great mistake of the orthodox Socialists consisted in exaggerating the importance of mere machinery, institutionalism, artificial arrangements and contrivances. They constantly attacked the wrong side. They blamed freedom for the fruits of privilege, competition for the results of monopoly. They stressed coöperation, and voluntary coöperation is an excellent thing that can hardly be carried too far in production, distribution, exchange of services. To

get rid of the State, in the proper sense of the phrase, is to get rid of the artificial and unjust inequalities and privileges supported by the State. Abolish these, recover or open up opportunities, prevent exploitation and economic slavery, and little will be left in the State to condemn. Coöperation on a wide scale will be practiced without legal compulsion—from self-interest and natural human sociability.

Is it too much to ask the broader and more liberal Socialists to put aside for a time their vague plans for the future coöperative commonwealth and aid the non-Socialist and the individualist radicals in the active campaign against privilege, land and trade monopolies, and other violations of the basic democratic principle of equality of opportunity and of liberty?

A NEGLECTED OPPORTUNITY AND DUTY IN JOURNALISM

IN two papers that have appeared in this journal ¹ the present writer has discussed the actual and possible rôle of the modern newspaper in the political and moral life of the people—or in the education of the great reading public. The shortcomings of the average commercial newspaper were touched upon, but the conclusion that was reached was, on the whole, by no means as cheerless and pessimistic as that of many severe critics of contemporary journalism. Independent, honest, and high-minded journalism, the writer firmly believes, is entirely possible, and in no wise incompatible, moreover, with “enterprise,” readableness, and popularity.

But to say that such journalism is possible even on a commercial basis—to say, in other words, that a publisher need not sacrifice *reasonable* profits to dignity, moral courage, and righteousness—is, of course, not to say that the actual supply of honest and independent journalism is even approximately equal to the demand for it. The truth is, not many

¹ See especially the paper entitled “Is an Honest and Sane Newspaper Press Possible?” *American Journal of Sociology*, November, 1909.

of our newspapers answer the reasonable requirements of the intelligent and decent elements of the community. Only a few do this; the majority leave much to be desired. Some are too sensational; others are erratic and unstable. Many are utterly indifferent to the questions that really matter, in the long run, simply because the average person is supposed to be indifferent to them. In the handling of political, civic, industrial, and social news, few of the big newspapers even pretend to adhere to any standard, or to care for method and consistency. The personal, the trivial, the cheap, the "yellow" incidents are generally exploited at the expense of the substantial and serious matters that underlie the news. The unpardonable sin, the intolerable thing, in commercial journalism is "dulness," and absolutely everything is ruthlessly sacrificed to "dramatic, human interest," to "breeziness" or "appeal." And, of course, the managing editors and their reporters and copy-readers always think of interest and appeal in terms of crowds and multitudes. Hence sensational or melodramatic items will, at the last moment, displace and "kill" important but "dry" civic, administrative, or political matter that is appreciated only by small groups of citizens and readers.

It is a fact which hardly requires further elaboration that our greatest commercial newspapers cannot really be depended upon to "give the news." Their boast in this respect is totally unfounded.

They give *certain* news, and give it without system or method. They omit and suppress other news with equal capriciousness and lack of any definite policy save the one avowed policy of making the whole paper as exciting and lively as possible. Certain Chicago papers recently suppressed a grand jury report which criticized sensationalism and charged journalism with responsibility for juvenile criminality.

To this familiar complaint against contemporary journalism there must be added the even more grave, if perhaps less common, complaint of deliberate unfairness, class bias, and political or factional partisanship in handling news. This complaint is made against the national news agencies as well as against individual papers. Many social workers, labor leaders, and progressive thinkers feel that big business, big finance, and capitalism unduly control the news machinery of the country. This control, they believe, results in much injustice, and in prejudice and confusion of vital issues. The Colorado mining strike is usually cited as an illustration of the unfairness of the news agencies. The way in which the hearings, by a Senate subcommittee, on the appointment of Mr. Brandeis to the federal Supreme Court were treated or "digested" and "summarized" in the press reports is another illustration furnished in certain "advanced" circles. The writer's own opinion is that the unfairness of the press associations is the result

rather of narrow ideas and ignorance than of deliberate prejudice, or of the conscious desire to pander to the monopolistic elements of the country. That, however, unfairness there is, can hardly be doubted.

Now, the probability of press reform in these directions is very faint. Practically every factor in contemporary journalism militates against reform. How many of our big newspapers are published and controlled by men who love journalism, have lofty professional ideals, glory in good work worthily done, and realize the responsibility that rests upon them? After all, a newspaper is what the owner chooses to make it. A man of principle, of intelligence, of self-respect, of poise, will run one kind of a newspaper. He will, first of all, run a newspaper in which the editorial expressions of opinion will be scrupulously differentiated from the presentation of facts in the news columns. He will not color, or manipulate, either news or the headlines. He will demand strict honesty and impartiality of his reporters, correspondents, and desk men. He will give all sides worth giving. He will insist, first and last, on furnishing the raw material of opinion to all his readers—of carrying knowledge to them, and of carrying the power that goes with knowledge. His own views he will state candidly and vigorously, but he will state them *as* his own views, and neither claim to know what public opinion is when he does not know it, and has no means of knowing it, nor assume to re-

flect the opinions of the many publics that make up the great public.

But how many men of principle, of self-respect, of dignity and ability, run newspapers? We have men who are in the business for profit. We have men who are in it because they are vain, ambitious, pushful. We have men in the business who have political axes to grind, who have friends in public life whom they wish to advertise and "boom." We have men in the business who love power and notoriety. We have men in the business who use their papers as adjuncts to financial promotion and speculation. Finally, we have men in the business who, though personally unfit for it, have succeeded fathers or grandfathers of conspicuous fitness for journalism, and who live on past reputation and past prestige.

We can no more expect genuine journalistic reform from these types of publishers and editors than we can expect the proverbial silken purses from sows' ears. The style, verily, is the man. The newspaper, to repeat, and its style, from headlines and offensive, nauseating self-advertising up to the editorial manner and the mode of presenting news, reflect the proprietor's mental and moral traits.

Nor is this all. The basic material conditions of contemporary journalism are fatally unsound. Journalism that is too "cheap" to be self-supporting as journalism cannot be satisfactory. Newspapers that cannot make their ends meet without heavy, abun-

dant advertising, and to which circulation is merely a means to advertising, cannot be independent, sober, and honest. They are under the constant necessity of "splurging," of trafficking in rumors and false reports, of making mountains out of molehills. And this in turn carries with it the necessity of rigorous economy in handling news that cannot possibly be rendered sensational and exciting. Inexperienced and uneducated reporters are too often assigned to "cover" civic and local news of moment. The ability and the experience available in the office are required elsewhere.

Has not the time come to revive definitely the idea—vaguely broached years ago—of privately endowed newspapers?

We have various "foundations" for education, for research, for progressive philanthropy, for certain social and industrial reforms. They are indispensable. We know that higher arts, the higher music, could not exist without liberal endowment. Is it not sufficiently clear that sound, clean, and dignified journalism cannot hope to take root, to establish itself in modern cities, without at least temporary endowment?

It is idle, of course, to expect municipal or state endowment of journalism. The remedy, were it practicable, would prove worse than the disease. The endowment of a newspaper, or chain of newspapers, by a single multimillionaire, or group of multimil-

lionaires, would undoubtedly also prove vain or undesirable. The policies of such newspapers would either actually be controlled and dictated by the rich patrons, or else the general public would suspect such control and dictation. Such suspicions, even if unfounded, would be fatal. Newspapers supported by any of the existing "foundations," for example, would become targets for all manner of attacks and misrepresentation.

But we are by no means limited to this form or mode of endowment. If it be admitted that the education of our democratic masses cannot be safely left to commercialized newspapers; if it be admitted that it is desirable to set up and maintain standards of journalism—intellectual and moral; if it be admitted that it would be a boon to a community to have a great, trustworthy, vital, honest, ably edited, and ably written newspaper, and that gradually the influence of such a newspaper would make itself felt even in the worst of the commercialized newspapers—if all these things be admitted—and the writer does not believe that there is serious doubt as to them—then it must be admitted that there is no insurmountable obstacle in the way of a reasonable and carefully safeguarded endowment plan.

Tentatively, and in order to provide a basis of discussion, to elicit suggestion and criticism, the writer submits the following outlines of a plan:

1. Organize a national foundation for the special

and sole purpose of establishing a chain of absolutely independent and sober-minded newspapers in the big cities of the country.

2. Appeal not only to men and women of great wealth, but to persons of moderate fortunes, or even of small means—small, that is, for our day, but not too small to permit indulgence in an intellectual, moral and artistic luxury—to become contributors or supporters of this newspaper foundation.

3. Enlist progressive and honorable business men, professional men, educators, labor leaders, journalists, social workers, authors, artists, and others, and organize a national board of trustees representing these several elements of the community to direct the foundation.

4. Organize a smaller but representative board in each city where one of the proposed newspapers is to be started.

5. Adopt and prescribe a definite and practical news policy for the proposed chain of newspapers. That is, decide how to handle news relating to vice and crime, to family scandal, to sport, to trivial gossip, and the like.

6. Proclaim an absolutely non-partisan editorial policy. Announce that all controversial and contentious questions—Mexico, for example, or the meaning of neutrality in connection with the great world-war, or the submarine and its uses, or the trade in arms and ammunition—will be frankly treated as

such. That is, while the editorial columns of the journal will present the views of the editor or editorial board, other columns will be opened to writers of authority and standing for the sober presentation of differing views; nay, that care will be taken to secure the timely presentation of divergent views, so that the reader may have before him the best statements of the several points of view actually occupied with reference to any important question.

7. Organize an editorial board in every city represented in the proposed chain, but at the same time let one responsible managing editor be selected and engaged, and let ample power be vested in him for all ordinary journalistic purposes.

8. Charge a "living price" for the paper—two or three cents a copy, if necessary—and let circulation grow naturally in response to the appeal of an independent, reliable, well-written, progressive, and wide-awake newspaper.

9. Do not exclude advertising—except, of course, quack and immoral advertising—but do not solicit it. Let it, too, come naturally, as a recognition of the value of the journal as a business medium.

10. Pay good salaries and wages, but not excessive, inflated ones. Let it be known that absolutely honest and careful work will be required of all reporters, desk men, correspondents, special writers, department editors, etc., and that flippancy, sensationalism, artificiality, exaggeration, affectation,

theatrical sentimentalism will be frowned upon and discouraged. Let it be known that the paper respects the public, regards it as capable of appreciating truth, accuracy, dignity, and sanity in journalism. There are thousands of young men and women who will work joyfully and enthusiastically for such a newspaper. There are thousands of capable and progressive journalists who are ashamed of the style and method that are imposed upon them. Some have the courage to say so in print; many say so in private conversation.

There is nothing utopian about these requirements or conditions. Newspapers of the type described might never become "gold mines," but no person of sense and experience can doubt for a moment that in time they would become self-supporting. The dissatisfaction and the disgust with many of our "great newspapers" are more widespread and profound than one realizes. As a very thoughtful and active woman of national reputation said to the writer lately: "The public is supposed to be getting what it wants in journalism. It is really taking what it gets. Why, I have to read every day a newspaper I despise. I have to obtain my information, and often I unconsciously form opinions, under the direction and manipulation of men I know and do not respect either morally or intellectually. But what can I do? There is no choice. The other papers in my city are even worse in some respects than the one I take." Thou-

sands of men and women in every city will heartily subscribe to these words. Thousands would heave a sigh of relief if they were assured of honest, independent, and sincere treatment of the issues of a great campaign.

Let me, however, anticipate and meet some objections to the plan that are certain to be raised.

The first may be formulated as follows, "Why, the proposal involves syndicated 'journalism.' What is a newspaper without the personality behind it? When you read opinions, you wish to know whose opinions they are. What weight attaches to syndicated policies? How can a foundation or a board of directors shape and determine newspaper policies?"

The answer is simple. How many of our newspapers *have* personalities behind them? How many readers *know* these personalities? And what if the personalities are known unfavorably? What if we actually know that greed, political ambition, love of notoriety, etc., inspire the opinions expressed by certain newspapers? We may be compelled to read these organs in spite of our knowledge.

Besides, if we want opinions, a truly independent and honest newspaper will know how to satisfy this want. It will interview known experts and authorities, or invite them to contribute careful articles. The sensible person is not deceived by the tacit claims of the editorial writer. Anonymity covers much

ignorance and ludicrous pretension. If certain facts require interpretation, one wants to know the qualifications of the ready interpreters. The editorial "we" guarantees nothing. It is often a false and impudent pretense. It often pretends to speak for a community, or class, or group, even when it deliberately misrepresents that community, class, or group. And it certainly speaks before it has made an effort to sound public opinion. It cannot wait—that would not be "enterprise," and a rival editor would be sure to rush in ahead of the man who hesitates, investigates, or waits.

The proposed newspaper foundation would represent all honest opinions and views. Its object would be to bring data, facts, information, knowledge, to the readers, and of course opinions are facts. The existence of differences of opinion among those who are really entitled to form and hold an opinion on a given question is itself a fact of importance. He who wants advocacy, special pleading, partisan treatment of a subject, and who would rather not hear the other side, is generally accommodated. It is the reader who wants "the full record" that is disappointed and neglected.

Here is one "burning" illustration of this statement. The controversy over the new submarine boats and their "rights" in warfare—the controversy over the defensive armament of merchantmen and the rights of civilians and neutrals on such ships—se-

riously troubled many Americans. They wanted to know what international law had to say on the issue. They wanted to know whether our national administration was fully justified in taking the position it finally took on that question. Did any newspaper deem it necessary to ask the leading professors of, and authors on, international law to prepare statements thereon? The issue involved momentous and tremendous consequences, yet the most enterprising of the newspapers contented themselves with the expression of personal and valueless notions, or with little scraps and fragments of expert opinion. One gathered the impression somehow that the supposed authorities were not agreed. The anxious reader was perplexed, not enlightened, by the little that was put before him. Yet to have put before him the mature views of the eight or ten men in the country whose authority could not be challenged would have been a relatively simple matter.

Another objection to the plan may be anticipated. It is this: that people will look with contempt on a newspaper that depends on "charity" or endowment for its very existence. To this there are two answers. Do people look with contempt on science, art, education, that depends on private and enlightened beneficence? Is dependence on a few big advertisers, with all the direct or indirect "control" of news and policies such dependence notoriously implies in many cases, preferable to dependence on

voluntary, unselfish endowment? In the second place, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Contempt would not long survive the testing of a respectable and fit newspaper by its "consumers." Good writing, good reporting, good book reviews, good art criticism, good special correspondence, timely and able articles on current subjects, honesty and independence, fairness to all parties and schools that are entitled to consideration—such qualities as these would not be long in commanding attention and admiration, in bringing enthusiastic praise and support.

We have plenty of syndicated trash, syndicated falsehood, syndicated malice, syndicated vulgarity and sensationalism. Why should not decency and integrity, sobriety and common-sense use the resources of coöperation and beneficence? What is more important to democracy than freedom and honesty of discussion? What is more dangerous and pernicious than the pollution of the sources of popular education?

This or that multimillionaire may be satisfied with existing conditions in journalism. But there are thousands of wealthy men and women who are emphatically not satisfied and who would cheerfully contribute to an endowment fund of the kind suggested. A newspaper conference was held a few years ago to discuss the evils and vices of contemporary com-

mercial journalism. Cannot a conference be called to consider the feasibility of a newspaper foundation? Is not the matter worthy of the attention of the sociologists?

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONARY DRAMA

As intelligent observers are aware, the world has been witnessing a dramatic "race between war and revolution" in several countries. The war is practically over, but the revolution is far from having been liquidated. As the aftermath of the great and tragic war we have many grave and complex problems that may give our statesmen and jurists more trouble than they have apparently bargained for. The mere setting up of small and restless nationalities in the independent or "sovereign" business of government is a holiday task beside the infinitely more difficult task of insuring reasonable harmony among them and preventing them from picking quarrels with more powerful neighbors. Small, ambitious nations can become big nuisances. Federation, union for large purposes, coöperation in the interest of efficiency and economy, with ample cultural autonomy for constituent units, would appear to be the only real solution of the many national and racial problems that the war has left us as its heritage.

That the minds of sober students and earnest informed thinkers would naturally turn toward this solution, can hardly be doubted. The lessons of his-

tory, assuredly, are too plain to be misunderstood. There is no progress in disunion, disintegration, multiplication of weak, insecure states. There are no advantages to true civilization in reversion to a dead past. Even a League of Nations formed on the most liberal lines would afford no guaranty of peace and security were the newly liberated nationalities to remain severally independent, jealous of one another, walled in and legally isolated in a commercial sense. As Immanuel Kant pointed out long ago, a true League of Nations implies, among other things, complete freedom of trade among the associated nations. Tariffs, and especially preferential tariffs, are sources of irritation and friction, and a multiplication of independent states necessarily involves a multiplication of tariff barriers and customs houses.

These ideas, to repeat, would meet with little resistance from men of vision and understanding if the world situation were not so befogged and if confusion were not made worse confounded by the revolutionary outbreaks and disturbances.

Peace has to be made, not with stable and duly constituted governments, but, in some cases at least, with fragile, unrepresentative pseudo-governmental organizations—accidents of the hour, fruits of anarchy and chaos.

Furthermore, the world finds itself in the midst not merely of political, but of social, economic and intellectual upheavals. No wonder pessimism is said to

reign in high circles, despite the rather sudden ending of the war.

Now, Russia was the first of the great powers to stop fighting, sue for peace and embark upon a colossal "social" experiment. Her internal troubles and trials since the first of the two revolutions of 1917 have perplexed the Western world more deeply than those of any other country. Many have frankly "given Russia up," saying that her "psychology" is bizarre and utterly incomprehensible to a non-Slav mind. But we have to understand Russia—especially we Americans, who are to be called on to aid her materially and possibly give her sympathetic guidance as well.

In point of fact, the several acts of the Russian drama are not very difficult to interpret in the light of Russian conditions—physical, political, moral, and historical. Science bids us look for "simple explanations," particularly where human conduct is concerned. This article is an attempt to interpret the Russian revolution and its sequel without bias, partisanship or passion, and incidentally to throw light on the question of our duty and opportunity in Russia.

1. *The Overthrow of Czarism*

All Russian writers of note agree that the revolution of March, 1917, was truly national, spontaneous and popular. For the first time Russians of all

schools and factions found themselves "unanimous." Autocracy had committed suicide. The old régime was bankrupt, and there were none to defend it or plead for a new lease of life for it. Even the peasant millions who had venerated the "White Czar," the "little father," and had long considered him to be their sincere if impotent protector, were reconciled to the abdication of the House of Romanov and to the establishment of a republic. Famine, cold, misery, staggering losses in the war—losses attributed not to the ordinary fortunes of war, but to incompetence, corruption, selfishness, pettiness, and actual treachery in the Russian bureaucracy and cabinet—had thoroughly cured even the illiterate peasant of his affection for the autocrat. The army welcomed the revolution. It was weary of butchery and slaughter. Too often had it had to oppose with bare breasts and arms the irresistible advance of disciplined, perfectly equipped and ably led enemy legions. The army knew that Russia could not continue to play the part that had been assigned to her. She had made terrific sacrifices and had reached the breaking point. An agricultural empire, with an illiterate people, undeveloped "pigmy" industries, a small and ignorant middle class, inadequate transportation facilities, empty arsenals, how could Russia stay longer in a war that taxed to the utmost all the technical, industrial and scientific resources of the twentieth century?

The revolution, then, came because Russia needed and demanded peace and bread. The masses of the people were not interested in mere politics; as has well been said, the Russian people do not "think politically, but economically." The first provisional government was expected to grant the people the blessings the czar had been unable to give—peace and bread. It was, however, unequal to the situation. It lacked moral authority. It was too conservative and moderate for the period. It had not the courage to inform its foreign allies in positive terms that Russia was practically out of the war and that the renewed "offensive" expected of her was impossible.

The first provisional government was a government of gentlemen, of cultivated and westernized men, of professors, diplomats and administrators. The workmen, the soldiers, the sailors, and the peasants in the villages were not in the mood to listen to the gospel which this government preached,—the gospel of patience, of moderation, of sweet reasonableness, of loyalty to allies, of strict observance of covenants that had been made by the czar. They insisted on immediate relief and reform. The provisional government undertook many admirable things, but it could not give the people peace or bread. It begged for time, and begged in vain. The real power was in the hands of the militant, mercurial committees of soldiers, sailors and workmen, and these committees distrusted the provisional government and hampered

it in every direction. They soon made the position of the government untenable, and it had to resign. It had to make way for a more radical and more representative government.

2. *The Kerensky Cabinets*

After the fall of the Lvov government the central council of soldiers' and workmen's delegates had the opportunity to take the reins of government into its own hands. It hesitated and declined. It professed its readiness to support another coalition cabinet and work with it so far as it might approve of its policies. Kerensky was the logical choice for premier in a new cabinet. He was a socialist, a popular orator, a favorite with the trade unions, a former agitator against autocracy. Even moderates urged him to take the premiership. He was not a man of action or of mental vigor. He was not a statesman or an administrator. But he had personal magnetism, and it was hoped that he would by persuasive oratory and tactful private negotiations manage to induce socialists, individualist radicals and liberals to work together amicably and preserve a semblance of discipline and order in the army and in the country.

Kerensky was obliged to make many successive changes in his cabinet. He sought to placate the extremists without alienating the moderates. He played the ungrateful rôle—doubly ungrateful in

Russia, where compromise is treated as sin—of opportunist and Fabian. His chief duty was to pave the way for a constituent assembly. He and his associates did not feel that they had any legal or moral right to settle momentous, knotty and serious questions—least of all the question of land tenure. They knew the peasants' attitude toward the land question. They knew that immediate expropriation of landlords without compensation was a popular doctrine, and that this doctrine was being disseminated by a section of the Social Democratic party of Russia—the Bolsheviks (who have become so notorious since). But they would not or could not use force against these agitators—even when some of the latter were openly accused of accepting enemy money and carrying on propaganda that happened for the moment to suit enemy purposes. The Kerensky government argued that free speech and free assembly were too sacred and inviolable to the revolution to be infringed upon even in a critical and anxious hour. They were determined to be consistent and logical. They would not do the cruel things which they had condemned the czar for doing. The agitation they would not, and perhaps could not, check, the agitation of the extremists who talked to the peasants and soldiers in terms they could understand, finally proved to be the undoing of the Kerensky government. It fell because it was too conservative for the left and too radical for the rightist parties. It fell

because it was feeble, uncertain, divided against itself, and practically impotent. Like its predecessor, it had failed to give the masses either peace or bread. It had failed to summon a constituent assembly, and it had failed to impress the Allies with the desirability of encouraging the movement for "a negotiated peace," of promoting inter-belligerent conferences of radicals, laborites and socialists, and formulating definite peace terms. Kerensky was not as frank with the Allies as he might have been, and it is doubtful whether they ever fully understood the Russian situation before the victory of Bolshevism. On the other hand there is reason to think that the Allies resisted unpleasant explanations and shrank from looking the facts in the face so far as Russia was concerned. They thought that a Kornilov, or another stalwart patriot and soldier, could suppress revolutionary pacifism and reestablish the eastern front. They stressed Kerensky's weakness too much, and could not bring themselves to believe that elemental forces, beyond the control of any "strong man," had been unchained and let loose in Russia. They mistook a mass movement for an insignificant revolt. They indicted individuals for acts or omissions which, at the time and in the circumstances that existed, could not possibly have been avoided. Russia after the revolution was out of the war and intended to stay out. Even the Cossacks refused to support a pro-Ally, pro-Patriotic movement.

3. *The Bolshevik Dictatorship*

Lenin, Trotzky and their associates—none of them “workmen”—had little difficulty in wresting power from the Kerensky government. They did not lead the masses—they followed them; they voiced the people’s insistent demands for peace, bread and land. They had audacity and the courage of their opinions. They were Social Democrats, followers of Karl Marx, and they subscribed to the economic interpretation of history, or “historic materialism.” They had no respect for what they called “bourgeois shibboleths.” They had no interest in political ideals and cared little about mere forms of government. Religion and morality meant nothing to them; the social revolution would bring forth its own religion and morality. They believed in the gospel of the Communist Manifesto, did not flinch from expropriation and confiscation of property, and were prepared to use any means that might prove to be necessary to the realization of their supreme end.

Their first duty, as they rightly enough conceived it, was to end the war and give Russia the opportunity of turning to internal problems and revolutionary reforms. They did not *prefer* a separate peace; they served what to them seemed quite sufficient notice on the Allies that a general peace must be made forthwith on the basis of the Soviet formula,

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"No annexations; no indemnities; self-determination." They gave the Allies time, while warning them repeatedly that Russia might be compelled to desert them and conclude a separate peace.

They expected that the German Socialists and trade unionists would come to their aid in the final phase of the peace negotiations and force the Berlin government and the German high command to grant Russia fair and reasonable terms. They did much to shape and influence labor sentiment in Germany and Austria-Hungary, and they expected to reap immediately the fruits of their bold and thrilling ideas. They thought they had so thoroughly prepared the soil of Europe for revolution that even the German kaiser and his generals would not dare propose to Russia's Socialist government oppressive and humiliating terms.

When they finally signed the Brest-Litovsk treaty they did so because the anticipated help was not forthcoming and because they felt sure that revolution in Western Europe was only delayed. They signed a treaty that, they said, gave them a breathing spell, a chance to organize a "red" army, and the infinitely more important opportunity of abolishing the old economic order and establishing genuine socialism in what remained of the Russian empire. They candidly said that they could afford to give up Poland, the Ukraine, the Baltic provinces, and much

more besides, for an uncertain period, provided they were left free to make their historic experiment in Marxian socialism in the interior of Great Russia.

The Bolshevik leaders called their successful rebellion against Kerensky and his coalition cabinet "the social revolution." They planned to expropriate the expropriators, to seize the land, the mines, the banks, the factories and the other capitalistic establishments, and to transfer these to the people. They did not actually believe that the peasant and proletarian masses were "conscious Socialists," converts to Marxian socialism; but they believed that the people's sufferings and discontent, and the peasants' land hunger, would enable them to take advantage of the situation. They meant, in short, to use the irresistible demand for peace and bread as a stalking horse for the introduction of the type of Socialism they had long advocated and dreamed of.

But what of the middle classes, of the non-socialist parties and groups, of the milder socialists who were opposed to confiscation, terror, and repudiation of national debts? Would these surrender, or fight Bolshevism?

The answer was—the *dictatorship of the proletariat*. Lenin and Trotzky declared that all the counter-revolutionaries, whether noble, bourgeois or former foes of the czar and his régime, would be ruthlessly suppressed. The rule of the people was the goal in view; but the rule of the urban pro-

letariat, led by a few Marxian socialist intellectuals, was *the indispensable preliminary stage*. History justified the dictatorship, they claimed. Revolutions cannot be peaceful or beatific. Sentimentalists, rhetoricians, academics, fair-weather radicals were as dangerous to them as the reactionary Bourbons. All enemies must be crushed. There could be no compromise with weak-kneed reformers. Past services and claims must be treated as negligible factors. The success of the social revolution must not be jeopardized by ideology or weak concessions to "bourgeois virtues." Russia was the pioneer, the pathfinder, and at any cost must achieve the great objective. The other nations would follow in her footsteps. Russia was not perhaps quite ready for socialism, but there are such things as "leaps" in the history of human progress. The minority was ready for the leap, and once made, there could be no turning back. The majority would *subsequently* be educated and converted.

The group of masterful men that held these beliefs assumed power with the support of armed guards, embattled urban workmen, and hosts of disinherited and vindictive peasants who had not forgotten the cruelties of the *ancien régime*, the burdens of the czar's tax system, the exactions of the corrupt officials and the tyrannical agents of the secret police. The soviets throughout Great Russia gravitated toward Bolshevism, for it meant little, if any, inter-

ference with them and immediate seizure of the land that belonged to nobles, capitalists, the church or the crown. A reign of terror ensued. Every "bourgeois" was under suspicion. How many men, women, and children the Bolshevik régime has slain or starved to death, the world does not yet know. But that anarchy and civil war have held sway throughout Russia, and that Bolshevik troops have had to fight whole sections of the dismembered empire, are notorious facts.

4. *The Bolshevik Failure—the Causes*

At this writing the Bolshevik government is still nominally in the saddle, but its collapse is foreseen and generally anticipated. Even Lenin tacitly admits that his great adventure is likely to end in smoke. He has not brought internal peace to Russia. He has not restored normal conditions. He has not averted famine and has not started the wheels of industry. The "leap" has not been made. Ukases and decrees on paper are not enough to carry a people over a chasm and settle them securely under a new system of laws and institutions.

Why Lenin and Trotzky have failed, and were bound to fail, may be explained in a few words. In the first place, they did not give the people the external peace they had promised. The treaty of Brest-Litovsk angered many Russians, who continued

to regard Germany as an enemy. Moreover, it brought them the Czecho-Slovak complications and, eventually, intervention by the Allies and the United States.

In the second place, the Bolshevik government did not bring internal peace, concord and rehabilitation. Province after province, district and center after district and center seceded, repudiated the Lenin régime. Some districts set up other governments and opened negotiations with the Allies. Russian exiles in Europe and America carried on active propaganda against Bolshevism and Soviet rule, denouncing them as tyrannical beyond anything ever attempted by the czar, utterly anti-democratic and hopelessly incompetent and "crazy." In the parts of Russia which the Bolshevik executive claimed to control and govern every former landlord, including the richer peasants, every former owner of property, every "bourgeois," and nearly every non-socialist intellectual was known to be bitterly anti-Bolshevik at heart. Thousands of trained men went on a strike and declined to work under the mediocre or ignorant appointees of the Bolshevik soviets. This led to reprisals, to "pogroms" directed against the intellectuals. Russia could not resume normal life without the energetic and earnest aid of every intelligent son and daughter. True, these educated and trained men and women numerically constitute an insignificant element of the whole population; still, as Lenin has

admitted, Russia cannot produce, trade, exchange, transport, finance her industries and commerce without this small element. If it is striking against and boycotting Bolshevik rule, that rule must collapse.

And what after such a collapse? The answer of anti-Bolshevik Russians of all schools and parties is that the Bolshevik ministry must be replaced by a truly national, representative government, and that a constituent assembly should be convoked without further delay to give Russia a stable and genuinely democratic government. This is the alternative program. A constituent assembly elected under a system of universal, equal and secret suffrage would have the authority to speak for Russia and to act for her. No dictator has such authority, no matter how benevolent and altruistic and self-sacrificing he may be—or imagine himself to be.

5. *Is the Soviet System "Superior"?*

There are, however, men and women in England and America who assert that the Bolsheviks are more democratic than their opponents; that they have evolved a higher form or type of popular government; that the attacks on them betray narrow, provincial, prejudiced minds, and that, even if they fail, the future is bound to vindicate them. It is asserted that Europe and America have crude, outworn, unjust systems of government, while Bolshevik-

ism has blazed the way to a fairer and nobler form. Let us examine these claims. Let us ask just on what basis of fact or principle they rest. What is the essence of the Soviet form of government?

Let Lenin himself, the acknowledged intellectual leader of Bolshevism, answer this query. In an elaborate and powerful address which he delivered at Moscow some months ago Lenin said on this crucial point:

"We introduced and firmly established the Soviet republic—a new type of state—ininitely higher and more democratic than the best of the bourgeois-parliamentary republics. We established the dictatorship of the proletariat, supported by the poorest peasantry, and have inaugurated a comprehensively planned system of socialist reform."

These two sentences, if they mean anything, mean that a dictatorship of the city workers supported by the poorest peasants is infinitely higher and more democratic than a republic based on universal, equal and secret suffrage, on the doctrine of majority rule arrived at by free and tolerant discussion. What reasonable radical can subscribe to this notion?

In the same address Lenin continues, more explicitly:

"The Socialist character of the Soviet democracy consists first in this: that the electorate comprises the toiling and exploited masses; *the bourgeoisie is excluded*. Secondly in this: that all bureaucratic

formalities and limitations of elections are done away with; that the masses themselves determine the order and time of elections and with complete freedom of call. Thirdly, that the best possible mass organization of the vanguard of the toilers—of the industrial proletariat—is formed, enabling them to direct the exploited masses, to attract them to active participation in political life, to train them politically through their own experience; that in this way a beginning is made, for the first time, to get actually the whole population to learn how to manage and begin managing.”

In other words, the Soviet form of democracy is higher and better because it disfranchises the middle class, because it disfranchises the richer peasant who shares the sentiments of the middle class, and because it puts supreme control in the hands of the city workers. Further, the Soviet form is higher and better because it dispenses with all formalities in elections and enables a mass meeting, or a tyrannical chairman pounding a gavel to declare this or that group of persons elected to this or that set of offices. Secrecy, uniformity, precautions against fraud and force in elections are “bourgeois” fancies, and their abandonment insures more certain and direct rule by the people!

Of course, all this is grotesquely absurd. Yet there are self-styled radicals and progressives who

extol the Soviet type of "democracy" and ask us to copy it, or at least devoutly worship it as an ideal, if we are too imperfect to realize it.

The Soviet form of government is neither democratic nor rational. It is government by accidental groups, by disorderly assemblies, by haphazard arrangements. It is government by usurpers and pretenders who may or may not choose to obey a dictatorship of the so-called proletariat, which in turn is led by a small group of remorseless non-proletarian dogmatists and social bigots.

Some superficial apologists for the Lenin régime find some hidden beauties in the fact that the Soviet government, whether local, provincial or central, is a government of people who "work together" instead of a government of people who happen to live in a given area or who think alike! Now there may be some advantage in basing representation on occupation, profession, calling, instead of on mere population. But what has this to do with the disfranchisement of those who "work together" as "richer peasants," or as "bourgeois," or as non-socialist intellectuals? And what happens when those who work together disagree and think separately? In point of fact, the Lenin form of Soviet government is a despotic government of certain people who think alike and who disfranchise and suppress all who venture to differ with them and to have other ideas

of social and economic organization. It is not a higher form of democracy, but a lower form of tyranny.

Russia had such institutions as the Mir—the village commune—the Zemstvo, and the city electorate to build on. The czar's suffrage acts were illiberal and undemocratic, and the revolution extended and popularized them. Proportional representation was adopted to protect minorities. Local, provincial and national institutions could have been firmly planted on the thoroughly democratized suffrage, and the majority would have ruled within constitutional limitations. The Bolshevik faction destroyed democracy, scornfully rejected majority rule, and established a dictatorship of a small class in the name of "the social revolution" that was to bring forth a perfect democracy. The experiment was as indefensible theoretically as it was futile, needless and impossible practically. In Russia, under a democratic government, the workers and peasants would have controlled any assembly, any parliamentary body. The land problem, the credit problem, the problem of industrial control, would have been solved conformably to the wishes of the great majority—workers and peasants. The minority, the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals would have been outvoted on every definite issue. But—they would have had the rights of freemen—the right to express opinions, to agitate and educate, to seek to influence and

win over the majority. They would have had their day in the court of public opinion. They would have had no ground for complaint. As it is, they are deprived of all political rights, all voice in government, simply because they might have proved too persuasive, too eloquent, too successful in debate. Their "side" was not wanted. They could not be permitted to talk or to vote. The people must follow the proletariat vanguard and Lenin. They cannot be allowed to choose. And all this is "higher democracy"!

These bedlamite ideas have happily been assessed in Germany and Austria at their true value. The Social Democrats of Western Europe have fortunately little sympathy with Bolshevism and have regarded Russia's recent experiences as warnings or deterrent examples. The principles of democracy and liberty are rightly understood in the radical circles of Germany and Austria, and the danger of Bolshevism in those countries was greatly exaggerated after the abdication of the autocrats and the establishment of a provisional Socialist government. Russia must learn from Europe and America what democracy is. She is learning now. She is not lost.

TRUE DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESS

Some Thoughts on the Russian Soviet System

IN a recent issue of *The Open Court* the present writer challenged the claim of the Russian Bolshevik leaders that their "Soviet system" embodies a higher form of democracy than the American or any European form. He attacked the dictatorship of the small quasi-proletarian clique that has ruled central Russia in the name of the working classes and the poorer peasants, and he objected to the disfranchisement of the so-called bourgeois elements of the population.

Several correspondents have taken issue with him, on the ground, as they contend, that these undemocratic and illiberal measures are temporary and begotten of emergency and the danger of counter-revolution. What of the Soviet system itself in its substantial and permanent features? he has been asked. Is not the Soviet system a notable and valuable contribution to the art of democratic government? Has it not, as a matter of fact, impressed and fascinated the liberal thinkers of Europe and America? Have not even the severe critics of Bolshevism admitted, with astonishment or reluctance,

that the Soviet system "works" in Russia and contains elements worthy of study and emulation?

Yes, the Soviet system has taken many Western minds captive. There is undoubtedly something in it that appeals to radicals and liberals in the West. What is that something, and how much of it, if anything, can Europe or America adopt with advantage? These are legitimate questions that can be discussed calmly and without prejudice.

What is the essence of the Soviet system—or, rather, what would be its essence under normal conditions?

The answer is that the principle of the Soviet is representation on a new basis. Under it men vote together because *they work together* and belong to the same social and economic group. In the words of an apologist and supporter of Bolshevik Russia:

"A soviet delegate comes from a group—a shop or a union—meeting regularly. A soviet representative is continuously in touch with the people he represents. The soviets are elected largely by occupations. They are full of miners who know mines; of machinists who know machines; of peasants who know the land; of teachers who know children and education. The soviet is a center for the transaction of business by men who know their business."

The same writer, by way of contrast, thus characterizes our American Congress—and, of course, the characterization would apply to the British Com-

mons, the French parliament, the various diets or assemblies, or the Russian Duma as it existed under the Czar:

"A congressman represents all sorts of people, irrespective of their work, who meet at the polls every two or four or six years; there is no other bond of union among them. Congress is full of lawyers and politicians and office-grabbers. Congress is too often a talking machine, an arena for playing party politics."

This is not scientific or philosophical language, but the points made are tolerably clear. Are they valid? Are the people of a state or nation likely to be better represented, and more faithfully and intelligently served, under the soviet plan than under the familiar and conventional plan? Let us see.

When voters elect an alderman, a state legislator or a member of Congress, they elect him, as a rule, because he belongs to a certain party and stands on a certain platform. We may and should eliminate national party issues from local elections, but we cannot make local elections nonpartisan or nonpolitical. Local issues simply—and properly—take the place of national issues, more or less irrelevant. We vote as partisans, and we join parties because on the whole they severally reflect and represent our political and economic opinions. It must be admitted that parties have an irritating way of outliving their usefulness and their representative character,

but if thousands cling to parties that are morally dead and practically futile, whom but ourselves can we blame for this fact? Tradition, habit, inertia, prejudice, thoughtlessness keep such parties alive, rather than the intrigues and stratagems of professional politicians. Besides, when a really vital issue emerges, a realignment is quickly and spontaneously effected. Passions, convictions, interests outweigh tradition and habit when there is a conflict between these sets of influences.

In short, roughly and generally speaking, the familiar plan or system is a system of government by parties, big or small, and therefore by opinions. The question how our opinions are formed—what part class or group interest plays in the process—need not be raised here. Perhaps opinion is inspired or prompted by economic interests, but only the shallow and half-baked radicals maintain that opinions are of no consequence and may be completely ignored. The fact is that men fight for opinions, make sacrifices for opinions, and are often unconscious of any personal or class interest back of the opinion, not to mention the by no means exceptional individuals whose opinions manifestly conflict with their pecuniary interests.

We must, therefore, consider and criticize the familiar plan of nominating and electing representatives as a plan designed to give us government by discussion, government by compromise and ad-

justment, government by opinion. From this point of view, our system is undoubtedly full of faults and imperfections. Sometimes what we call representative government is not in fact representative. Men elected to represent mixed and heterogeneous constituencies are found to represent narrow special interests, spoils cliques, etc. Again, too often the representatives are not competent to voice the opinions of their constituencies and not industrious or capable enough to acquire such competency. Then, too, party platforms may be so ambiguous, indefinite, and empty that the men who stand on them can hardly be said to have opinions on the actual issues of the period. Finally, even if we suppose that the elected representative of a ward or district is faithful, intelligent, and fit to represent those who voted for him, what of the minority in the same district, which is deprived of a voice in the legislative body? Who represents that minority? Some one from another district, where those who believe as this minority does constitute a majority? This is scarcely satisfactory, for localities have special needs and special conditions, and may have special opinions even while accepting the general platform of the party that commands a majority of the district.

For example, a Democrat from a Chicago district is not an ideal representative of an Alabama Democratic constituency, nor a Vermont Republican a

fit and desirable representative of an Oregon or Kansas Republican constituency. When a minority in a district is deprived of a voice, it practically is governed and taxed without its consent.

These evils have long since been recognized by students and rational reformers, hence the movement for minority representation and for proportional representation. That proportional representation is steadily gaining ground, everybody knows. Even some of our new city charters provide for such representation, and on small commissions in charge of municipal affairs we now find not only members of the major parties, but labor men, Socialists, and other radicals.

The logical position of the upholder of democratic and representative government is thus sufficiently indicated. He must advocate the creation of large election districts and the election from them of representatives on the basis of proportional representation. We must demand that every legislative body contain members of each of the important parties, schools, and social groups. A system that insures this gives us government of and by opinion. If, in addition, the term of office is made short, the method of nomination simple and fair, and the election pure and honest—that is, free from fraud—then the system is as democratic, as genuine, as popular as we can expect any system to be under present intellectual and moral conditions. Indif-

ferent, ignorant, careless men cannot expect to be loyally and properly served by representatives. Eternal vigilance still is, and always will be, the price of good, or truly democratic, government. "Educate your masters," said an English Tory statesman after a notable extension of the suffrage system that enfranchised millions of workmen, agricultural laborers, and others. If the "masters" remain ignorant or apathetic, they are masters only in name. Those rule who take the trouble to rule, who work, watch, improve every opportunity, and assert themselves on all lawful occasions.

Sound and true democracy cannot be created by fiat or miracle. Education and slow political and moral evolution are forces for which there are no substitutes. Given education, however, with adequate machinery and organization, and government by discussion and the free play of opinion can be made a reality.

One admission must here be noted in all candor. It is possible, and perhaps probable, that if Second Chambers are retained, they will in an ever-increasing measure be converted into modified soviets—that is, they will be composed of representatives of great industries, occupations, professions, interests. There is no reason why England, France, Italy, or some American State should not make the experiment of a second chamber so formed and constituted. That is, farmers, manufacturers, merchants

and bankers, carriers, workmen, professional men, artists, and others might form guilds or other organizations and send men from their own respective ranks to represent them in a chamber smaller than the popular and democratic chamber elected, as now, on the basis of opinion, party affiliation and the like.

Now compare the Soviet system *at its best* with a thoroughly reformed and modernized system of government by opinion.

At the base of the Soviet pyramid, we are told, are the voters of the villages, hamlets, towns, and cities. These voters meet in factories, in village halls, railroad depots, and the like, and elect the local soviet. The methods and procedure are, and are to remain, elastic. The local soviets elect the delegates to, or members of, the District soviets, and these in turn send delegates to the Provincial soviets. At the top of the pyramid is the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, a body composed of delegates of the lower soviets. The soviets delegate authority to executive committees, local, provincial, and national.

The admirers of this system prefer not to discuss the two main criticisms that are made by its opponents. But they must and will be discussed by candid persons who really wish to study the relative advantages or merits of the rival plans.

In the first place, the voters of the hamlets, vil-

lages, towns, and cities do not elect either the Provincial or the National soviet. Is this democratic? Is it free from danger? The All-Russian Congress of Soviets is very remote indeed from the governed, whose consent is supposed to be necessary to make government popular and democratic. There is no guaranty whatever that the general and higher soviets will always represent all the elements, sorts, and conditions of the people. As a matter of fact, the higher soviets may have as many politicians, lawyers, and non-workers as the American Congress. The superiority claimed for the local soviet may be real, for the latter is composed of representatives of all "legitimate" occupations, interests, and professions. But when delegates elect other delegates, and the latter elect delegates to still another body, the character of the supreme body plainly depends on all manner of accidental and adventitious influences. This is not democracy.

The second criticism of the Soviet system is even more fundamental. It is all very well to talk in general terms about the wonderful results of representation of occupations, vocations, interests, actual social groups having common needs and experiences, but is it a fact that the members of a given group or profession think alike? Will it ever be a fact? Do workmen in a steel mill agree on political and economic questions? Are all the employees of a big store of one mind respecting such questions? Is

there unanimity among all railroad workers? Do teachers see eye-to-eye in the realm of government and social science?

These questions answer themselves. In any factory we are likely to find conservatives, moderates, liberals and radicals, Socialists, Syndicalists, anarchists, and what not. Men and women who work together not only do not think alike, but often violently differ among themselves and attack each other's gatherings. The bitterness among Socialists and anarchists is proverbial, as is the antagonism between ardent trade unionists and anti-union workmen of strongly individualist proclivities. Illustrations need hardly be multiplied on this point.

Now, when in any soviet, workmen see themselves, as they inevitably will, opposed by workmen, teachers by teachers, physicians by physicians, clerks by clerks, what balm will they find in the thought that they respectively "work together"? A foe is a foe, and an opponent an opponent, whether he works at the next machine, in the next shop, or in a totally different vocation.

Convictions and opinions are ultimately the determining factors in legislation and political action. The voter, the individual, wants his opinion to prevail, or at least to have a fair chance. He wants his "side" to have its day in court. A brother worker who does not agree with him cannot represent him.

It cannot be seriously doubted, therefore, that eventually the Russian voters will insist on fair and proper representation of opinions in the soviets, local and general. This cannot be secured except by proportional representation, and proportional representation involves profound modifications in the Soviet system. Opportunity must be afforded to those who think alike to act and vote together. If workmen, artists, teachers, and professional voters wish to be represented by the same set of delegates, they cannot justly be deprived of that right. Farmers cannot justly be prohibited from voting for teachers to represent them, nor teachers from voting for labor leaders. So far as the mechanical Soviet system precludes such inter-group voting it is more undemocratic and objectionable than any feature in the rival system.

Which system will insure adequate and just representation of all social groups, all opinions, all schools of thought? This is the paramount question. Which system will give us orderly and progressive government? Which is designed to make democracy safe, workable, rational, and sober-minded?

No reason has been furnished by the admirers of the Soviet system for scrapping our own imperfect system and blindly adopting their ill-considered, ill-devised substitute. We can and should improve our system and certain useful hints toward improve-

ment may possibly be discerned in the Soviet system. But—nothing more than hints. The notion that we can change things, elements, qualities by changing *names* is puerile. The notion that a reshuffling of human units will somehow rid us of religious, economic, social, and other differences, the differences that divide us into parties, factions, and schools of thought, is fantastic and grotesque.

To repeat, evolution, not revolution or miracle, will solve our problems and remove the obstacles to human solidarity and human justice, national and international, that face us on every side.

BOLSHEVISM: ITS RISE, DECLINE, AND FALL

"PRUSSIANISM has been overthrown, discredited and destroyed," many liberal-minded people have been saying, but the democratic forces of the world are, or soon will be, confronted by another formidable and dangerous enemy—Bolshevism. We must, therefore, intelligently begin preparations for the next world war—war on this new foe, war for the defence of democracy and civil liberty.

It is true that Bolshevism is the bitter foe of democracy and liberty, but it is not true that it is a "new" foe, or that any special preparations are, or will be, necessary in order to oppose and defeat it. Bolshevism is merely one of the forms of Prussianism. If Prussianism is really crushed, then Bolshevism also is crushed, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. If, on the other hand, Bolshevism is a foe to reckon with, then Prussianism is still alive and full of vigor.

Prussianism has not yet been crushed, but the liberal and democratic forces in the world have the opportunity and the power to destroy it. It is being destroyed, but only as fast and as surely as genuine

democracy, liberty and justice are being established and made secure. Bolshevism is being undermined and destroyed by the same means and the same operations. We are not called upon to carry on two wars, or to fight on two fronts; the war on Prussianism is also a war on Bolshevism.

It is the purpose of this paper to justify the foregoing affirmations. This involves an inquiry into the rise, decline and fall—yes, the absolutely certain fall—of Russian Bolshevism. Whatever superficial and ill-informed parlor or other “reds” may say, or think they think, about Bolshevism, the fact is that it is already an absolute failure, and that its days, in any scientific, fundamental sense, are known to be numbered, notwithstanding the military and political successes of the Soviet government. Incidentally we shall distinguish between Bolshevism and what is loosely called, especially by hostile critics, “Sovietism,” which is not synonymous with the former term at all. We shall distinguish between the essential and the non-essential or accidental features of Bolshevism, and perhaps remove certain misconceptions which account for the recent panic among some American officials which led to indiscriminating attacks on “radicals” of various types and which treated all Russian revolutionists in this country as dangerous “reds.”

The future historian of revolutionary movements will have little difficulty in accounting for the rise

and fall of Russian Bolshevism. The Bolshevik leaders themselves have furnished ample material whereon to base a firm, balanced judgment. Bolshevism is condemned out of its own mouth. It is condemned, further, by the very authority which it has falsely claimed to follow—that of Marx and his school of economics. It is condemned by the teachings of living Socialists of reputation and ability. It is condemned by the pre-war and pre-revolutionary writings of Mr. Lenin himself, the schoolmaster and intellectual leader of Bolshevism. Bolshevism, scientifically speaking, never had a leg to stand on, and the thoughtful, cultivated Socialists should have been among the first to disavow it. Only amazing ignorance of Russian history, Russian literature, Russian economic, social and educational conditions, accounts for the foolish sympathy which certain American radicals and Socialists have expressed for the insensate Bolshevik experiment in the primitive, backward, illiterate, divided and disorganized Slav hinterland of western Europe.

Nothing is more ludicrous and puerile than the notion that, while Bolshevism is impossible and undesirable in England, Germany, Belgium, France and America, it may, nevertheless, be “good for Russia.” The real student of Socialist or radical economics and philosophy knows that exactly the reverse statement would be consonant with such economics and philosophy. Bolshevism, if possible at

all, may be deemed possible in highly developed industrial countries, where labor is organized, disciplined, conscious of its responsibilities as well as of its opportunities and interests, and where the consolidation and concentration of industrial power has proceeded far enough to render "socialization" of at least the basic, important industries a comparatively simple matter. That Russia, with her predominantly rural, peasant population, her crude and slight industrial development, her ignorant urban workmen, her dependence on foreign brains, technique and capital, and her small, ineffective "intelligencia"—that Russia could hope to lead the West in establishing Marxian Socialism, or Lenin Communism, is so fantastic and irrational an idea that a few years ago no Socialist organ or teacher of any pretension to weight or authority would have stopped even to discuss it. It would have been dismissed as an absurd idea conceived in complete ignorance of the elements of Socialist economics and Socialist interpretation of social evolution.

Let us quote a few sentences from the Socialist Bible, Marx's "Capital":

Along with the constantly diminishing number of magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolize all the advantages of this transformation [the application of science to industry, the socialization of the form of production through indirect co-operation, the internationalization of exchange and trade,

etc.] grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery and exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organized by the very mechanism of the process of capitalistic production itself. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production which has sprung up and flourished along with and under it. Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labor at last reach a point where they *become incompatible with the capitalist integument*. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds.

Capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of nature, its own negation.—Vol. 1, pp. 836-837.

Whenever a certain maturity is reached, one definite social form is discarded and displaced by another. The time for the coming of this crisis is announced by the depth and breadth of the contradictions and antagonisms, which separate the conditions of distribution, and with them the definite historical form of the corresponding conditions of production, from the productive forces, their productivity and the development of their agencies. A conflict then arises between the material development of production and its social form.—Vol. 3, last page.

Here is a quotation from the Manifesto of the Communist party, written by Marx and F. Engels:

The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of

the laborers, due to competition, by their revolutionary combination, due to socialism. . . .

And here is a quotation from "A Summary of the Principles of Socialism," written by H. M. Hyndman and William Morris, and signed by all the members of the Executive Committee of the Democratic Federation of Great Britain:

We in England have arrived at the completest economic development. Our example, therefore, will guide and encourage the world. . . .

Only by collective superintendence of production and exchange, only by *the scientific organization of labor at home and supply of markets abroad*, can our present anarchy be put an end to and a better system be allowed to grow up. . . . The very increase of companies, the very development of state management now going on, point out clearly the lines of necessary progress. (Italics mine in all the quotations.)

The foregoing quotations, which, of course, could be multiplied indefinitely from standard Socialist literature, classical and contemporary, sufficiently demonstrate the essential unsoundness and folly of Russian Bolshevism, which never was anything else than perverted, misapplied Marxian Socialism "in a hurry,"—Socialism prematurely and ruthlessly forced by fanatics and doctrinaires on a totally unprepared country, under conditions that, to sane

minds, made any measure of success utterly impossible.

The Evolution of Bolshevism

Let us next trace the history of Russian Bolshevism and attempt to account for the tragic episode.

It is, perhaps, not generally understood in the West that in Russia, since the era of reform under Alexander II, practically every progressive or radical, and certainly every revolutionist, called himself a Socialist. Russia has had neither an individualist, anarchist, nor liberal movement of any importance. The exceptional personalities—like Bakounin, the anarchist, or Kropotkin, the anarchist-communist, or Professor Gradowsky, the liberal—only emphasized the prevailing tendencies to which they were in opposition. For several decades in Russia to say, "I am a radical" was to say, "I am a Socialist." Why? To explain this fact, one must have considerable knowledge of Russian history. Suffice it to say that the Russian Village Mir and the Russian Artiel (co-operative wage workers' society) have long been regarded as institutions socialistic in character, institutions that readily lent themselves to the changes necessary to convert them to complete Socialist uses. For decades many Russian thinkers and revolutionists maintained that their country could be spared many of the bitter struggles and sanguinary collisions which capitalist Western

Europe was apparently destined to undergo in the process of transition to Socialism. While Russia could not exactly "skip," or fully avoid, the stage of capitalism, in the opinion of these thinkers she could reasonably expect to shorten it considerably, to profit by Europe's experience and build on her own broad, national and democratic foundations. That the whole civilized world was marching fast toward Socialism, the Russian radicals assumed as a fact and never thought of questioning.

In the course of political development the Russian Socialists split. The Social-Democratic party was formed, and its tenets and methods diverged more and more from those of the Socialist-Revolutionists. The principal differences between these two parties were these:

The Socialist-Revolutionists' platform was simple—"Land and Liberty." This meant land for the peasants and city workers, with or without compensation to private owners—though *without* compensation to the Church and the Crown for the lands they possessed—and civil, religious and other liberty, in the Western sense, for the whole population of Russia. The nationalization or socialization of the land was not to be forced, but in every way encouraged, the semi-Socialist Mir being used and developed gradually along Socialistic lines. The peasant landowners were not to be expropriated in obedience to any dogma, but they were to be edu-

cated to appreciate the Mir and its possibilities. Concern for the peasants, indeed, led to the Socialist-Revolutionists being called "Peasantists." The party made steady headway among the rural population of Central Russia and by some was incorrectly described as a peasant party. Constitutional liberty was highly prized and always emphasized by this party as the condition precedent to any other solid, lasting reform. It was willing to use terror as a means of forcing the blind, reactionary autocracy and bureaucracy to grant a constitution with all the basic political rights and immunities that implied. Liberty, or free institutions generally, were, however, to be utilized as the means of establishing socialism in industry by legislation, education and all other constitutional methods.

The Social-Democrats called themselves scientific and practical. They claimed to be the true disciples of Marx. They made their appeal to the city proletariat, as well as to the poorest elements of the peasantry who had so little land that they were forced to eke out a living by seeking employment in factories during the winter season. The richer peasants, the professional classes and the intellectuals were severally regarded by the Social-Democrats as enemies of the social revolution.

The idea that Russia, by reason of her Mir, her Artiel, her semi-socialist traditions, could hope largely to escape the capitalist phase of evolution,

or to shorten it, was definitely abandoned by the Social-Democrats as Utopian, sentimental and non-evolutional. Lenin, the leader of the Social-Democrats, vigorously assailed this old notion and insisted that capitalism was the necessary preliminary to Socialism in Russia, as elsewhere, and that the part of wisdom for the true Socialist was to co-operate with evolution by accelerating the trend toward capitalism. The Russian Mir, with the communal ownership of land, was, according to Lenin, a nuisance, an obstacle to progress. Let the tendencies to peasant proprietorship, as well as to big landed estates, be encouraged rather than resisted. Capitalism contains the seed of its own destruction, and the enlightened, "objective" Socialist has no quarrel with capitalism *per se*, so long as it unconsciously paves the way to Socialism by creating, educating and organizing the proletariat, as well as by consolidating industry and making it ripe for ultimate socialization on Marxian lines.

For a decade or more the Social-Democratic party fought the Socialist-Revolutionists vigorously on these issues. But during this period differences of opinion developed within the Social-Democratic party itself. These differences finally caused a split. The majority faction called itself Bolsheviki—this being Russian for "the majority"—and the minority faction became known as Mensheviki—again, this being Russian for "the minority element." The

principal issue between these two wings of the same party related to the treatment of the richer peasant and the "intellectuals." The Mensheviki had, and have now, more in common with the Socialist-Revolutionists than with the Bolsheviki.

While the autocratic régime, but slightly tempered by the reforms of the disturbed period that followed the crushing defeat of Russia's military and naval forces in the war with Japan, continued to suppress and stifle free discussion of Russia's needs and problems, the indicated differences of radical opinion could not be explained to the uneducated Russians in popular language. Scientific works for and against Marxian, or Bolshevik, economics were produced, published and read even in Russia; but they were intended for a very small minority. It was a criminal offence even to belong to the Social-Democratic or the Socialist-Revolutionist party, and the adherents of either of these parties that managed to get themselves elected to the Duma enjoyed few and limited opportunities of expounding their views. Many of them were arrested and tried for treason. Their addresses in the Duma could not be printed in any newspaper outside of Petrograd—and the addresses could not always appear in the newspapers of the capital, the very seat of the Duma.

The world war came, the autocracy and bureaucracy of Russia once more revealed their miserable inefficiency and their corruption and infamy. The

revolution of 1917 was inevitable. It was not the result of underground plots or activities. It was a mass movement. The peasants were as ready for it as were the city workers. Autocracy was hopelessly discredited. If any of the conservative or moderate or liberal statesmen, or members of the Duma, indulged, at the time of the "political" revolution of March, 1917, the hope of saving the Autocracy, or the economic system on which it in part rested, they were gravely mistaken, strangely blind. Under no circumstances would it have been possible by any combination of groups, or by any stratagems, to prevent the political revolution from gradually assuming the character and complexion of a *social* revolution. All apologies for the blunders and excesses of Bolshevism that are based on the distinction between the "political revolution" that the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals contemplated and favored, and the social revolution that the interests of the peasants and wage workers demanded, and which the Bolsheviks alone, forsooth, were determined to bring about, are simply untrue and unsound. They may deceive the ignorant foreign radicals who "are not Bolshevik, but"—they have not deceived intelligent Russians or foreign students of Russian history and Russian conditions.

To quote at this point from a letter of Prince P. Kropotkin, the Russian savant and revolutionist, to George Brandes:

. . . You know how criminal toward all social progress in Europe was, in my opinion, the attitude of those who worked to disorganize the Russian power of resistance—which prolonged the war by a year, gave us a German invasion under cover of a treaty, and cost seas of blood to prevent victorious Germany from crushing Europe under its imperial boot.

If Kropotkin had thought that the revolution of March, 1917, would remain merely political—that is, superficial and limited to forms of government and slight attempts at ameliorating the lot of the masses—he would not condemn the Bolshevik attitude toward the Allies and the war as “criminal toward all social progress.” It was in truth criminal because it retarded social progress instead of accelerating it.

But to resume the narrative. The first revolutionary or provisional government of Russia was not sufficiently radical or representative. It did not last and could not have lasted. The Lvov cabinet, although it planned and even undertook many important reforms, did not command the confidence of the militant radical elements or of the suspicious and expectant peasantry whose one thought was—*Land at last*. This fact necessitated the reorganization of the ministry and the appointment of a Socialist, Kerensky, as premier. The Kerensky cabinet was not strong in personnel, but it was sufficiently radical

and representative. The Bolshevik indictments of it, when closely examined by persons entitled to express opinions on the subjects, lack substance or foundation of fact. The Kerensky cabinet would have wrestled earnestly with the land problem, the factory problem and the other economic problems of Russia. Weak ministers would have made way for bold and courageous ones. But the alliance with the Entente would have been continued, and Russia would have stayed in the war, doing little, perhaps, in the field, but furnishing invaluable moral support to the Allied cause and helping to undermine Prussianism.

The Bolshevik campaign against the Kerensky government was a campaign of doctrinaires and fanatics, of self-styled internationalists, ruthless enemies of capitalism, of "bourgeois" policies and half-way measures. The Bolshevik leaders believed that the great social revolution, that was to overthrow all bourgeois and capitalistic systems, including what they called the sham democracy of America, was at hand, and that it was their bounden duty and unprecedented privilege to give the old order the *coup de grâce* and usher in the Marxian Socialist system. What they themselves had said and written concerning Russia's backwardness and unpreparedness for Socialism was forgotten or dismissed as irrelevant and inapplicable to the unforeseen situation. Russia, the Bolshevik leaders thought, happened to find her-

self at the head of an international procession. Leadership had been thrust upon her; she was not to remain long in a dangerous, though splendid, isolation. The revolution would spread with amazing rapidity. Italy, France, Germany, Austria, Hungary were on the eve of tremendous upheavals. The prospects were glorious; to hesitate, then, would be criminal.

Only as regards Britain and the United States did the Bolshevik doctrinaires admit some anxious doubts. Lenin himself, the schoolmaster of Bolshevism, was frank enough to recognize the strength and stability of capitalism in these two countries. They might resist the inevitable for some time and cause certain complications. But, of course, Russia would not be the only victim of such complications. At any rate, the anticipated resistance of England and America, the last strongholds of capitalism and plutocracy, should not deter Russia from crossing the Rubicon and sounding the trumpet to rally those nations that were ready for the final contest with the bankrupt social order!

We know what the course of developments has been. Hungary—or, rather, Budapest and its immediate hinterland—tried Bolshevism for a short time. A triple crisis, and particularly the fierce opposition of the peasant population and the middle classes, put an end to that experiment. Germany and Austria had short-lived revolutions, but Bolshev-

ism hardly ventured to show its head in either country. Lenin and his associates now frankly admit that the social revolution in western Europe has somehow been checked and postponed. The German Social-Democrats, instead of holding out hope and encouragement to Bolshevism, are disavowing even the purpose of undertaking limited experiments in Marxian Socialism. All they are contemplating is the enforcement of some legislation giving the wage-workers a voice in the management of industry. The fear of militarist and monarchical reaction is profound and widespread in Germany. The republican and democratic régime is frail and insecure. Advanced as German industry is, the German workmen, organized and unorganized, are not ready to take over the industries and manage them efficiently. The middle class has not disappeared, nor has it been reduced to negligible proportions. To attempt too much, under the circumstances facing the Socialist minority, is to court complete failure and triumphant counter-revolution.

Even in Italy, where for many months the unrest in the army and the disaffection among the wage workers appeared to threaten revolution, the sympathy with Bolshevism is purely platonic. The Italian Socialists, judging by the tactics and attitude of the 156 Socialist deputies in the national parliament, are aware that the country will not support extreme measures. The Catholics, the liberals, the independ-

ents and the minor groups, though weak when divided, would, if driven to unite by the menace of expropriation and communism, find sufficient strength to make a successful defence of private property and civil liberty. The solid Socialist delegation in the Italian parliament is not pressing any radical measures, being content to await the logic of events, meantime accepting small concessions from the bourgeois and nationalist government.

Since, then, there is to be no world social revolution in the immediate or near future, and since the Lenin-Trotsky summons is to fall on deaf ears, what are the prospects of Bolshevism in Russia?

Let one of the Bolshevik leaders, Max Litvinoff, who has been negotiating with the small Baltic states as well as with diplomatic agents of England and Scandinavian governments, answer this crucial question. In a statement published by him at Stockholm, Litvinoff said:

At present we are compelled to take a temporary transitory middle course between capitalism and communism. Full communism is possible only if other countries accept the same economic basis. *They will either follow our example, or if Russia is before her time she will have to revert to capitalism.*

The Bolshevik leaders know full well *now* that "Russia is before her time" and that "she will have to revert to capitalism." There is not a single in-

telligent, sober-minded observer who, after a study of the economic, social and moral conditions in Russia, has not reached this conclusion. Thus the able correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, a faithful and consistent organ of genuine English liberalism, wrote recently in summing up his personal impressions of Russia: "The Bolsheviks set out to establish communism; in this they have failed." They have failed utterly in the villages, for the peasants would fight like tigers against state ownership and control of the land. *The Bolshevik land policy collapsed at the first touch of reality, of peasant psychology.* Land is private property in Russia, and will remain such for decades, at least. To what extent the Bolshevik doctrines have already been modified in the banks, factories, mines and stores which were confiscated after the coup of November, 1917, the outside world is not fully informed. But that compromises and concessions have been made to the bourgeois intellectuals, to the unregenerate captains of industry whose services were indispensable, is denied by no one. That more concessions are expected, and indeed promised, is also generally known.

Russia's natural resources have scarcely been touched, and she has no capital with which to develop them. American and British capital is openly sought by Bolshevik chiefs, and all manner of franchises and grants are as openly promised. Foreign capitalists and entrepreneurs are to be allowed to

carry on business in the "capitalistic" way—to issue securities, pay interest and dividends, and hire workers in the open market, subject only to such restrictions as national labor laws may impose.

It is hardly necessary to labor the point that the bids now being made for a reasonable peace with capitalistic countries and for loans and credits by capitalistic syndicates involve the recognition of the impossibility of adhering to communism—or to Marxian Socialism modified by the Slav temperament. The Bolshevik leaders know that they have failed, and that their "social revolution" was as premature as it was disastrous to Russia.

In the letter of Prince Kropotkin already quoted from, there occurs this sentence: "The Bolsheviki strive to introduce by the dictatorship of a fraction of the Social-Democratic party the socialization of the soil, of industry and of commerce. Unhappily, the method by which they seek to impose in a strongly centralized state a communism resembling that of Babeuf—thereby paralyzing the constructive work of the people—that method makes success absolutely impossible, and is paving the way to a furious and vicious reaction."

This is what thousands of Russian intellectuals, including Socialists of several schools, have been saying for two years past. This is what the informed and mature European and American radicals have been saying. The misdirected, hysterical sympathy of

certain American self-styled radicals and democrats for Bolshevism is a puzzling phenomenon. It argues inability to think and to understand. It argues profound ignorance of the elements of revolutionary philosophy and also a certain insincerity and intellectual dishonesty.

Bolshevism is Prussianism, and it must fail exactly as Prussianism failed, and for the same reason. Its method was fatal, its philosophy anti-democratic, anti-humanitarian, illiberal.

The future of civilization does not depend on any "ism," and the ruthless attempt of a handful of doctrinaires to impose Marxian Socialism on Russia was particularly fatuous. But there can be little doubt of the fact that the world-wide Socialist movement, which has undergone many changes and is likely to undergo further changes, will furnish many hints and ideas to the solution of our social-economic problems. There is but little doubt that capitalism will ultimately be superseded and replaced by a co-operative system of production and distribution, and that the wage relation will be replaced by a relation of copartnership—a relation that reduces friction to a minimum and stimulates effort for the common good. If the civilized and advanced countries exhibit a disposition to adopt co-operation, or what may perhaps be called voluntary Socialism, Russia, with her Mir and Artel, may confidently be expected to make rapid progress in that same direction. The

Bolshevik error was in supposing that Russia, under the lash of a dictatorship for the proletariat but not of it, could be forced to swallow Marxian Socialism, successfully operate its machinery and institutions and thus give the world a convincing object lesson.

Russia will revert to capitalism, but only to renew her slow, gradual, evolutionary advance toward co-operative industry. She will march with, if somewhat behind, western Europe and America, but not necessarily very far behind. Those of her thinkers were right who have maintained that she might shorten the process of transformation by utilizing her peculiar institutions, on the one hand, and, on the other, by studying the developments and readjustments of more advanced nations.

The Soviet System

But will Bolshevism contrive to save the so called Soviet form of government, which manifestly has no close connection with communism? The interest in and the admiration for the Soviet system are not unnatural. The essence of that system is "functional representation," or, as the Guild Socialists of England would put it, "functional democracy." To the Soviets, local, provincial and central, men and women are sent, not because they profess certain opinions, or because they belong to certain parties,

but because they pursue certain vocations or work in certain useful industries. This system is supposed to yield a better quality of representation, to keep mere politicians, windbags and trimmers out of public life, and to make the legislative bodies responsible, efficient, dignified and independent.

We know that the question of improving representative government—which at times has broken down even with us Americans—has been under discussion for decades; that functional representation is not a Bolshevik idea; that Anglo-Saxon writers have suggested again and again that at least one of the legislative chambers—the Senate, with us, for example—should be composed of direct representatives of industries, trades, professions and recognized interests, instead of, as now, of lawyers and professional politicians that are supposed to represent the population at large. We know that functional representation has been studied with sympathy along with such other means of improving governmental machinery as the referendum, the recall, proportional representation, and the like.

There is no reason why Russia should not lead the West in experiments with functional representation. True, she needs this system less than we do, for her population is industrially more homogeneous, and under any plan of democratic government her peasants would dominate her provincial and national legislative bodies. Still, this feature of the Soviet sys-

tem is not unsound and is fairly attractive. It is certain to develop evils and weaknesses of its own under normal conditions and severe tests, and the present writer is disposed to think that proportional representation, plus the referendum and recall, is preferable to the strict plan of functional representation. This, however, is not the place to argue this point.

To sum up: Everything characteristic of Bolshevism is wrong, unscientific and impossible. Bolshevism is Prussianism in another form. It is equally opposed to democracy, to liberty, to evolution. It is merely the substitution of the tyranny of the Agnostic and Socialist Lenin for that of the monarchist and orthodox Nicholas Romanoff. Lenin is sincere—so was Romanoff.

The world will not be saved by benevolent tyrants of any school. It will be saved by trial and error under forms of government that permit the fullest discussion, the greatest freedom for social and economic adventures, for individual and minority departures, and the amplest scope for experiment compatible with reasonable stability of the social structure. Revolutions, so-called, are incidents and accidents. A momentous change—the establishment of co-operative industry—comparable only with the transition from feudalism to capitalism, is not to be effected by explosions of bad temper and anger, though such explosions may occur. Just as all ways led to

Rome, so in our time all ways lead, and will for decades and perhaps centuries continue to lead, to co-operative industry and industrial democracy. A hundred forces and factors will contribute to the great social revolution. The tragic chapter written by Bolshevism into the annals of modern society has but served to emphasize the futility and absurdity of reform under a rigid formula by catastrophic and violent leaps at the command of stern and unbending autocrats.

The Allies, including America, have not known how to combat Bolshevism. They have not understood this singular phenomenon. They have charged the Bolshevik leaders with pro-Germanism, and have adopted measures—the blockade, the “sanity cordon” of small, anti-Bolshevik principalities, aid to various military dictators and counter-revolutionists—that, instead of weakening Bolshevism, have brought it strength and prolonged its life. Some of the blunders of the Allied governments may be explicable and even natural. But the fact remains that Allied policy has not had the effects that were intended. Bolshevism cannot be destroyed by bayonets or by blockades. It can be destroyed only by free discussion, by free intercourse with the West, by the release of the industrial and moral forces within Russia herself that are opposed to tyranny and violence. Russia is not Bolshevik and under normal conditions Bolshevism would long since have been

overthrown there. Give Russia goods, capital and vital contact with the West, and the whole Bolshevik fabric must collapse.

Meantime the anti-Bolshevik movement in the United States is assuming the character of a panic. Anti-sedition laws of the vaguest and most dangerous sort are demanded; deportations of ignorant aliens whose foolish talk is unworthy of attention are making martyrs and "refugees" by the hundred. Free speech is menaced, and the post-office is being used to creat a peace-time censorship of the most stupid and intolerable kind. In short, Prussian methods are adopted or proposed in democratic America to fight Prussianism. Where is our faith in liberty, in discussion, in common sense and, in the virtue of historically developed institutions that on the whole fit our conditions and our needs and that, despite all crude, silly agitation, will be modified only so far and so fast as our conditions and needs change?

Democracy has but one enemy—to repeat—and to fight this enemy with anti-democratic weapons is to surrender to him. The most searching criticisms of democracy will do it infinitely less harm than a single act of injustice toward its critics. The advocacy of violence and crime cannot be permitted and the physical-force revolutionists who attack officials or individual capitalists may properly be restrained or punished. But to suppress the books or the organs of radical groups because they *advocate* commun-

ism, anarchy, syndicalism, or guild socialism as systems preferable to ours is to evince distrust of genuine democracy and to violate its basic principles.

We want and need the opinions of the "reds," nay of the reddest of the reds—provided the expression of opinions does not degenerate into the direct encouragement and propaganda of crime.



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